The Dissertation Committee for Ernest Boyd McGowen, III Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

The Brave New World: The Social and Participatory Behaviors of the Modern Suburban African American

Committee:

Tasha S. Philpot, Supervisor

Daron R. Shaw

Brian E. Roberts

Robert C. Luskin

Ismail K. White

The Brave New World: The Social and Participatory Behaviors of the Modern Suburban African American

by

Ernest Boyd McGowen, III, B.A.; M.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

August 2011

Dedication

To the three most important women in my life (in no particular order), Dominica, Rebbie, & Jewell

The Brave New World: The Social and Participatory Behaviors of the Modern Suburban African American

Ernest Boyd McGowen, III, PhD.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2011

Supervisor: Tasha S. Philpot

Abstract

Have steady increases in socioeconomic status (SES) and occupational prestige along with changes in residential context and subsequently social networks necessitated a shift in our understanding of Black political participation and group identity? Specifically, how does the unique political environment facing African-American residents in majority Anglo suburbs attach unique utilities to participation, different from their neighbors or even their own co-ethnics that reside in the central city? I argue that African Americans in majority Anglo areas who expend political resources in the most proximate races will derive a negligible benefit. Further, these citizens' most proximate residential and social network contexts heighten feelings of minority status. Consequently, I contend this class of Black voters are pushed away from the traditional forms of participation (i.e. voting for the congressman or local school board representative) and towards non-traditional, and more resource costly, forms of group directed participation which also come at much higher utilities.

Table of Contents

Introduction: The New Kids on the Block?

Missouri City, Texas began as a settlement in Southeast Texas, "a land of genial sunshine and eternal summer" as was claimed in the advertisement to attract settlers originally posted around the St. Louis area. As the city of Houston began to expand its borders and the highway system made longer commutes more feasible, Missouri City found itself as one of the new bedroom communities of the burgeoning metropolis in the 1950s and quickly moved to stave off annexation by incorporating. Around the same time, Houston's African Americans began to move out of the historic inner-city wards and those with enough socioeconomic resources began settling in these areas just near the city boundaries where affordable, single-family dwellings were available. Fast forward to today. The more affluent blacks (still considered lower-middle to middle class) have moved the short distance from Southwest Houston into Missouri City and the previous inhabitants have moved further out to the wealthy exurbs of Sugar Land and First Colony. Now Missouri City has an extremely politically active black population of 38.3%, compared to 11.5% for all of Texas, according to the 2000 census. While the state registered only 5.1% of businesses as black-owned, more than 37% of firms in Missouri City have African American proprietors. Missouri City is now one of the most desirable places for middle class and professional blacks in the region. However, it is still majority white and while it has voted solidly Democratic in statewide and presidential contests, for the past thirty years (until 2006) it was represented by one of the most powerful, and conservative, Republicans in the country, Tom Delay.

Missouri City is the kind of suburban environment that will be the focus of this project, suburban neighborhoods with African Americans of higher than average

socioeconomic status who hold high racial and Democratic identification. Unfortunately for these voters, the political environment at the local and national level differs greatly from that of the congressional district. The motivating question of this project is how the suburban social and political environments affect the opinion and participation of African Americans with high racial identification.

Until recently, an undertaking of this magnitude would have been considerably more difficult. Geographically, most African Americans were still clustered in the historic inner-city neighborhoods or 'black belt' suburbs of the 1970s and 1980s so the suburban African Americans were much closer to the exception than the rule. According to a 2007 article by USA Today, blacks went from around a tenth of suburban residents to nearly a fifth from 1990 to 2000.

Practically, the debates about African American congressional representation have focused on the effectiveness of minority-majority districts (MMD). Suburban African Americans who have been drawn out of the MMD into largely Republican, majority white districts by virtue of their geographic distance from the inner-city have been largely ignored by Democrats who cannot reach them without narrowly targeted mobilization strategies, and Republicans who hold different ideological positions on most policy issues. What is still unclear is whether increases in affluence have caused their racial identification to recede in favor of characteristics like class or occupation as some scholars have suggested. Do the same electoral appeals that are successful with urban blacks work with these suburbanites? Furthermore, do these suburbanites even have the same opinions about racialized issues or political preferences?

Methodologically, studies prior to the 1980s made little effort to include blacks from any type of neighborhood. The most oft cited studies dealing with African Americans, which will admittedly make up the bulk of my theoretical foundation, are

more than ten years old, and employed sampling designs that were heavily weighted toward the areas with the highest concentrations of blacks.

Now, with the benefit of newer studies we can begin to answer the questions posed earlier. The 2004 National Politics Study (NPS) was one of the largest surveys that asked about the racial makeup of one's neighborhood, workplace, and church. Also, the historic American National Election Study's (ANES) 2008 iteration included a black and Latino oversample. Finally, an original survey instrument crafted by myself for the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) not only specifically asks respondents if they live in suburban neighborhoods, but also assesses social interactions among neighbors, co-workers, and church members. It also asks if respondents seek political participation avenues in the historic inner-city neighborhoods and allows for analysis of how congressional district demographics affect participation.

Figure 1 provides a pictorial depiction of the theoretical perspective developed in this project. At its simplest, I expect suburban African Americans with high levels of group consciousness to engage in participation directed towards aiding their group. The first manifestation of this behavior will be the opinions expressed by individuals with high and low group consciousness. Whatever the level of consciousness expressed, ideology will incline the voter to a particular political party that is expected to encourage the individual to turnout, even if the appeal is not one framed in a group-based or racialized manner. For the high racially identifying suburban African Americans, not only will opinion affect partisanship, but it will also structure her opinion of interactions in social networks. The more residential and occupational prestige one acquires, the more likely they are to live and work in majority-white environments and therefore have majority white (and on average more conservative, especially on racialized issues) social networks. These social networks are primary vehicles for norm transmission and

behavioral cues. If the networks one encounters most often are not reinforcing to their racial identification, the individual will seek out more salient, alternative networks. These (majority black) networks will be most often found in the inner-city areas and will revolve around institutions like the black church, barber and beauty shops, or historic organizations like the local NAACP or Urban League chapter. The norms and behavioral cues proffered in the salient networks will be directed toward group-based participation thereby heightening the utility attached to these behaviors over more general forms of participation. As this suburban African American assesses her participatory choices, she will find a local environment that is ideologically conservative, and unconcerned with, if not hostile to racial minority issues. This local environment should push her to the inner-city community for social, and now political, actions. These group-based participatory choices should include alternative behaviors besides voting that can be targeted toward aiding the group, and fulfilling the personal psychological desire to physically cultivate group consciousness through things like donating money to local co-ethnic candidates or working inner-city get-out-the-vote drives for a church or volunteer organization.

In my own experience as a child growing up in Houston, Texas during the 1980s and 1990s, I have seen firsthand the toll this push from the local environment and pull toward the receptive community of co-ethnics exerts. When my parents, both with college degrees and decent occupations, decided to start a family, they moved out of the inner city into a completely white suburb. Even though my Grandfather was the City Councilperson representing the historic black community of Houston's 5th Ward and my father was the president of the Houston Area Black Democrats, we were registered to vote in a conservative, Republican city council and congressional district.

For me, this meant attending majority white daycare and elementary schools where my 'otherness' was made even starker by the first time I was called the n-word at

afterschool care and was told a short time later that I should be nice to a young lady because, “years ago my grandparents probably owned yours.” Interactions were very different at church or around the campaign headquarters, with a strange acceptance and adversarial posture toward mainstream (read: white) society. The duality of these social networks actually heightened the perceptions of differences I had with my neighborhood playmates and classmates. Adding to this were the obvious differences in neighborhood quality and general economic depression found in the co-ethnic areas. It became implicit (and explicit) that for our group, those that ‘made it’ should do their best to help those who had not.

It was not until I reached graduate school that I realized there was a theoretical foundation and research history that could explain my story and that of others like me. Determining if this phenomenon goes beyond anecdote to something statistically perceptible and extendible to people in different eras and environments is the primary goal of this project.

Guided by this theoretical underpinning, three hypotheses follow:

H1: There will be a perceptible opinion gap between suburban blacks and whites regardless of other demographics, especially on racialized issues.

H2: Because their most often encountered social networks will not be aligned with their ideology or opinion, suburban African Americans will seek out salient social networks that are located in the inner-city communities, even at higher resource costs.

H3: They will attach lower utilities to participating in their local communities and will privilege more salient forms of participation that can be directed toward the group.

The remainder of this chapter will continue to lay the groundwork for my theory. Geographic evidence will show exactly where these suburban African Americans are located and how they are drawn out of the MMDs. An examination of previous surveys of African Americans will give a baseline for their opinion, and show the dearth of suburban African American respondents as a result of their sampling designs. Finally, aggregate, precinct level, data will be presented showing that blacks in majority white congressional districts do have lower rates of House turnout compared to presidential races as their precinct gets more majority black and their congressional district gets more majority white.

WHO ARE THESE PEOPLE?

The focus of the project is suburban blacks that still live a relatively close distance from a majority black urban community.[1] Research by authors like Hayes 2001 and Pattillo 1999 on the suburban blacks of the 1970s and 1980s shows that they were most often confined to so-called "black belt" neighborhoods that were different from the inner-city multi-family dwellings where their parents resided. However, geographically they were still living in the city proper. More recently, we have seen the children of these blacks moving still further out from the city core into the majority white neighborhoods once characterized by phenomena like redlining and white flights. While evidence from sociology and demography show that these blacks are still more likely to live in suburban neighborhoods with whites of lower socio-economic status (see Alba et al. 2000 and Gay 2004), the suburbanization of highly educated blacks near traditional areas is a fact.

[1] Although the theory can be readily extended to minorities of any stripe, not just racial or ethnically, that live and work in a pervasive environment.

The Maptitude geographic information system, (GIS), will geographically depict this phenomenon. The GIS is simply a mapping system based on latitude and longitude coordinates. The beauty of the Maptitude program is that it comes loaded with demographic data, like median income, for the areas it maps. In addition, it allows the user to create their own maps and even map their own data. The following maps were compiled by joining demographic data at the precinct (or more precisely voter tabulation district (VTD) level with data for congressional districts.

The Global Information System mapping is of Texas, Georgia, and Illinois. Each of the three states is unique in their racial environments and applicability to my theory. Texas and Illinois have similar make-ups with more than eighty percent of their entire African American populations concentrated near the urban centers. Georgia is true to its Deep South character as heavily African American with majority black precincts spread throughout the center of the state. The characteristics each state's congressional districts also show interesting variability. Having the most Latinos of the three, Texas only has opportunity districts[2], none has an African American majority. Illinois only has three African American majority districts, and all are contiguous to the Chicago area. Finally, only three of Georgia's eleven congressional districts are majority black, however four more are between 31% and 44%, not necessarily opportunity districts but clearly ripe for coalition politics. It is assumed that the electoral politics of these heavily African American districts should address racial issues in a constructive way with the need for coalition building.

As we move into the densely populated African American metropolitan areas, the mapping data clearly show some precincts separated from their demographic brethren by

[2] A majority opportunity district is one that has a majority of minorities, but with no one group making up more than 50%

only the fictional boundary of a congressional district line. These precincts, found in Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, are separated from the co-ethnic centers of their neighboring CDs by less than 20 miles and are most often located adjacent to the major thoroughfares into the city. It should be the residents in these areas, if they have high group consciousness and find their proximate networks non-reinforcing, that will travel the short distance to more friendly surroundings.

To provide a contextual portrait of my theory I produced maps of the African American proportions of each precinct in each state. In addition to the color-coded data, each map features a bar graph representation of the district's black and Anglo populations and a scaled dot representing the precinct level turnout. For example, the Atlanta map (Fig. 3) will have the aforementioned bar graphs and a scaled symbol for turnout greater than fifty percent. This method was the best attempt to depict a large amount of disparate data in an intelligible way. The theory is that precincts near the boundary of the minority-majority district will have lower aggregate turnout because of their electoral choices and distance to the cultural community and therefore fewer dots. While we will save the models of turnout and network dynamics for later chapters, we can see when the majority precincts that should be exemplars of my theory are found in the three states.

Texas

According to the 2000 Census, Texas has 8339 precincts and 32 congressional districts. Of these precincts, less than 300 are majority African American and all are located in the metropolitan areas and some rural east Texas towns. While there are no strict majority African American CDs in Texas, the two African American representatives come from districts where the combined black and Latino populations exceed 50%. While the black populations are lower than 50%, the two African American

representatives of the 30th and 18th districts, Eddie Bernice Johnson and Sheila Jackson Lee respectively, are firmly entrenched incumbents by virtue of the partisan gerrymander with tenures of more than 15 years. We also see some of the consequences of racial redistricting where African Americans and Democrats have been taken from other areas to create minority opportunity districts. In most cases, the surrounding districts (especially in the Dallas area) have super majorities of whites and are often times represented by a Republican.

Of the five large metropolitan areas of the state, only two, Houston and Dallas-Ft. Worth have sizable African American populations. While most of the majority African American precincts are located in the southern part of Dallas (Fig. 1), the minority majority congressional district (MMCD) in which they reside travels from the south to the north, including most urban precincts. This has forced the lines of the surrounding districts to have a majority white suburban/rural mix that should greatly diminish the chances candidates will discuss racial issues in electoral races. The precincts drawn out of the minority-majority congressional district are located to the north and south of the Texas 30th. Census data confirms the assumption that these precincts will have higher levels of income and education. In terms of turnout, we see African American precincts with higher turnout in the southern majority white congressional district as opposed to the north. I believe this is due to the proximity to the historic community (which is located in South Dallas) and a 'bleed over' of political culture. In the majority black precincts to the north, turnout is considerably lower and are located less than 15 miles from the cluster of black precincts to its south. Those precincts in further from the boundary are located more than twenty miles from the minority-majority district center but lie directly on the interstate allowing for easy access to the cultural community. They also have fewer high turnout precincts.

The city of Ft. Worth (Fig. 1) is also unique in that it has a large cluster of majority African American precincts but they are essentially split between three congressional districts with large white majorities. As we would expect, these areas have numerous precincts with low turnout.

Harris County (Fig. 2) is constructed similarly to the Dallas/Ft. Worth area in that the minority-majority district encompasses the center city, is designed to include most African Americans in the area, and must add heavily Democratic and Latino areas in order to designate it an opportunity district. Houston also has majority African American precincts that were drawn out of the Texas 18th to the south and north. The precincts to the north clearly have geographic proximity and cultural similarities to those precincts within the MMD but lower aggregate turnout. The precincts to the south seem to maintain their high turnout even though they are residing in a very Republican district represented by Tom Delay. I believe this finding has more to do with local racial politics than national dynamics. The heavy African American area to the south of the Texas 18th is suburban and has formed its own municipality, Missouri City. African Americans in these local races are coalition partners at best but oftentimes run African American candidates for office. This presence of a co-ethnic anywhere on the ticket should stimulate turnout in those races and 'trickle up' to other races as well.

Georgia

Georgia is very different from Texas in terms of racial makeup and geographic homogeneity. It only has 2339 precincts and 13 congressional districts. Historically, we find the largest African American populations in the Deep South states like Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Unlike Texas and Illinois, Georgia has rural and urban African American precincts scattered throughout the center of the state while the northern

region is almost entirely white. The two majority African American congressional districts are located in the Atlanta area and are represented by African Americans. Interestingly, the other district represented by an African American is the Georgia 2nd with an African American proportion of 40%. Georgia was one of the states used extensively in early minority-majority district research and was the basis of the Cannon et al. 1999 article espousing a 40% black population as a preferred threshold for an opportunity district. Of the remaining ten districts, four have African American populations between 39% and 31% and all are represented by Anglo Republicans. The applicability of these rural districts, with clear masses of African Americans but few urban cultural centers, to my theory is unclear. For instance, there are historic cultural centers in these districts around Savannah and Augusta and areas of more than 1,000 square miles where all the precincts have African American populations greater than 60%. Moreover, these areas are likely to be cultural mobilizers based on Georgia's involvement in the civil rights movement of the 50s and 60s, not to mention the redistricting and disenfranchisement court cases of the same era.

The Atlanta area (Fig. 3) is more typical of the other metropolitan spaces. Of the seven congressional districts that encompass some part of the Atlanta metro area, two are majority African American. However, the city of Atlanta has such a large African American population that it cannot be contained in just two districts. An examination of the Atlanta map shows large pockets of African Americans to the South and Southeast of the minority-majority districts. Unlike the areas of Houston and Dallas near the MMD, the turnout drop off is unmistakable. The distance from the southernmost precincts in the Anglo CD to the center of the MMD is 17 miles and adjacent to a highway, whereas the shortest distance from a neighboring precinct to the center of the MMD is less than seven miles. The patch to the southeast is about twenty miles from the center of the nearest

MMD and adjacent to a highway, this is not an insurmountable distance to travel relative to the 32.55 total miles it would take to travel across Atlanta.

Illinois

Illinois had more than 11,000 precincts and 20 congressional districts based on the 2000 census. Unfortunately, the precinct naming convention of the census bureau and that of the compilers of the Federal Election Project are irreconcilable, therefore there is no turnout data for Illinois. A glance at the statewide map will show its similarity to Texas and its surrounding states in that nearly all of the majority African American precincts are near the Chicago metro area (save for East St. Louis). There are only three majority African American districts of the twenty, but they have extraordinary black proportions between 64% and 77%. Either because of geography or racial redistricting, all of the remaining districts have African American populations of less than 19%, with fourteen districts at less than 10%. The three MMDs are found in the Chicago area (Fig. 4) and are all represented by African Americans. The geographic compactness of the African American precincts makes them easier to draw into districts and therefore Illinois has fewer bordering tracts with majority African Americans. A few precincts, which appear semi-rural due to their spaciousness, south of the Illinois 2nd, are about twenty miles from the center of that district and the South Side of Chicago. There is also the town of Joliet to the southwest that is twenty-two miles from the center of the Illinois 2nd. Both of these areas are exemplars of my theory. Interestingly, those are not the closest African American pockets to the historic communities of Chicago; Gary, Indiana is only approximately fifteen miles from the center of the Chicago 2nd. Its place as the US city with the largest African American proportion and history in the Northern civil rights movement of the 60s and 70s should make it a political center in itself. However, its lack

of affluence and high crime rate would make it a deterrent for high income and educated African Americans.

By virtue of these maps we are able to see a sizable population of African Americans in majority African American precincts yet drawn out of the MMCD. For these voters, the duality of their situation must be even starker. On one hand their closest community is one where they are firmly in the majority, yet when it comes to political expression, in this case in congressional elections, they are in the minority. These, along with suburban blacks in majority white precincts and districts, assuming high group consciousness, are the very voters who should seek out alternative participatory avenues that are more reinforcing to their racial identity.

WHAT IS SUBURBAN OPINION?

There has been data on suburban African American opinion going back as far as the first National Black Election Study in 1984. The problem is that very few of the respondents were from suburban neighborhoods, and as mentioned earlier, the definition of what is a suburb has changed. Whether this is due to a shift in actual residential patterns or due to specific sampling designs will be addressed later, at this point it is worthy just to get a snapshot of what suburban opinion was before we examine its contemporary manifestations. It should be said that each of the surveys used for this project was crafted for a specific purpose and seldom with any desire to replicate previous studies, save for a few stock questions dealing with participation and racial opinion. Only the NBES of 1894, 1988, and 1996 are iterations of one another. Even for the NBES there are major discrepancies. The 1988 NBES has half as many respondents as the 1984 version. It is actually a panel study though respondents in the 1984 study

were not told they would be re-contacted and some questions were added and deleted. The 1996 study was very different in focus compared to the previous iterations. Some differences should be expected due to the changing political environment of a new decade. However, it seems as though the 1984 and 1988 studies were more interested in assessing the respondents' feelings toward the presidential candidacy of Jesse Jackson, while the 1996 NBES was more geared toward the respondents' feelings about their congressional representative (the 1984 and 1988 surveys did not even ask about the respondents' feelings about their representatives.)

The incompatibility of the NBES surveys means comparisons will not be exact. One goal of this chapter is to assess previous data on suburban African Americans. Unfortunately, the 1996 study does not duplicate the neighborhood question asked in 1984 or 1988. For 1996, the proxy will be residence in a congressional district that is less than 35% black. This is an unsatisfactory yet necessary compromise, but in no way detrimental to the theory. At its most general, mine is a story about voters in pervasive environments where minority status and its resultant affects are heightened. A congressional district where you are outnumbered 3 to 1 or a mostly white neighborhood should both qualify.

An examination of the crosstabs (Table 1) reveals very little difference in opinion between neighborhood strata within each survey. There is more variation between surveys, but it is not clear if these are actual shifts between blacks in successive decades or because the respondents surveyed come from vastly different environments. We can see initially that there are more urban than suburban residents in each of the surveys. In the 1984 and 1988 NBES, 14% and 22% respectively said they lived in the suburbs. The

proportion of black suburbanites in the 2008 CCES was 39.8%.[3] As stated before, there is a remarkable consistency between urban and suburban blacks on most questions. There also seems to be a growing political sophistication amongst all African Americans as the years pass. On questions like party identification, we see overwhelming Democratic Party support regardless of neighborhood. In fact, the gap within neighborhood is never more than five percentage points (1984-1988 suburbanites) and the difference between suburbanites and urbanites is never more than three points (1984). There is a similar pattern for approval of Congress and one's individual representative. Interestingly, the representative approval scores fall in line with my theory, where suburbanites (or those living in a heavily majority white district) have a poorer view of their congressperson than do their urban co-ethnics. If one has high group consciousness but the local congressional race does not deal with those issues, not only should we expect these people to hold less favorable views, but ultimately to behave differently.

We also see a growing sophistication that seems to have a racialized slant. Not only do many more blacks watch the national news in 2008, they are also more likely to convince others to vote and give money. Racially, these voters have the highest proportion of presidential voters and working in black campaigns. Of course one could attribute these gains to the candidacy of Barak Obama, but does that explain why they also show the highest levels of group consciousness and shopping in black stores, or why the candidacy of Jesse Jackson in 1984 and 1988 did not illicit the same response?

Due to the exploratory nature of this exercise, I will refrain from making any strong conclusions until later chapters. However, it is clear that black suburban voters, despite resource gains and changes in their environments, look a lot like black urbanites.

[3] I originally attributed this to the internet sampling design employed, however, there is some evidence to suggest that this number approximates reality.

Some scholars might have called such a conclusion into question in the early 1980s believing increased socio-economic status by some blacks would cause them to shed their racial identity in favor of one that more resembles the mainstream (see Wilson 1979). As we will see going forward, this is far from the case as suburban blacks are moving farther from whites and are, in some cases, more liberal than urban African Americans.

WHY DO WE SEE THESE NUMBERS?

Another potential explanation for the previous numbers maybe the sampling designs of each of the surveys. It is my contention that environment matters. This goes beyond the simple racial makeup of one's neighborhood or congressional district to things like region, political culture, and demographics. If we can look at exactly where each survey draws its respondents from, we can get a better understanding of the survey and the affect of its methodology. We may even be able to explain the fluctuations between instruments.

The four surveys previously mentioned, along with the 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) all have vastly different goals towards representativeness. The result is four different sampling designs. Recognized as some of the first surveys exclusively directed at African Americans, the 1984 and 1988 NBES designed their sampling procedures to accumulate blacks. The authors divided the country into three strata based on the number of blacks in the area of the respondents' telephone exchange. This was a necessary evil, and clearly a more beneficial trade off, as an equal probability search would not be cost effective due to the low numbers of blacks in most states in the country (Jackson 1984). The 1996 NBES followed the same logic but tweaked the design by splitting the 'low black density exchange' strata of the previous iteration into

two, areas with less than 5% African Americans (strata 4) and those with more than 5% but not included in the first two strata (strata 3). Again, this was a question of necessity, "Blacks living in predominately White communities are automatically excluded in targeted samples as…interviews in Strata 4…are four and one half times more costly" (4, Tate 1996).

However, recognition of the necessity does not ensure optimality. For the sake of this project, it is the people in strata 3 and 4 about whom we have the least information. The information we do have is heavily skewed as respondents in strata four are up-weighted with a score of 2.48. Essentially, the opinion of the 25 blacks in white neighborhoods is about twice-and-a-half of a person. The weight in strata 3 is 1.94.

That is not to say contemporary surveys are without fault or do not provide an equally geographically skewed picture of suburban African American opinion. The 2008 CCES (of which I was the co-principal investigator and administered original questions) has only 178 African Americans out of 2000 respondents (8.9%). It is also an internet-based survey, which brings with it a host of validity issues. The polling firm has extensive documentation about how their matched random sample internet design produces results akin to an equal probability random digit dialed design. Unfortunately, their strata weights are more concentrated on delivering a nationally representative sample of registered voters, adequate data for smaller states, and the competitiveness of one's congressional district (Rivers 2005). There is clearly no privileging of respondent race in their design. In another suboptimal trade off, I am able to ask questions specific to my theories and hypotheses, just to a paltry number of people (52) in the desired category.

The 2008 ANES, on which I was the principal research assistant, may come closest in sample terms but its breadth of questions leaves much to be desired. The 2008

ANES actually employs a Black and Latino oversample. 28.8% of respondents are black, but there is no specific question about neighborhood type. In addition, some of the more race specific questions of the NBES are not duplicated. Using congressional district as a proxy, 70% come from majority white congressional districts and a full 45% of blacks come from districts that are less than 20% African American. Yet an examination of the actual respondent concentration maps reveals a more nuanced story.

As in the first section, GIS maps were drawn for African American respondents in each of the three most recent surveys. Every applicable congressional district was coded for its proportion of blacks at the time, and for the number of people represented by each district in the survey. Geographic data beyond the state was not available for the 1984 or 1988 NBES. The aim is to get a picture of what types of district environments may have affected responses and to see what consequences each instrument's unique sample design had on its pool. To provide some consistency with the previous maps, three sections of the country will be highlighted: Texas-Louisiana, the Deep South, and the Midwest. For each survey, there were respondents in California and the Northeast but none of the patterns differs that greatly from the regions depicted.

For each map, the more red a district's color the higher the black proportion. Additionally, there is a scaled dot symbol for the number of people from that area included in the survey. The larger the dot, the more people are included in the survey, from a low of one person to a high of fifty. A glance at the map for the 1996 NBES (Fig. 5) shows exactly what we should expect. There are quite a few people from different regions but these are heavily concentrated in large metropolitan statistical areas or MSAs. These make up strata 1. The areas with the highest black proportions are found in the south (strata 2), especially Alabama, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. Interestingly, no respondents are found in Mississippi. Looking at the particular regions

(Figs. 6-8), we see the pattern in more detail. Texas-Louisiana, and the Midwest look very much alike with most respondents clustered in the metro areas, whereas the Deep South and its high proportion of black congressional districts means there is a mix of rural and urban districts equally represented.

Looking at the CCES map (Fig. 9), we can see what a difference sampling design makes. Remember, the CCES did not make it a point to oversample African Americans; therefore, there is much less representation from the Deep South. In addition, while the concentration of blacks in large cities is still present, the types of cities where blacks are found have changed (Figs. 10-12). Very few come from the Dallas metro or Raleigh, NC area, while Little Rock, Columbus, OH, and Indianapolis, IN now have strong representation.

Finally we see blacks in the ANES (Figs. 13-16) come from fewer places but include more people. The largest representation of blacks in any congressional district in the CCES was seven, in the 1996 NBES twenty-five, and in the ANES it is 50. Interestingly, sampling more people from metro areas would make the inclusion of the suburbanites I described at the beginning of the chapter more likely, but the ANES does not include a neighborhood strata question. In the TX-LA region, there are few people from Houston or Dallas and none in Baton Rouge, New Orleans, or Little Rock. There are also fewer people from the South, especially when compared to the 1996 NBES where almost every southern congressional district had some representation.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this exploration is that each survey is asking questions of people in different environments. I will stop short of saying this means that the congruence we saw in the crosstabulation numbers holds regardless of environment. More likely, low numbers and heavy weighting indicates that we simply need more data. This, taken with the geographic patterns of the first section, may mean

we are trying to hit a moving target, where sampling designs focused on just blacks do not produce enough variability as to neighborhood and the African American population is not geographically diversified enough to receive adequate representation in national sample designs.

WHAT EFFECT DOES ENVIRONMENT HAVE ON PARTICIPATION?

I have done some preliminary research on these blacks in majority African American precincts and majority white CDs. As we will see, the aggregate data shows strong confirmation of the theory.

The data come from the Federal Election Project by David Lublin of American University and Stephen Voss from the University of Kentucky. The authors traveled to all 435 congressional districts in the country compiling precinct level vote shares and racial population information for the 2000 Presidential election between George W. Bush and Al Gore. In addition to presidential vote counts, the data include congressional, senate, state legislative, and in some cases school board vote tallies as well as racial information for both the total and voting age population.

To determine the relationship between neighborhood residence and turnout I employed a multilevel model with individual precincts aggregated to the congressional district level. Data on the congressional districts come from the 2000 Census and include population, household, income, education, age, and mobility information for districts in Texas, Georgia, North Carolina, Illinois, and Michigan. After cleaning inconsistencies in the datasets, Texas had 7674 precincts and 30 congressional districts. Georgia had 2626 precincts and 11 CDs. North Carolina had 2051 precincts and 12 districts. Illinois had 10339 precincts and 20 congressional districts, and Michigan had 1541 precincts and 16

congressional districts. A total of 23376 precincts and 89 congressional districts were available for analysis. Campaign spending data come from the Federal Election Commission records of receipts and disbursements as of October 10, 2000.

The theoretical model was estimated via a hierarchical linear modeling technique. This procedure is well suited to questions where larger environments influence smaller or nested jurisdictions. The basic idea is that every precinct in the five state sample is not created equal but there are some similarities between precincts in the same congressional district. If we assume these precincts are more similar to each other than they are to precincts in other congressional districts we can model this variability. The multilevel model uses maximum likelihood to estimate separate error terms for each level of the model. The result is analysis of effects between the dependent variable and covariates at level one (the precinct) and estimates of how level 2 (congressional district) variables affect the relationship between the first level variables.

I ran two separate models, one for turnout and one for roll-off, each with the same independent variables:

Level-1 Model

$$\text{Turnout/Roll-off} = \beta_0 + \beta_1*(\text{AA Vap \%}) + \beta_2*(\text{Gore \%}) + \beta_3*(\text{Anglo CD \%}) + r$$

Level-2 Model

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}*(\text{Single Mom}) + \gamma_{02}*(\text{Unemployment}) + \gamma_{03}*(\text{Income 100-150k}) + \gamma_{04}*(\text{Public Assistance}) + \gamma_{05}*(\text{Home value 100k+}) + \gamma_{06}*(\text{Spending ratio}) + u_0$$

$$\beta_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}*(\text{Single Mom}) + \gamma_{12}*(\text{Income 100-150k}) + \gamma_{13}*(\text{Home value 100k+}) + \gamma_{14}*(\text{Spending Ratio}) + \gamma_{15}*(\text{Majority Anglo CD}) + u_1$$

$$\beta_2 = \gamma_{20}$$

$\beta_3 = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31}$*(White collar) + γ_{32}*(Income 100-150k) + γ_{33}*(Home value 100k+) + γ_{34}*(Spending Ratio) + u_2

For the turnout model, all three slopes vary randomly so magnitudes and intercepts were estimated. In the roll-off model, only the slope for the level 1 intercept varies randomly. All other slopes were assumed to have the same magnitude but different intercepts. Graphical evidence shows that this assumption is plausible, as well as reliability estimates of the variances of the slopes when the model was run with slopes and intercepts varying.

As stated earlier, the dependent variables are turnout and roll-off for each model respectively. **Turnout** is compiled as the combined totals for Bush and Gore divided by the total voting age population of the precinct. **Roll-off** is calculated as the difference between presidential votes cast and congressional votes. Positive numbers indicate more people voting in the presidential race than the congressional contest

Single mom is the number of female-headed households with no male present and children under 18. **Unemployment** is the percent unemployed. **White collar** is a compilation of jobs deemed white collar from occupation questions on the census. **Income** is the number of voters with incomes between 100 – 150 thousand dollars. **Public assistance** is the number of individuals on government subsidies. **Household value** is the number of households in the district valued at more than 100 thousand dollars. **Spending ratio** is compiled as winner's disbursements divided by loser's disbursements. Higher numbers indicate larger gaps in spending between candidates. **Anglo CD%** is a four level categorical variable ranging from 1 with 0-18.75% African Americans in the district to 4 with 56.25-75% African Americans in the district, **Black VAP %** is the proportion of the voting age population that is African American.

Alternative measures for median income and education were also used but were exchanged in the final models due to high correlations.

RESULTS

A look at the descriptives shows the small number of majority African American precincts and majority minority congressional districts in these five states (that were selected by virtue of their large and compact African American populations). Of the more than 23,000 precincts only 4000 can be classified as majority African American. Even the word majority is a misnomer because a threshold of 40% was actually the cutpoint.[4] Of these 4000 precincts only 684 are located in a congressional district that is majority Anglo. Of the 89 congressional districts, only 11 can be considered minority opportunity districts for African Americans.[5] This extreme unbalancedness caused some models to fail to converge, most likely because there was too large a gap between the information in the control (Anglo dominated precincts) and the actual population to be estimated (684 vs. 20,000). That said, preliminary graphical evidence does confirm most of my hypotheses.

To show the relationship between Gore support, turnout, roll-off, precinct black population, and district homogeneity scatterplots were run of samples from the entire dataset and individual states. The full sample had 2376 precincts, the samples for Texas and Illinois were 10% at 767 and 1033 respectively. The samples for Georgia, North

[4] This number is far from arbitrary. As stated earlier, the majority minority redistricting lineage has set a 40% threshold as enough for a homogeneous minority to elect a candidate of choice. Hence the name minority opportunity district. Scholars have also picked up on the figure, most notably Canon et al.'s 1999 article where they found 40% to indeed be a suitable plurality.

[5] This does miss those districts that are minority-majority when African American and Latino populations are combined. Attaching a dummy variable to these districts would be difficult because it would also capture districts with very large Latino populations and few African Americans, a situation that is comparable but of a different dynamic than this study.

Carolina, and Michigan were set at 500. The graphs show some interesting relationships. As expected, figure 17 shows support for Gore approaching 100% as the African American proportion in a precinct increases. We see the intercept for African American population in heavily Anglo districts is higher than more heterogeneous districts, the slope is also much steeper. When the African American population in the precinct reaches about 80% it is virtually indistinguishable in terms of support for Gore, regardless of CD makeup. This findings lends credence to the idea of congruent opinion and the assumption that majority African American precinct turnout can be seen as an expression of collective preferences.

Figure 18 shows the relationship between turnout and black precinct population for each type of congressional district. In line with my hypothesis, we see that majority African American precincts in Anglo CDs have lower turnout and the relationship is even negative in some states. Majority African American congressional districts have stronger relationships between precinct composition and turnout, presumably because mobilization becomes more rational for congressional and presidential candidates and targeted messages have less chance of falling on unreceptive ears. Figure 19 shows the same relationship for roll-off, just in different directions because of the variable's composition. Here an increase in black precinct population for the Anglo districts increases ballot roll-off as would be expected if the local race is non-salient. For minority-majority districts, where voters are specifically mobilized for the congressperson and material and psychic ties are stronger than between the voter and the presidential candidate, we see less roll-off.

Tables 2 and 3 show the results from the hierarchical linear models. Again, each model has the same independent variables. Table 2 has turnout as its dependent variable

and Table 3 reports the roll-off analysis. Because the roll-off model holds certain slope directions constant, it has fewer estimated parameters.

The turnout model confirmed most of my hypotheses. The reliabilities for each of the slopes was high, well over 75%. This means that the variance of the estimated slopes between CDs is relatively small. Results for the turnout model were calculated with robust standard errors. The beta coefficients show us the results from the level 1 model. β_1 shows a negative relationship between African American VAP and turnout, as would be expected with most majority African American precincts coming from low resource areas. Gore support is also negative (β_2), probably due to a lack of competitiveness in highly Democratic districts, and majority African American turnout in Anglo CDs (β_3) is positive which seems to confirm the relationship between more resources and higher turnout found in the literature.

The second level results confirm the graphical evidence and support my hypotheses. For the negative slope between African American VAP and turnout (β_1), we see tentative evidence about the effect of Anglo CD on black population as increases in black population in Anglo CDs (γ_{15}) make the relationship more negative. This indicates a depressing effect of Anglo political environment on turnout. If the story were all about resources we would expect the Anglo CD control to make the relationship more positive. γ_{13} shows that higher home values increases turnout in African American precincts and in an illusion to the roll-off model more spending in African American precincts increases turnout but is not statistically significant.

The pattern continues for the variable for African American population in a Anglo CD (β_3). Higher spending gaps have a negative relationship lessening the relationship between African American proportion and turnout in Anglo CDs. As expected more white collar workers and higher home values also have negative relationships with

turnout. These variables come as direct confirmation of the idea that voters in majority African American precincts in Anglo CDs will have lower turnout rates because races are not salient. Even as the number of white collar jobs or home values rises, situations that are expected to take average demographics and therefore political discourse away from racialized issues, voters in these precincts are turned off from the process and find other things to do.

Interestingly, there may be cursory confirmation of a non-racial salience to the race as the number of high wage earners rises. This variable is assumed to work the same way as home value and white collar workers, driving political discourse to non-racial and therefore non-salient areas. The high income earners' strengthening of the turnout-Anglo CD relationship shows certain types of political dynamics or certain demographics do increase the salience of local races.

The roll-off model (Table 3) confirms the graphical and turnout analysis. Unfortunately, robust standard errors could not be computed for this model despite the non-random specification of the level 1 independent variable slopes. As expected, the intercept for black VAP (β_1) was negative meaning majority African American precincts are less likely to roll-off the ballot compared to all others. Amongst all majority African American precincts, we also see from γ_{13} that more high home values lessens roll-off as well. With most high African American proportion precincts being in minority-majority congressional districts, we can expect this effect to describe how an increase in income for all blacks makes them more likely to vote for the congressional rep. Yet, γ_{33} shows us that for majority African American precincts in Anglo CDs (β_3) higher home values produce more roll-off. Again, tentative evidence (yet confirmatory of the graphs) that African American precincts in Anglo congressional districts are less enthusiastic about their congressional contest compared to all other precincts. The intercept for all majority

African American precincts in Anglo congressional districts (γ_{30}) is also positive indicating less salient and likely less receptiveness to campaign information from the local race overall.

The graphical and statistical results seem to confirm all of my hypotheses. Even though this analysis is in the aggregate, and individual motivations cannot be assumed, we have seen evidence that majority African American precincts have similar opinions regardless of congressional district racial composition. With these racial composition districts also mirroring SES differences between districts we can say that this opinion congruence occurs regardless of income or education levels in these precincts. These similarities would lead one to expect commiserate rates and stimuli to turnout for the precincts in each type of congressional district as well. This is not the case. With the major difference between majority African American precincts in highly homogeneous and highly heterogeneous districts being the political and electoral environments surrounding the precincts, we can attribute these turnout and roll-off differences to political environment. When voters with like opinion show different behaviors based on environment it is safe to assume environment is the depressant that is turning these voters off. The primary reasoning for this lack of enthusiasm is the (almost definitional) non-salience of racially positive campaign issues in majority Anglo districts.

OUTLINE

Chapter 1 will recount the relevant literatures to my theory and hypotheses. It will examine the environmental effects of neighborhood context, especially in suburban neighborhoods and their effects on participation, in addition to how the racial and demographic composition of an area affects opinion. I will also recount the canonical literature on social networks, their role as norm transmitters, and how minority status in a

network, including ideological minority status, affects one's view of the salience of network interactions. Finally, it will provide an analysis of the participation literatures where higher resources are seen to automatically evoke more participation and the catalytic effect of group consciousness among African American voters and the roles of historic majority black institutions from the civil rights movement in promoting group conscious behaviors.

Chapter 2 will show the vast opinion gaps between blacks and whites, especially suburban African Americans in majority white neighborhoods and workplaces whose ideology is considerably more liberal. It will also show that suburban African Americans find their opinion less often in line with the networks they most often encounter (neighborhood and workplace) compared to self-selecting networks (church and volunteer organizations).

Chapter 3 will assess the behavioral component of the theory, that suburban African Americans do in fact travel to these areas more than other groups and see if their propensity to do so is metered by their level of racial identification. Also, it will examine if there is a difference between just social interactions or those with political purposes and assess the perceptions respondents have of their co-ethnic community.

Chapter 4 will determine if community interactions affect general or just group-specific participation and whether suburban African Americans view their local congressional elections and candidates differently than alternative forms of participation. It will also empirically model how changes in congressional district level demographics like median income, minority populations, and homeownership influence the individual level decision to participate.



Figure 1: Dallas/Ft. Worth, Texas - African American %



Figure 2: Houston, Texas – African American %



Figure 3: Atlanta, Georgia – African American %



Figure 4: Chicago, Illinois – African American %

Question	NBES 1984		NBES 1988		1996 NBES		2008 CCES (Black only)	
	Suburban	Urban	Suburban	Urban	no MMD	MMD	Suburban	Urban
Group Consciousness	.63	.62	.44	.32	.66	.66	.88	.74
Party Identification	.81	.84	.86	.88	.85	.87	.85	.84
Talk or Convince to vote	.38	.45	.44	.45	.39	.34	.66	.53
Attend Meeting or Rally	.23	.22	.29	.21	.16	.11	.11	.15
Give/Raise Money	.20	.21	.24	.24	.11	.1	.32	.3
Help Black Campaign	.22	.18	.27	.21	.11	.1	.43	.6
Work for any Campaign	--	--	--	--	.18	.21	.13	.12
Vote for President	.79	.81	.87	.89	.89	.9	.96	.99
Follow Gov't affairs	.34	.28	.81	.80	.64	.69	.80	.82
Shop in Black Stores	--	--	.68	.61	.6	.55	.76	.77
Watch National News			.66	.61	.52	.54	.87	.84
Congress Job Approval	--	--	--	--	.3	.33	.35	.33
Representative Job Approval	--	--	--	--	.66	.79	.64	.66
Church Attendance	.62	.58	.66	.61	.64	.63	.52	.6
Age	35.09	41.78	46.14	48.06			41.76	43.54
Education	.56	.50	.67	.55	.45	.45	.52	.49
Income	.47	.40	.66	.48	.38	.41	.48	.61
N	98	597	59	209	684	532	55	83

Table 1: Opinion and Participation by Survey

Figure 5. NBES Black Population



Figure 5: NBES Black Population

Figure 6. TX-LA NBES Black Population



Figure 6: TX-LA NBES Black Population

Figure 7. Deep South NBES Black Population



Figure 7: Deep South NBES Black Population

Figure 8. IL-MI NBES Black Population



Figure 8: IL-MI NBES Black Population

Figure 9. CCES Black Population



Figure 9: CCES Black Population

Figure 10. TX-LA CCES Black Population



Figure 10: TX-LA CCES Black Population

Figure 11. Deep South CCES Black Popu



Figure 11: Deep South CCES Black Population

Figure 12. Midwest CCES Black Populati



Figure 12: Midwest CCES Black Population

Figure 13. ANES Black Population



Figure 13: ANES Black Population

Figure 14. TX-LA ANES Black Population



Figure 14: TX-LA Black Population

Figure 15. Deep South ANES Black Popu



Figure 15: Deep South ANES Black Population

Figure 16. Midwest ANES Black Populat



Figure 16: Midwest ANES Black Population



Figure 17: Gore Support and African American Population by CD Composition



Figure 18: Turnout and African American Population by CD Composition



Figure 19: Roll-off and African American Population by CD Composition

	Turnout Model		
Fixed effects	Coeff.	Std. Error	p-value
For Intercept (β_0)			
Intercept (γ_{00})	0.483	0.007	0.000
(cd) single mom (γ_{01})	-9.0E-06	2.0E-06	0.000
(cd) unemployment (γ_{02})	0.015	0.008	0.066
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{03})	3.0E-06	1.0E-06	0.007
(cd) public assistance hh (γ_{04})	3.0E-06	6.0E-06	0.580
(cd) home values 100-150k (γ_{05})	2.0E-06	1.0E-06	0.010
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{06})	-0.092	0.047	0.052
For Black Voting Age Population Slope (β_1)			
Intercept (γ_{10})	-0.408	0.062	0.000
(cd) single mom (γ_{11})	1.7E-05	1.0E-05	0.107
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{12})	3.3E-06	9.0E-06	0.001
(cd) home values 100-150k (γ_{13})	1.1E-05	5.0E-06	0.031
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{14})	0.456	0.293	0.123
(cd) Anglo CD dummy (γ_{15})	-0.426	0.128	0.002
For Gore proportion slope (β_2)			
Intercept (γ_{20})	-0.406	0.032	0.000
For Anglo congressional district slope (β_3)			
Intercept (γ_{30})	0.140	0.017	0.000
(cd) white collar workers (γ_{31})	-1.0E-06	6.7E-07	0.015
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{32})	1.3E-05	4.0E-06	0.002
(cd) home values 100-150k(γ_{33})	-3.0E-06	1.0E-06	0.020
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{34})	-0.133	0.077	0.088

	Turnout Model
Random Effects	Std. Dev.
Intercept (u_{0j})	0.073
Black VAP slope (u_{1j})	0.538
Anglo congressional district (u_{2j})	0.135
level 1 residuals (e_{ij})	0.131
Likelihood	13738

Table 2: CCES Turnout

	Roll-off Model		
Fixed effects	Coeff.	Std. Error	p-value
For Intercept (β_0)			
Intercept (γ_{00})	410.564	254.040	0.110
(cd) single mom (γ_{01})	-3.7E-02	7.1E-02	0.605
(cd) unemployment (γ_{02})	32.862	314.128	0.917
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{03})	5.2E-02	3.3E-02	0.121
(cd) public assistance hh (γ_{04})	3.5E-01	1.7E-01	0.044
(cd) home values 100-150k (γ_{05})	6.0E-03	2.4E-02	0.788
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{06})	-197.254	1634.301	0.905
For Black Voting Age Population Slope (β_1)			
Intercept (γ_{10})	-258.064	114.552	0.024
(cd) single mom (γ_{11})	0.026	0.012	0.032
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{12})	-0.001	0.010	0.949
(cd) home values 100-150k (γ_{13})	-2.8E-02	6.0E-03	0.000
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{14})	-2.6E+02	3.9E+02	0.503
(cd) Anglo CD dummy (γ_{15})	-2.0E+01	1.6E+02	0.901
For Gore proportion slope (β_2)			
Intercept (γ_{20})	-27.586	64.897	0.670
For Anglo congressional district slope (β_3)			
Intercept (γ_{30})	87.374	35.413	0.014
(cd) white collar workers (γ_{31})	-0.001	0.000	0.108
(cd) income 100-150k (γ_{32})	0.007	0.006	0.224
(cd) home values 100-150k(γ_{33})	0.010	0.002	0.000
(cd) spending ratio (γ_{34})	46.606	146.476	0.750

	Roll-off Model
Random Effects	Std. Dev.
Intercept (u_{0j})	2393.499
level 1 residuals (e_{ij})	1074.493
Likelihood	-196169.5

Table 3: CCES Roll-off

Chapter 1: What We Know About Suburban African Americans

Steady increases in socioeconomic status (SES) and occupational prestige have had serious effects on the life circumstances facing many African Americans. They are moving farther from the metropoles, slowly creeping from the inner city ghettos and "black belt" suburbs of the 1970s and 80s (Pattillo 1999; Hayes 2001), into the largely Anglo suburbs of cities such as Detroit, Columbus, Phoenix, and Houston. In the 1990s, for example, African Americans accounted for 12.4% of the growth in suburbs. That percentage has jumped to 16.6% since 2000 according to the *USA Today*. Have these changes in residential context and social networks necessitated a shift in our understanding of Black political participation and group identity? Specifically, how does the unique political environment facing African-American residents in majority Anglo suburbs attach unique utilities to participation different from their neighbors or even their own co-ethnics that reside in the central city? In the aggregate, we know that black suburbanites exhibit counterintuitive political behavior. Namely, they participate in congressional elections at lower rates than blacks in central cities, despite having higher levels of socioeconomic resources. How and why this pattern of voting exists is the focus of this project.

For a number of reasons, there has been little specific attention, especially in political science, paid to this growing group of democratic participants. First, proto-surveys like the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES) and early Detroit Area Studies (DAS) were hampered by serious diminishing returns. Sampling in the central cities was straightforward. However, finding suburban African-American respondents would mean a more than two-fold cost increase. Newer studies like the 1996 National Black Election Study were more ambitious in their targeting designs and produced higher

numbers of African Americans from majority Anglo strata. Unfortunately, these surveys have had minimal improvement in measuring this population, are now more than ten years old, and did not measure residential context or social networks variables needed to answer the questions posed earlier.

Second, the authors of seminal books like *Voting* (Bereleson et al. 1954) and *The American Voter* (Campbell et al 1960) wrote before the economic gains of the black middle class, subscribing them to a few token references in the group-based participation chapters. One of the most extensive early treatments of African-American behaviors, V.O. Key's (1949) *Southern Politics in State and Nation,* was more a description of a downtrodden group with little self-determination, far from the case today.

As a result, extant models of political behavior cannot sufficiently address the political dynamic experienced by suburban blacks. General models of political participation attribute most participatory differences among individuals and groups to resource discrepancies like income and occupational prestige. For example Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) suggest voting should be almost costless for high resource individuals and therefore undertaken at higher rates. These models, however, do not distinguish between stimulating and depressing political environments. Thinking about traditional *and* alternative participatory behaviors, why should we think that voters would rank all types of behaviors equally or that the demographic makeup of one's environment would not adjust the participation calculus?

In other disciplines, mainly sociology, there has been some attempt to understand the growing number of blacks living outside of predominantly black neighborhoods. However, this research on the growing class of more affluent African Americans rising up in the 1980s and early 1990s have cursory (to be generous) treatments of how suburban residential context or the fusion of mainstream values with black culture affect

participation or political behavior. Exemplars like Pattillo's *Black Pickett Fences* (1999) and Haynes' *Red Lines, Black Spaces* (2001) were written in the ethnographic tradition and employed more qualitative designs, which cannot adequately test the relationship between residential context and black political participation.

Thus, I begin to fill the void in knowledge about the political ramifications of black residential mobility by developing and empirically testing a theoretical framework for understanding how blacks in majority Anglo locales navigate through the political world. In particular, I draw upon extant research in political science, psychology, and sociology to explain the political behavior of this understudied group that currently lies outside of existing models of political participation. I argue that African Americans in majority Anglo areas who expend political resources in the most proximate races will derive a negligible benefit. Further, these citizens' most proximate residential and social network contexts heighten feelings of minority status (Blumer 1958, Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Consequently, I contend this class of Black voters are pushed away from the traditional forms of participation (i.e. voting for the congressman or local school board representative) and towards non-traditional, and more resource costly, forms of group directed participation which also come at much higher utilities.

To empirically test these claims, I contrast black political behavior in congressional elections to their behavior in presidential elections. I primarily operationalize black suburban residents as those blacks living in predominantly black enclaves or precincts within majority Anglo congressional districts (CDs). The assumption is that elections in majority Anglo CDs will not address racial issues in a positive manner and therefore lose salience to African Americans with high group identification. In a presidential election it is virtually assured that racial issues will receive some sort of treatment by one of the parties. Therefore, I am not only able to

compare blacks in low-density black CDs to those in high-density black CDs, but also how blacks in low-density black CDs respond to different types of elections.

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

When it comes to politics, I believe that affluent suburban African Americans in majority white congressional districts have the same political socialization and opinions as their urban counterparts but vastly different participatory choices. With higher than average resources, suburban blacks have the choice of voting in their local jurisdictions or forfeiting their vote in these races to engage in other forms of participation within cultural communities. I argue that suburban blacks are likely to choose the latter because of heightened utility derived from more group salient forms of political participations.

Looking to the literature for clues about these sorts of relationships can be frustrating. The time-honored books on political participation, such as *Voting* and *The American Voter* (and to some extent *Voice and Equality* or *Invisible Politics*), did not adjust their theories to account for the burgeoning Black middle-class population, which never really fit neatly into any box. Indeed, none of the central works on American political behavior speak convincingly on the subject of relatively affluent suburban Blacks: the Columbia and Michigan schools did not take the populations into account; the rational choice theories were preoccupied with candidate choice and turnout; the resource and network theorists subscribe to a one-way causality for network and resource effects; and the black politics empiricists lack complete data.

The most well known theory of African-American participation draws on class, but goes beyond it; when controlling for socioeconomic disparities, African-American turnout is equal or higher than that of other groups. This finding has long intrigued

scholars in the race and ethnicity and participation communities because it flies in the face of the general resource argument. In an effort to close the gap, scholars have inserted the concept of "group consciousness" (or "linked fate"). The theory posits that blacks with lower than average resources are locked into a network where political participation is one of the most important group norms, and the historic counter-culture of the group causes indigenous organizations and institutions to emphasize lowering participatory costs. Unfortunately, most of the work stops there and treats participation as an afterthought since researchers were primarily interested in opinion dynamics.

Books about alternative participation, namely *Voice and Equality* (Verba et al 1995) and *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) utilized surveys based largely on white responses that necessarily inform their theories. Both books suggest that political resources and social networks generally pull a person towards participation, particularly voting. None of these works can account for how resources and social networks, in conjunction with one another, can push citizens away from participation.

Thus, the goal of this chapter is to layout a means for understanding how this phenomenon can occur. For my purposes, the participation discussion will be rooted in the rational choice theories of voting made famous by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968), and extended by countless others to questions of candidate positioning, information acquisition, and party identification. At its most basic, a citizen will cast a vote in an election if the benefit (material or psychological) from electing their preferred candidate multiplied by the chance that person will cast the tiebreaking vote for their candidate is greater than the costs associated with voting. This calculation has lead to the "paradox" of voting, where benefits are usually collective in some form and the chances of casting a tiebreaking vote in a 500,000 person election are miniscule (and

therefore will never outweigh the costs). However, the reality of the situation is that people do vote--hence the paradox. Why do people engage in "irrational" behaviors? Most famously, Riker and Ordeshook (followed by a long lineage) realized the calculation must be missing something because people vote in uncontested elections and people abstain even when faced with virtually costless registration requirements or voting schemes. Instead, they add that voters are socialized to view participation as a civic virtue through schooling and the media. This civic virtue (or "duty") is thus inserted into the model to make voting rational.

My major concern with the calculus of voting and its lineage is that it is too candidate-centered. The benefit of voting can be material or psychological, but is contingent on the differential between the benefit from your preferred candidate winning minus the benefit if the challenger were to win. For an African American in 65% Black precinct within an 80% White congressional district, the chances of either major party candidate seriously addressing racial issues is negligible, so tangible benefits fall away. Psychologically, group reinforcement further lowers the potential benefits because one sees group members in the neighborhood but knows the most costless political expression, voting, will do nothing to help them or the group. In this instance, the probability of the African-American voter participating in the election is lower than someone who feels better represented (even if only descriptively).

With respect to civic duty, we should not expect an African American with high levels of income and education to have less civic duty than another voter, *ceteris paribus*. However, we should expect high group identifiers to view *civic duty* differently. The duty will be less toward perpetuating the democracy and political culture and more toward advancing group aims. This is clear from years of surveys where most blacks

score higher on group identification questions than questions linked to nationalism or civic duty.

Finally, I think the rationality of alternative participation by affluent African Americans in high SES neighborhoods can be elucidated from the cost side of the equation. Voting is perhaps the least costly political behavior. The very concept of "precinct polling places" is to cut the geographic distance one has to travel to vote. The spread of technology, including wide-spread Internet access and websites providing extensive and detailed information on politics and elections, cut information costs beyond perennial candidate mobilization tactics. Institutions, like early and straight-ticket voting, all lessen the resource and information costs of voting, and though registration may be relatively difficult, once registered there is no recurring cost. Additionally, all of these "barriers" turn into mere ant hills in the face of increasing income and education, which we find to be pervasive in the very environments that are the target of this project. Alternative forms of participation (letter writing, donating money, volunteering time, etc.) come at higher costs than voting since they receive less attention from elites and require the individual expend more resources.

If one rationally engages in an activity that comes at a higher cost, we can assume that they derive a larger benefit from it or attach a higher utility to it to balance the equation. If the data show that these suburban African Americans choose the alternative behaviors over voting (when compared to other African Americans or other groups) we can plausibly attribute this difference to the higher salience of those behaviors.

A simple illustration may aid the point. Geographic distance has long been associated with costs in both the participation and social network literatures. Specifically, proximity is seen as one of the major cost-cutters of political behavior, (i.e. citizens can register when they get drivers licenses and social groups at work and home

are the main movers of opinion). If one is headed to a grocery store and bypasses the store at the end of the block for one 15 miles away, the more distant store must have something the other does not. All things being equal, we would expect a person to choose the closer store. Whatever extra item or service offered at the more distant store, rationality says it must be worth the extra cost in terms of time, gasoline, or even the potential to get in a car accident. Since both stores offer food, the *type* of food at the more distant store must be valued more than the close store as the consumer must incur higher costs to attain it. The same can be said of a suburban African American living a drivable distance from a historically African-American central city community. Their immediate neighborhood has a church and restaurants, the local community has volunteer organizations, and the congressional district has candidates for office soliciting support through votes, time, and money. If their participatory choices take them away from the nearest church or campaign and instead devote more time, gasoline, and cognitive resources toward activities in the central city neighborhood, we can assume that they value their racial identification more than other demographics that they have in common (like high income and education) with other non-black neighbors. In short, if you value your racial group contacts above your income or education group contacts then that group identification must be paramount.

While recognizing the role of group consciousness, only a few studies have addressed how environment affects the behaviors of high group identifiers, namely (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Swain 1993; Gay 2004; Kauffman 2004; Vaca 2004). These provide some evidence that African American opinion is consistent regardless of socioeconomic resources, but say little about participation differences. If Blacks continue to climb the socio-economic ladder will theories based on "compensatory" participation to attain descriptive representation still hold? If Blacks continue to move to the suburbs, what can

we say about reverence and ties to the institutions of the historic community? Do they hold irrespective to increasing geographic distance? More esoterically, is group consciousness considered "high" based on the expression of opinion, which only requires thought, but regarded as conditional when directed toward physical and resource intense behaviors? These are all questions that are outstanding in the literature and which my survey instrument was designed to answer.

African-American political science has always mirrored demographic shifts in the polity. Following the Emancipation Proclamation and Great Migration to the North, black political thought revolved around the significance of race and the rivalry between competing ideologies like black separatism, militancy, and assimilation (Dawson 2001). By the mid 20th century, the increasing educational and occupational opportunities led scholars to question the group commitment of newly affluent blacks as they assumed an inverse relationship between group consciousness and residential mobility (Wilson 1978). The removal of *de jure* barriers to the franchise in the south coincided with the behavioral revolution and all scholars, not just those concerned with race or participation, began to incorporate these peculiar southern blacks and their entrenched out-group political culture into existing theories (Key [1949] 1984 and Walton 1985). Technological advances in survey instruments and the increasing cannon of bi-annual surveys like the American National Election Studies exposed the strong congruence in opinion amongst African Americans that extended to most areas of political opinion and was not found in any other racial, ethnic, or demographic group (Bereleson et al. 1954, Campbell et al. 1960, Jackson 1987). Finally, white flight out of the inner-city enabled the minority-majority district era of the early 1990s and lead to empirical studies that melded political environment and African-American participation, namely the empowerment theories of

Bobo and Gilliam (1990) and books like *The Urban Voter* by Karen Kauffman (2004; see also Swain 1996).

This project will extend this research and attempt to reconcile the previous strands of the literature. Increasing residential mobility and socio-economic resources have produced a group that looks more like mainstream white society than the inner-city blacks of the 20th century. The only similarity is the phenotype of their skin and the relatively lower SES. Is an out-group perception enough to hold this racial coalition together or do suburban blacks hold fast in their opinions but fall away in terms of behavior? I believe these blacks not only maintain their ties to the group in their behaviors, but that the unique environment of the suburbs and the social contacts it predominates at work and home make this maintenance even more important.

Finally, this project may be situated to challenge the vaunted position of group consciousness in African-American participation theories. If we find that suburban African Americans vote in rates equal to other neighborhood groups in elections that have nothing to do with race, we might reasonably assume that race is not a particularly dominant determinant of voting. On the other hand, if they vote at lower rates than average, but at equal rates to other minority group voters in the neighborhood, we might reasonably assume that out-group perception is the true engine of African-American group consciousness (as opposed to, for instance, a particular type of racial socialization). If we do not find a strong tug towards the historic community it may be that the costs are simply too high and therefore group perpetuation may lose out. This may be why we sometimes find opinion congruence but not congruence in group oriented behaviors.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS FOR BLACKS

Following World War II, virtually all blacks lived in segregated residential spaces regardless of class (Patillo 2005). As income and educational opportunities became more available, however, blacks sought to translate these gains into better living conditions. Because of the socioeconomic gains over the past 50 years, fully 40% of blacks can be characterized as middle-class and living outside of the central city in suburban areas (Clark 2007).

The census defines a suburb as any part of a metropolitan area that is not in the central city. A metropolitan area is a major population center composed of a central city of at least 50,000 people and the surrounding county or counties that are densely populated and economically interconnected with the central city. Suburban areas are unique because they are officially portions of larger metropolitan areas, yet are allowed to set up their own municipal governments, introducing tighter control over the allocation of resources to a demographically homogeneous group (Oliver 2001).

Fischer (2008) gives historical perspective describing how turn of the century suburbs were not the affluent locations we know today. He cites government subsidies for spending on housing and infrastructure in the wake of WWII as the major drivers of the suburbanization of America. The policies of this era solidified previous racial boundaries through federally sponsored programs that directed economic resources toward burgeoning suburban developments but redlined African Americans (as opposed to other racial groups) out of the ability to translate newfound middle class status into geographic mobility.[6] By the time discrimination in housing was made illegal by the Fair

[6] While I contend that my theory can be extended to any individual with high group identification to a group outside of the mainstream like bikers or naturalists, this example highlights the preeminence of race in the American political history and psyche of African Americans. One could be a member of any number of groups; millionaires, law partners, Republicans, but simply because of race they have *always* been unable to translate those group memberships into their expected levels of residential or social status.

Housing Act of 1968, the physical separation of blacks from whites was firmly entrenched in urban space.

As a result of this legacy in housing discrimination, black residential mobility has not lead to commensurate residential racial integration (Schneider and Phelan 1993). To be sure, the movement of blacks into the suburbs has been slower than what their growth in affluence would have predicted. Communities to which blacks had access in the 1980s were closer to the central city with lower median incomes (Schneider and Phelan 1993). But this has been changing. By the 1980s the African-American suburban population grew by 35% and by 1990 over one-fourth of blacks lived in the suburbs (Bledsoe et al. 1995, Fischer 2008).

According to Oliver (2001), suburbs are uniquely different from central city communities in their very singular social compositions and land uses, and these things have direct effects on the type of political discourse found in their jurisdictions. For Oliver, democracy in suburbia is characterized by apathy due to affluence and demographic homogeneity. He places great import on the ability of citizens to "vote with their feet" or expressing governmental disagreement by simply moving to another area.

With respect to race, Oliver argues as do others (see e.g. Patillo 1999; Haynes 2001; Alba and Logan 2000; Fischer 2008), that suburbanization has institutionalized the historic racial division of the central cities with municipal boundaries. While their numbers continues to grow, black suburbanites tend to live in predominantly minority neighborhoods (Alba and Logan 1993). Surrounded by comparable Anglo neighborhoods, these black suburban enclaves are less homogenous than central city communities (Alba and Logan 2000), resulting in small black communities within larger Anglo suburbs.

I argue that the racial composition of these suburbs is a uniquely, multi-layered environment for minority residents, which has drastic effects on social network dynamics and ultimately political participation. On the one hand, black suburbanites are immediately surrounded by co-ethnics. On the other, they tend to be isolated from traditional cultural centers like those found in the central cities of Detroit, Chicago, and New York. So while their next door neighbors might hold similar values and beliefs, the larger community (those living in the same CD but not the same precinct for instance) will differ drastically with regard to political orientations.

The super environment, that of the actual suburb or congressional district, is perceived as racially hostile and this feeling is made more evident by the stark contrast of a co-ethnic dominated block or precinct. The racial composition of these environments, and of the larger political marketplace, make the few African Americans living there feel more starkly in the minority than normal. Residential racial homogeneity, out-group perception, and minority opinion in proximate social networks will boost the salience of group-reinforcing behaviors and these citizens will derive higher benefits from racial group-related activities. To be sure, the history of discrimination and disenfranchisement is persistently shown to be the root of both high linked fate among blacks and the perpetuation of indigenous institutions like the long standing churches and petition organizations that were at the forefront of the struggle for civil rights (Dawson 1994). Further, analysis by Hochschild (1995), Haynes (2001), and others have shown that the group branded by the media as the "Black Middle Class" actually report experiencing more discrimination in their Anglo-dominated neighborhoods and workplaces and make conscious efforts to help the less affluent members of the group and maintain historic institutions. Therefore, this out-group perception and perceived discrimination will cause suburban blacks to attach higher utilities toward the racial group, especially indigenous

institutions and businesses, and heightened adherence to group norms (Blumer 1958). Consequently, I argue, suburban blacks will forgo participating in more proximate, localized politics and expend considerable resources to engage in more racial group-centric political activities in cultural communities located modest distances from their residences.

Support from this argument can be gleaned from research on other politically-relevant groups in the American electorate. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988), and along with Plutzer (1993), have examined how holding minority political status affects political outcomes. For instance, Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague (1993) use the aggregate party affiliation of parish and neighborhood jurisdictions to pinpoint whether reinforcing or dissonant environments affect certain behaviors. They find that the strongest Democratic identification is not in overlapping contexts (e.g. a Democratic neighborhood and parish); instead the highest effect on Democratic Party support comes when one lives in a Republican neighborhood but worships in a Democratic parish. Further, they say that people seek out protective (or reinforcing) environments that serve to shield them from political signals over which they have less control.[7]

With respect to Latinos, Pantoja and Segura (2003) argue that environments having candidates or policies deemed threatening to a group trigger feelings of anxiety and motivate people to more closely monitor public affairs and become more knowledgeable. Examining the highly public and contentious issues of immigration, they find that politically threatened populations react by better informing themselves. They

[7] A caveat is that the finding holds only if we can assume that people exercise control over their choice of environment. The African-American residential context literatures echo this point as well. Even with the increase in socioeconomic status by blacks on average, there is extensive scholarship showing that they are less able to translate their wealth into higher-status neighborhood environments (Alba and Logan 1993, Schneider and Phelan 1993, Clark 2007, Fischer 2008).

find evidence supporting Blumer's racial threat hypothesis that the racial make up of one's residential environment, especially out-group perception, are key motivations to choose group reinforcing behaviors. Their finding holds for all Latino immigrants, regardless of class. Residential context, however, produced some variance. Latinos in the most contentious environment, gathered more information than those in more receptive environments.

I argue that black suburbanites are similarly motivated when faced with a political environment viewed as in conflict with their interests. Politically, residential segregation and the lineage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act produce a contemporary redistricting ethos firmly grounded in packing African Americans into minority-majority districts, where they have more opportunity to elect a co-ethnic representative (Swain 1993). As an unintended consequence, an African American living a moderate geographical distance from the majority of her group members will have a much lower likelihood of the same descriptive representation. I believe these separated African Americans, individually and in the aggregate, will attach lower utilities to voting in political environments that do not address group salient goals and will choose alternative forms of participation that reinforce group consciousness by expending their political capital in urban cultural communities.

Oliver (2001) provides support to my general thesis that blacks living in predominately white locales are much less likely to politically participate in local politics due to a lack of salience. He says,

> blacks in predominately white places are less likely to engage in civic activities because they feel less empowered and less interested in community affairs…Insofar as they represent a tiny fraction of their city's population, it is unlikely that their feelings of racial community can be evoked in any politically meaningful way (125).

There is tentative evidence of engagement in the local cultural community where affluent African Americans, geographically disconnected from group-dominated areas and networks, make a conscious effort to maintain ties to these communities. Hochschild (1995) describes a mourning process, rather than a celebration of weakened links to urban communities by blacks who have moved away from central cities. As one of her respondents explained, he finds it "difficult to maintain close ties to two communities as much as I want to. We've got to participate in…[the new suburban neighborhood] as a matter of survival and so as not to be isolated…[But] I miss my old ties. It's painful, damned painful." (125). In her article about black middle class neighborhoods, Pattillo (2005) describes the dual tug of class and group ties of 1930 Chicagoans that first settled the black neighborhoods described in her earlier book, *Black Pickett Fences*. She says the depressing environment of the urban ghetto with decaying conditions and high crime rates translated into passionate service to aid the black poor on one hand and a determination to move away on the other. Finally, Haynes describes the participatory aspects of this tug.

> For Nepperhan residents, however [suburban residence] meant a trip across town to use the facility. But Nepperhaners appear to have accepted a political identification and responsibility that transcended their material self-interest. Locked into a common fate with the working class, Nepperhaners maintained the identification with the tradition of negro uplift (84).

He goes on to describe how the black middle class used their above average resources to get group-based information in lounges in Harlem and southwest Yonkers and became "active participants and leaders in institutions like the NAACP and the YMCA which served the black population of Yonkers" (Hayes 2001, see also Gosnell 1935). Moreover, Patillo describes the tug of class and group ties, finding that high status

blacks' commitment to the traditional black agenda has not weaned and they translate this bond to participation as well as identification.

But what is it that draws suburban blacks politically, though not residentially back to urban communities? The urban cultural enclave marked by economic depression, substandard living conditions, increased police presence, but also politically active churches, petition organizations, co-ethnic professionals and businesses, art galleries, social clubs, and historically red-lined neighborhoods of racial groups, is most affectionately referred to as the "ghetto." Bruce Haynes (1995) describes the temporal solidification of opinion and norms provided by the African-American urban ghetto. He uses a working definition of community that describes the cultural communities from which suburban blacks are separated. Community, "implies 'place,' but it also implies the constellation of personal connections (i.e. families, churches, schools, political organizations, voluntary civic associations) and the sense of historical continuity that individuals internalize" (xxviii). He finds that these connections, which I generally call social networks, form a multidimensional basis for group consciousness and the articulation of group interests. Most all scholarship, especially that of the African-American politics cadre, has modeled these areas as incubators of African-American culture (and liberalizers of African-American thought), dating back to the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920s through the Great Migration following the Great World Wars and the black freedom struggle throughout the 1950s-1980s (Haynes 2001).

In particular, these areas have provided exceptions to many of the rules provided by the literature on political participation. Namely, despite their lack of socioeconomic resources, black cultural communities in urban areas have a long history of political activism. In his book *Negro Politicians* (1935) Harold Gosnell describes these

communities as ones where resource deficiencies were overcome by political discussion in social networks:

> The politicians have found that the South Side area [of Chicago] is easy for them…to demonstrate that on Election Day the popular thing to do is to vote. There may be many in the district who have had limited opportunities for schooling and some of the older ones may neither read nor write, but they are kept informed regarding political matters by a variety of face-to-face contacts. In church, at a lodge meeting, on the street corner, in their place of employment, at a restaurant, at home with their children who have just come from school, or at a place of amusement, they learn about the political issues and the candidates of the day (22-23).

In addition to face-to-face contacts, group norms about political activism are also transmitted through indigenous media outlets, including black weeklies and newspapers (Walton and Smith 2010). For instance, Gosnell (1935) found that while local black print media were relied on more for news and gossip than political guidance, in hotly contested political campaigns, they were more important to their target community than publications in other parts of Chicago (106). More recently, in a content analysis of the 2000 Republican National Convention, Philpot (2007) found that coverage of the convention in black media sources tended to incorporate more group-centric frames, describing the convention in terms of what the events meant for the black community. Gay (2004) asserts that neighborhood institutions not only provide a forum for social interaction, which enables the reinforcement and perpetuation of community norms, but shapes the content of the norms themselves. She goes on to describe these as places where the "collective aspects of black life it encourages and social interaction it facilitates may foster a deeper and more assertive racial group consciousness" (549). As a result of this group-centered information flow, blacks linked into these cultural communities are not only encouraged to be politically active, but to engage in political activities aimed at uplifting the race.

But, again, environment matters. I posit that the level of reverence for the cultural community is mediated by residential context in a predictable way, but one not highlighted by previous research. The urban African American, especially the less affluent urbanite, has been shown to perceive less racism on a daily basis and view race as a less defining force in their lives, in direct contrast to the suburban African American (Hochschild 1995). As a result, I contend that African Americans residing in the cultural community will not feel the need to seek out culturally reinforcing activities to the same degree since their values and beliefs are not being threatened. In contrast, the suburbanite will romanticize this same area like a country of emigration, and consciously travel there in an effort to maintain their racial identity as most prominent in their lives.

GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS: THE TIE THAT BINDS

Group-based political activism is a defining feature of black politics. To simply gain full inclusion into American society took a collective strategy accentuating familial and community bonds and also requiring the sympathy of mainstream elites. As social inclusion began to be fully realized, the goal of the "struggle" moved to political incorporation. Participation, particularly voting, became a major strategy for racial and ethnic minorities through municipal mayoral and single member district elections that often broke down along racial lines (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Kauffman 1995, Vaca 2004) and minority-majority congressional districts designed to increase descriptive representation (Swain 1996, Gay 2003).

In his book *Human Groups and Social Categories,* (1981) Henri Tajfel presents the *Social Identity Theory* (SIT) which states that the social identities of citizens are contingent upon the categorization of people into in-groups and out-groups. He believes

group cohesion will be strongest among high status groups with low status groups needing some positively valued group attributes or faith. Authors like Billig (2003) extend the theory saying these group dynamics are explicitly accentuated by politicians for political gain and that political rhetoric is the main driver for the perpetuation of these worldviews. John C. Turner introduces the *Self Categorization theory*, similar to SIT, which says one's view of self (and by my extension one's view of their group's place in society) provides the basis for social psychological phenomena like group identity, identification, and stereotyping. Turner goes on to say that the shift from individual to collective identity is accompanied by a desire to emulate the attitudes and behavior of typical group members which in turn produces group cohesion (Huddy 2003).

The process of forming group identity begins during one's childhood. Sears et al., in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, describe general socialization this way, "children [learn] basic political attitudes (such as party identification or racial prejudice) from their families and friends, and that the residues of these early attitudes [dominate] their later political attitudes in adulthood" (6). This is the classic view of socialization accepted by most behaviorists that the political stimuli to which one is most often exposed (and finds credible) have the greatest influence on subsequent opinion.

Although the messages are different, the process of socialization is the same for young African Americans as other children. The omnipresent social castes ingrained in American history, and subsequent African-American group norm of maintaining positive attachment to one's culture, produces parents that pass down messages on two branches from one tree. On one branch, slavery, Jim Crow, generalized discrimination, and institutionalized racism instill a cautiousness toward the societal superstructure. On the other hand, the kinship that has been historically extended to all members of the group has produced a set of cultural norms and practices that pervade all aspects of one's life--

social interaction, recreation, music tastes, and politics. These childhood lessons for young African Americans of all household income levels are crystallized by experiences like seeing the bigger houses or greener lawns when traveling to the cross-town mall or noticing the abundance of liquor stores on the way to the historic church. As the child grows up, they begin to personally encounter racism and hear of similar experiences in their social networks.

To put it another way, African-American socialization narrows the plausible attitudinal alternatives potentially subscribed to the social world. Sears et al. posit that:

> [There are] three common heuristics…*availability* – how accessible or available concrete examples are in memory…*representativeness*, assigning specific instances to specific categories (stereotypes, schemata) according to how well the particular instance fits or matches the essential properties of one category rather than another; and *anchoring and adjustment* – forming a tentative response and then adjusting by reviewing relevant data (31).

Imagine a world totally dominated by what Diana Mutz (2002) describes as cross-cutting cleavages, a piece of ambiguous information like the government bank bailout, and a prompt to give an opinion. Decades of opinion surveys show that if we ask a non-trivial number of white and black people for their opinions, there will be a larger variance in white responses. Mutz would say (and I would agree) that the opinion expressed is conditional on which cleavage is most prevalent in the mind or most applicable to the situation. Variance in responses would indicate variety in the prevailing group attachment, with the corollary being that uniform responses mean the preeminence of a particular group.

If certain people are instructed parentally and socially (*availability)* to view their group as preeminent in all situations virtually eliminating ambiguity (*representativeness*), when the most accessible cues are those of an out-group, the psychic desire for reinforcement makes the *anchoring* reaction a group conscious opinion. This situation is

one that describes both the empirical evidence of congruence in black opinion, and the anecdotal quip that "African Americans see racism in everything." The question is whether this extends to political participation choices.

Nonetheless, this constant reinforcement of out-group membership maintains both the kinship to the culture and a distrust of the mainstream that shows up consistently in social science surveys (Kinder and Sanders 1996). The above is essentially the pre-encounter, encounter, and immersion/emersion part of William Cross' (1991) model of Nigrescence.

Group identity alone does not necessarily translate into political action. Chong and Rogers (2005) provide a good overview of general group dynamics, separating group solidarity into identification and consciousness. Most basic is psychological *identification*, an individual's sense of belonging or attachment to a social group, compared to *consciousness*, which combines identification with a perception of the group's social status and strategies for improving it. I contend this group consciousness is manifested by voters as more than general participation (Miller et al. 1981), but through group salient participation. Furthermore, if an individual is confronted with two types of participation she should rationally choose the most salient, placing no preeminence on voting. As a higher threshold, I believe this salience will extend to resource intensive behaviors like campaign work or contributions. Chong and Rogers (2005) describe consciousness-raising stimuli as the diffusion of an ideology that bolsters group pride and identification, diagnoses group problems, offers prescriptive solutions, and encourages group members to act in solidarity to achieve common ends (367). I contend that residential context, especially a cultural community in close proximity or the presence of a co-ethnic in high political office in the area, are the types of stimuli that elevate the utility of community integration, reinforcing social networks, and group

salient participation. Though the authors ultimately conclude racial solidarity does not contribute to the explanation of presidential voting or other group-based activities, they (along with Oliver 1999) recognize that feelings like efficacy are inversely correlated with out-group identification and predominately white residential contexts.

The translation of one's already developed group consciousness into group-based political activism is part of the *commitment* phase of Cross' Nigrescence model. During commitment, people learn how to direct their behavior toward others of the same identity. First, once developed, group identity must be maintained. Zuckerman et al. (1994) say that "membership in an objective social division must be reinforced by interactions at home, work, play, or in the activities of social and political organizations in order to affect political behavior" (1010). *Reinforcement* occurs when a correspondence exists between predispositions and stimulus content. The synergy from this consistency can deepen existing opinion and achieve an effect unattainable by a singular information source (Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992, Joslyn1997). There is also evidence that political events provide an additive effect, heightening pre-adult socialization, especially when the events reinforce the early lessons learned (Sears and Valentino 1997). A perfect example of this would be how blacks viewed government response to Hurricane Katrina as racialized at much higher rates than whites (White et al. 2007).

Second, Huddy argues that political context places an intricate role in individuals' orientations towards groups. She illustrates how three psychological factors of political cohesion--salient identities, a common political meaning associated with membership, and common interests by members--are all influenced by political environment and help develop group loyalties and their requisite behaviors. In particular, Huddy argues that "There is a long standing association and some supportive evidence that an external

threat enhances in-group solidarity and tightens in-group boundaries and that in-group solidarity increases in relation to the degree of threat" (539).

The same situation should hold for high status blacks with the external threat more by implication of being black in a white social structure. The concepts of racial threat and racial alienation are crucial to the theoretical underpinning of this project. Racial alienation ranges along a continuum from the profound sense of group enfranchisement and entitlement typical of members of the dominant racial group to a profound sense of group disenfranchisement and grievance typical of members of subordinate racial groups. Members of a racial group who feel alienated and oppressed are more likely to regard other racial groups as competitive threats to their own group's social position (Giles and Hertz 1994; Carsey 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Voss 1996; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000). In their article about perceptions of racial group competition, Bobo and Hutchings (1996) argue that group threat is the product of self-interest, prejudice, and beliefs about social stratification, which form a sense of racial alienation. This theory is attributed to Herbert Blumer's (1958) work, *Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position*. Though Blumer's work focused on the feelings of whites, Bobo and Hutchings' racial alienation extension is designed to model minority perceptions of racial threat. A key assumption of the authors' work is that the degree of racial alienation will correspond to a group's historical position in the social structure.

Although Bobo and Hutchings did not test the impact of racial threat or racial alienation on political participation, I believe they are the main psychological mechanisms affecting the behavior of African Americans that live in majority African-American precincts within majority Anglo congressional districts. Certain demographic groups, either a race, profession, class, or a host of other characteristics, are part of the mainstream while other groups are not. Not being part of the mainstream is sometimes

by choice, like cultural autonomy, and other times by social sanction, like Jim Crow or the residential redlining processes. Either way, a sense of being part of the subordinate group whose interests are threatened, I argue, affects one's participatory calculi.

Alternatively, the observed pattern of political participation of suburban blacks in congressional elections might be a consequence of a depressed sense of efficacy. There is clear evidence in both the race and ethnicity and participation literatures that certain groups, usually racial and ethnic minorities, have lower levels of efficacy than members of the Anglo or partisan majority (Verba et al. 1995, Hoschchild 1996). Years of opinion surveys have shown African Americans, in particular, are less likely to say they can affect government or that governmental institutions listen/respond to them. It would be implausible to see no connection between the historic exclusion from government of baby boomer's parents and subsequent political expressions of distrust. Interestingly, these findings even hold contemporarily despite increased political incorporation from apparatuses like minority-majority districts even though this incorporation was ultimately aimed to move blacks toward assimilation (which would have a much higher threshold than simple efficacy).

Theoretically, this lack of efficacy should run counter to the high participation rate among African Americans, which has consistently registered as higher than average when controlling for participatory resources like income and education. Is this paradoxical? Not necessarily, for the race in general there is a strong group norm perpetuated by race-based organizations and institutions that encourages political participation, particularly voting and protest, as the primary means to further group goals (Miller et al. 1981, Morris 1984, Walton 1985, Dawson 1994, Harris 1999), there is also a more recent norm propagated by black elites, especially members of Congress, that participation will advance the race via their presence in statehouses and mayorships

across the country (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Swain 1993, Canon 1999). There is little evidence either rhetorically or socially of norms rooted in material benefit or control over governmental institutions as primary rationales for participation. This is clearly a top down dissemination of ideas with even officeholders and activists downplaying the material angle (which they are less able to deliver on – see Canon 1999) in favor of a group consciousness model. Whether it is parental or political socialization, we see a group that promotes participation for their own goals and views politics as group-based and nearly zero sum, it is therefore not surprising blacks have high racial group identification and behaviors but low efficacy.

But to what extent do affluent suburban blacks maintain a sense of group consciousness? The answer to this question is still debated. While there is quite a bit of consonance in blacks' orientations towards politics, studies have shown that black opinion and ideology is not monolithic (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004). Further, it is along class lines that scholars have anticipated finding divisions in black politics (Dahl 1961; Wilson 1978). At the center of this debate is William Julius Wilson. In his 1978 book *The Declining Significance of Race*, Wilson argues that the black community is splitting in two groups, with higher educated citizens now better able to translate resource gains into higher income and occupational prestige. Affirmative action and civil rights legislation had only allowed the educated segment of the group to realize the American Dream, while the underclass lagged behind. In his 1987 *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Wilson added an environmental component to his analysis: "The compelling story told…especially Wilson's thesis that the black middle class had 'out-migrated' from the inner city, thoroughly moved interest away from the black middle and working classes. Attention landed squarely on the black poor" (Haynes 2001, xxiii). Subsequent research focused primarily on urban blacks rather than understanding how suburban blacks were

negotiating their new political reality. The assumption was that these suburban blacks would come to mirror whites of equal socioeconomic status. If anything, scholars were concerned with whether urban blacks would also assimilate (Jackson 1987).

Ultimately, the verdict is still out on whether race trumps class. For instance, Dawson's (1994) found that affluent blacks are more liberal than the country as a whole, but more conservative than poorer blacks, especially on issues that lay at the intersection of race and class like the redistribution of wealth. In addition, Hochschild's (1995) uses news media and governmental sources to find that affluent blacks are more liberal or group-conscious than less wealthy blacks on questions of discrimination and how much race affects their life chances. In contrast, Gay (2004) demonstrates that African Americans in neighborhoods with high-status black residents will be more likely than residents in low-status black neighborhoods to view race as the defining interest in their lives. Specifically, she finds that high-status blacks "more readily discard notions of linked fate…than they do their firm belief that discrimination remains a barrier to black socioeconomic attainment" (555). Further, she argues that:

> the imitative learning processes that can lead individuals to adopt the attitudes of their neighbors may dispose the residents of black middle class enclaves to embrace notions of shared values and fate, while their access to the economic resources crucial to their families' well being simultaneously may create some doubt about whether race remains the defining interest in their lives (550).

A possible reason for the differing findings is that the Dawson book is based on blacks in close proximity to each other while the Gay article examines a population defined by its affluence. At this point, the race and ethnicity literature is just beginning to untangle the puzzle of black group consciousness and class. One of the goals of this project is to design and implement an instrument that can test this class divide.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter has been to articulate the theory and hypotheses of the project and review the relevant literatures. There are many studies that have tested particular aspects of my theory, but did not incorporate suburban African Americans. Those that have data from this group are either not specifically political, or were not designed to answer questions of social network dynamics, cultural community engagement, or participation in non-salient environments. It is an ambitious goal to try to address all of these issues with a survey population of less than 200 African Americans. However, the analysis in the upcoming chapters, along with supplemental data from other surveys will lay out a convincing case that the participation differences highlighted in the introduction are the product of social network and community factors, and persist at the individual level.

Chapter 2: With Friends Like These…

The central question guiding this research is: Why do blacks in predominantly Anglo CDs participate in congressional elections at lower rates than their central city counterparts, even though their socioeconomic status suggests otherwise? In Chapter One, I argue that suburban blacks are forgoing participating in more proximate but less salient politics and transferring their resources to those environments that foster and reinforce racial-group norms to engage in less traditional forms of participation, despite the added costs of doing so. This argument hinges on the assumption that these blacks experience heightened perceptions of having minority status within their residential communities. In other words, I posit that black suburbanites reside in networks which they find adversarial to their beliefs and attitudes. As a result, these blacks will seek out alternative networks that are more in line with their social and political predispositions.

Rather than take this assumption as a given, I devote Chapter Two to empirically examining suburban blacks' perceptions of their various networks and group orientations. To do so, I utilize original survey data gathered as part of the University of Texas at Austin's module of the Cooperative Congressional Elections Study (CCES). The CCES survey instrument asks about interactions in four social areas: the job, neighborhood, church, and a volunteer organization. I also utilize the 2004 National Politics Survey (NPS). The NPS is one of the few studies with a large sample of racial and ethnic minorities that also gauges the racial makeup of respondents' neighborhoods, workplaces, and churches.

In the analyses that follow, I will provide empirical evidence that black suburbanites often feel like their proximate social networks are adversarial to their political beliefs. In particular, I illustrate the stark differences in opinion between

suburban blacks and whites--differences that persist even when controlling for socioeconomic status. Further, the data support the notion that these blacks seek out social networks situated in cultural communities located outside of their immediate neighborhoods.

The idea that social networks can demobilize voters has only tangentially been explored. While scholars have examined how minority opinion in social networks affects discussion and opinion, this research has not examined what impact this has on political behavior. Scholarship that examines the impact of social networks on political participation does not take into account what happens when voters are situated in social networks that conflict with their predispositions. Hence, this research constitutes a step forward in developing our understanding of the relationship between social networks and political participation.

THE PUSH AND PULL OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

Scholars (see McClurg 2003) have noted the important link between social networks and political participation. While the term has lost some specificity over the years due to the inherent validity problems involved with translating a multifaceted term into a survey question, this study will define social networks as a "web of social relationships with family, friends, neighbors, and co-workers…[where] people convey expectations to others about the kinds of behaviors, some political, that are appropriate and desirable" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 23). One of the main facets of social networks is the transmittal of behavioral norms (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Mutz 2002). Different social networks produce and transmit distinct types of messages. Those social networks couched within cultural communities will likely convey messages that

are group-centered. More mainstream social networks should advocate norms firmly rooted in the status quo.

With respect to race, mainstream social networks (e.g. media outlets, places of worship, or unions) have historically transmitted norms that echoed the dominant racial ideology of the past, which maintained that African Americans were an inferior race (Walton and Smith 2010). In direct response, African Americans created their own set of social networks to reject and combat negative messages about the race. These networks can be traced as far back as slavery and have been perpetuated through Reconstruction, the Harlem Renaissance, and the modern civil rights movement. Further, these networks have been an important mobilizing force within the black community (Morris 1984, Harris 1995, Dawson 2001, Haynes 2001). For instance, "The civil rights movement mobilized black citizens both indirectly and directly. Through its bold and confrontational, but pacific, tactics, it increased political awareness, political efficacy, racial identity, social expectations, and acceptance of personal risk among black Americans" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 129)..With the transmission of group information being at sometimes illegal, and at others infiltrated by government and law enforcement authorities, the importance of racially sympathetic institutions increased. Places like churches and volunteer organizations became primary outlets for racially salient information and social bonds.

I argue that the mechanism that led to the creation of black networks is the same one that drives suburban blacks to seek out these networks, even though many are not in their immediate vicinity. Joslyn (1997), quoting Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987), argues that "minorities are acutely aware of their own status, accurately perceiving dissonant information to which they are continually exposed…clearly recognize[ing] the variance between their opinion and prevailing sentiment" (341). As a result, suburban blacks'

immediate networks will be dissonant to their own views, causing a demobilizing effect. Further, suburban blacks, in an effort to find cognitively reaffirming networks, will seek out race-centric institutions that reinforce their existing beliefs.

While the literature supports the notion that minorities seek out reinforcing social networks, the literature on social networks currently does not address how networks can have a demobilizing effect on their members. For instance, Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America has become the premier work on social networks in political science, though its actual focus is only partially on social network dynamics. Ultimately about participation, the authors say elites use social networks in the workplace, neighborhood, and non-professional organizations as a means to mobilize voters. The authors, and most research that followed (see also Verba et al. 1995), have taken it as a given that networks are places where attitudes and opinions are reinforced because individuals have a strong psychological draw toward groups with others of like demographics. Mutz (2002) says social interaction is the primary mechanism linking social group membership and individual political behavior. Describing workplace social networks, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) posit that "Socially, people are bound to co-workers by friendship, common interests, and financial necessity. In part because of these strong ties and in part because of the ease of reaching people, political leaders often mobilize through the workplace" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 80). The idea is that the credibility derived from the social familiarity found within social networks will transfer over to explicitly political actions like voting.

From the cost-benefit perspective I presented in Chapter 1, mobilization through social networks works because it subsidizes things like information, travel, and registration costs (see also Huddy 2003). Socially obtained political information is valuable because it is relatively easy to find sources of information that coincide with

individuals' preferences (Downs 1957). It also allows for social contacts that provide friendships, team competition, and purposeful benefits. I part company with Rosenstone and Hansen, however, when they assert that "people receive information and rewards through their social networks, and the better placed they are within them, the more likely they are to take part in electoral politics" (159). They conclude that the most influential networks are those that are encountered most often, or the most proximate. Evidence suggests that this is true when there is considerable congruence in opinion and interests between individuals and their networks. But what happens when your most proximate and frequently encountered social networks are not the most salient or conflict with your views and attitudes? Current models of social network mobilization do not account for network participants who differ from the majority of the network in their primary identifications. By examining the political behavior of suburban blacks, however, I hope to gain some leverage in answering this question.

Affluent African Americans are more likely to reside in suburban areas. Evidence presented in the introductory chapter of this dissertation shows that the most affluent suburbs are populated largely by Anglos. Thus, these blacks are living in racially homogeneous neighborhoods where they are the minority. Higher education levels also make affluent suburban blacks more likely to work in majority white workplaces, making them the minority at work as well. We know that when it comes to residence and occupational prestige, these individuals are more limited in their choices than whites or even other minorities. With the number of acceptable alternatives narrowed, suburban African Americans in majority Anglo workplaces and neighborhoods will have less control over who their neighbors or coworkers are, yet encounter them on an almost daily basis. In addition, by living in an affluent suburb, these blacks will almost certainly not be represented by co-ethnic elected officials. As to mobilization, Rosenstone and Hansen

(1993) say blacks encounter an ascriptive barrier to communications with predominately white, male public officials. The barrier is psychological (e.g. doubting a white politician will be sympathetic to their views) (see Tate 2003) and systemic (e.g. not being central to the electoral coalitions of white politicians or targets of mobilization efforts) (see Frymer 1999).

With this dynamic, it is plausible that suburban blacks' most proximate networks will depress political participation. Such individuals would not find politics in their immediate jurisdictions to be relevant. Issues considered important to suburban blacks are less likely to appear on the agenda during local, state, and congressional elections. To the extent that salient issues do appear on the agenda, suburban blacks are less likely to hold similar views as their neighbors, coworkers, and elected officials. Because of a lack of interest, a loss of efficacy, or a combination of both, I argue that the most proximate social networks for these individuals will have a demobilization effect within their immediate jurisdictions. Further, these individuals will self-select into more salient, but less proximate networks where they can transfer their political resources.

My argument presupposes that affluent African Americans living in majority white neighborhoods and employed in predominantly white workplaces exists within a system of concentric networks. The most proximate networks, e.g. neighborhood and workplace, are ones where their opinion on many issues is most often in the minority. At the same time, suburban blacks find higher levels of opinion congruence in more geographically distant networks. Located in cultural communities, connection to these networks is maintained through kinships, friendships, or the need for goods and services only found in these areas. Although these networks are encountered less often, suburban blacks value the messages heard and the interactions experienced in these networks more than their neighborhood or workplace networks.

Because they are more distant and less frequently encountered, one might expect cultural networks to have a minimal impact on the participatory behaviors of suburban blacks. To be sure, Zuckerman et al. (1994) argue that political networks (i.e. explicitly oriented political organizations and groups) have much greater impact on voting decisions than ethnic, religious, and class networks. However, given the prevalence of high levels of racial identification among African Americans (see Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Dawson 1994), I contend that race-related social networks will be more salient than those not related to race. We know that psychologically individuals self-select themselves into networks with opinion-affirming social interactions (see Festinger 1957). When a suburban black encounters dissonant opinions in her immediate networks, a mental recoil ensues. This ultimately results in a reluctance to express a minority opinion and pushes said discussant to find reinforcing information and cues through group-majority networks and group-based information sources. In these group-based networks, the individual will find opinion leaders that will have maximum credibility and whose views will be more readily retained (Kinder 2003). When interpersonal interaction in these areas explicitly advocates a race-oriented perspective resulting political behavior becomes rooted in racial norms (Gay 2004). Hence, a premium will be placed on racial group-based political activity. For suburban African Americans, this may require forgoing low-cost participation (voting in one's congressional district) and expending higher resources and travel costs to travel to the central city for options like donating money to co-ethnic candidates, and volunteering, or holding a leadership position in an organization devoted to their primary identification.

Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) lend support for the idea that people will select themselves out of networks where their opinion is in the minority in favor of more attitude-affirming networks. Their study highlights two effects of social context--the

effect of the socially transmitted political information received and the effects of resistance to disagreeable, dissonance producing information. They track the majority party identifications in workplace groups and how dissonant opinions are represented and received by minority members. They find that voters are more likely to discuss politics with people who share their preferences:

When a citizen considers whether to discuss politics regularly with other individuals, the choice is predicated upon her agreement or disagreement with the potential discussant. If agreement is present the person is accepted as a discussant, but if disagreement is present then the citizen must either look for a new discussant or accept a politically disagreeable discussant and, hence, a politically dissonant relationship (470).

Likewise, Ceci and Kain's (1982) oppositional reactivity hypothesis also lends some support for my theory. For the authors, dominant opinion contexts that favor a particular candidate do not always produce movement toward majority opinion but rather often evoke a positive move away from whoever is currently being touted as dominant. The authors find evidence of individuals' resistance to the cognitive tension produced by information dissonant to their predispositions. In their study, subjects ignored such information or selectively retained or reconstructed information into congruence with established cognitive patterns. There is also a reinforcement mechanism where when prevailing group opinion and predispositions match, attitudes are hardened. They find less support for any adaptation where dissonant information is received and changes predispositions. This should be expected because the individual has rejected dissonant information about the same object their whole lives. Such opinions are either viewed negatively or at least less accessible, providing a much higher threshold to change one's attitudes or behaviors.

Furthermore, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) posit that social context can influence one's interaction with social networks. When confronted with a disagreeable discussant, the decision to continue the conversation depends on, "the structural setting of the relationships, the extremity of disagreement, the intensity of viewpoints, and…majority-minority standing on the part of a political preference" (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988, 471). For instance, when faced with a context in which they are in the political minority, Huckfeldt and Sprague found that voters are likely to overestimate the level of agreement among discussion partners in order to avoid dissonance.

But how does being a minority in a social network affect political behavior? I contend that social context not only impacts the relationship between opinion expression and social networks, but also the relationship between social networks and political behavior. In particular, I argue that minority status (real or perceived)[8] in one's primary social networks moderates the impact of those social networks on their political behavior. . If individuals believe their opinion differs from the majority of their network members, previous research shows there are direct consequences for the participants both in their reticence to join discussions and the behavioral norms to which they adhere. When these opinion differences occur in the realm of one's primary self-identity, or involve seemingly zero-sum competition (as we often see with racial issues), we should expect subsequent behavioral reactions to be even more intense. African Americans or other voters in networks where they feel in the minority will not only reject political information and cues discussed in the group, they will go further and choose alternative

[8] This distinction is most applicable to social interactions between individuals that involve some sort of message transmittal. In most studies of neighborhood dynamics, particularly Blumer (1958) and Bobo and Hutchings (1990), it is the perception of the racial makeup of one's neighborhood that affects behaviors. As this perception should persist whether or not a person actually encounters a person of another race, attributions of dissonance should be heightened by virtue of the increased accessibility in one's mind. Therefore, there may be different types of proximity.

behaviors that will reinforce their racial identification in networks where they are in the majority.

TYPES OF NETWORKS

In this project, I will compare the relative impact of four types of networks: neighborhood, workplace, volunteer organizations, and churches. These particular environments were chosen for various reasons. First, they were some of the most influential networks highlighted in the works of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba et al (1993). Second, there are both proximate and self-selecting networks to provide a wide cross-section from which to study relevant behaviors. Third, they are social settings in which most Americans interact.

The neighborhood is assumed to be the most proximate environment for any individual, and takes on an additional significance in the suburbs where neighborhood associations and code restrictions predominate, and separation from metropolitan centers begets feelings of autonomy (Oliver 1999). Social interactions in this particular area can come in many forms, some personal, others quasi-political. Imagine two neighbors living in homes adjacent to one another engaging in conversation. Presumably, perception of agreement or disagreement has been confirmed and solidified through stereotypes like a person's race or choice of vehicle, symbols like Army ribbons or political signs in election season, and previous conversations. If the two are in ideological agreement, previously acquired political information is passed between the two, (i.e. "Did you hear what O'Reilly said about the president?") If there has been disagreement, the conversation may avoid dissonant topics or discussants will introduce newly acquired information to bolster his or her entrenched position.

We can also conceive of a group identification component to the interaction. Say the two have some common identification that places them in the minority of the neighborhood, like an enthusiasm for motorcycles. When one neighbor passes over his copy of the latest magazine to the other or shows off his new riding outfit, cues and norms are transmitted and a bond of solidarity likely develops. This idea can also extend to larger settings like political discussions at potluck dinners or neighborhood block parties.

Aside from personal interactions, many of these suburbs have extensive neighborhood associations. Though rarely political in the partisan, Democrat/Republican, sense these boards are factious and have long persisting cleavages. Speaking about local suburban institutions, Oliver (1999) says, "[by] determining who can afford to live in a community, how many people it will contain, and what types of public policies it will pursue, local governments set the political conflicts, patterns of social interaction, and salient issues of a municipality" (190). When one of these institutions proposes stricter enforcement of noise restrictions on vehicles passing through the area, our motorcycle fans may discuss the situation, possibly align with teenagers and street racers, and develop a political opposition. Here, the transmittal of norms in personal settings has triggered a political behavior. If the motorcycle riders' minority status has become heightened by constant "harassment" we could expect those participatory norms to evoke an adversarial response on even vaguely related issues rooted in the previous group competition, much like we see in contemporary race opinion.

Specific to suburban African Americans, the literature consistently shows that these citizens live in neighborhoods predominated by whites (Bledsoe et al 1995, Schneider and Phelan 1993, Fischer 2008). When any appreciable amount of blacks

move into these areas we see that whites hold increasingly negative attitudes towards them, though when the socioeconomic status of blacks is higher than whites some of these feelings recede (Alba et al 2000). In these environments, Blumer attributes hostility between racial groups to racial threat on behalf of the majority toward competition from the minorities (Blumer 1947).

Oliver hypothesizes that African Americans or Latinos living in places that are overwhelmingly white may disassociate from strong racial identities in favor of individual traits. Yet, he hypothesizes that,

> [blacks] living in predominantly white places are less likely to engage in a host of civic activities because they feel less empowered and less interested in community affairs…In so far as they represent a tiny fraction of their [neighborhood's] population it is unlikely that their feelings of racial community can be evoked in any politically meaningful way (125).

Like the neighborhood, the job is an environment of almost daily interaction. Considering differentials in personal schedules and levels of activity between neighbors, as well as the relative brevity and sporadic nature of actual interactions when compared to the workplace, a job network may be the most proximate. Thus, how citizens view and operate within their workplace networks have important implications for this project.

The structure and nature of workplace networks are quite different from those found in one's neighborhood. Interactions at the workplace are unique for a number of reasons. The symbol of the water cooler as a meeting place and forum for discussion is firmly placed in our popular culture and lexicon. While it may be more accurate to imagine a small group congregating at someone's cubicle or office these days, the idea of people taking opportunities (sometimes multiple instances throughout the day) to interact and discuss non-work related topics is longstanding and applicable to my study. One

popular sports radio show even has a segment specifically designed to inform listeners and provide them with obscure statistics to impress one's coworkers.

The workplace is also unique in that it is not a formal political or social environment; therefore, those types of interactions are not the primary reason for the association. Additionally, control over the universe of possible discussion partners should be the lowest of any of the other environments. Spatial proximity, inflexible schedules (especially for things like lunch breaks or quitting time), and hierarchical structure are all decided by an unsympathetic third party. While a quick nod of acknowledgement may be sufficient to limit interactions between neighbors, oftentimes the social norms of the workplace demand some modicum of cordiality. At the very least one should smile politely as a coworker recounts her weekend or laments an approaching deadline.

This captive closeness and frequent interaction are why Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) describe the job as an excellent political mobilization agent. The belief is that workplaces are mobilizing agents where participants converse and transmit social and political messages to one another (Gosnell 1967, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The effect of these networks on political participation is also metered by the type of environment and the race of the individual (Verba et al 1993). In workplaces, like neighborhoods, minority status is sometimes a trigger for feelings of social inequality.

I also examine volunteer organizations. Volunteer organizations are particularly interesting for two reasons. First, people self-select themselves into volunteer organizations with a level of flexibility not experienced with neighborhood or workplace networks. Second, the range of volunteer organizations is so expansive that most minorities, especially racial and ethnic minorities, can find at least one organization

specifically designed to petition government or employ other strategies to advance the interests of the group.

Networks associated with volunteer organizations are less proximate than neighborhood or workplace networks. While the power of volunteer organizations to affect message transmission and ultimately participation is reduced by their less proximate locations, volunteer organizations make up this deficit by virtue of their increased credibility and the availability of like-minded network members. While the frequency of interactions may be at best weekly or even monthly, a member of a volunteer organization has specifically sought out this association and therefore is expected to prefer its information messages and behavioral cues over other possible networks.

More importantly, when messages are transmitted in these settings they are more likely to be accepted by the receiver. By joining a volunteer organization with like-minded members, an individual has created a network where she is ensured majority status. She will be less critical of the group than she would be if she was in the minority and will therefore be more receptive to the group's messages. Additionally, because the organization will present its leaders or certain members as experts on the group's goal, messages they disseminate will have added credibility, further increasing receptiveness. The information cost-cutting aspect of these networks can also be seen as related to the self-selection function. While the neighborhood and job environments cut costs because people encounter political and group information as they perform other responsibilities, people consciously seek out organizations for their information channels and participatory avenues.

Some organizations are also unique for the specificity of their purpose. Some organizations are designed to cater to vast swaths of people (e.g. the Democratic Party),

while others address the needs of smaller segments of the population (e.g. the Socialist Party). Some organizations were specifically designed to protest the government, either through "acceptable" methods or more extreme tactics. Protest organizations, in particular, exhibit norms that challenge the status quo. Further, protest organizations' elites will frame messages in a way that elicits stronger identification and group loyalty (Harris 1995).

The literature also says these organizations balance out the participatory calculus by providing solidarity benefits to the participant. Verba et al. (1995) say,

> organization membership exacts more in the way of resources [than voting]. However, unlike many other forms of participation, organization involvement may be especially rich in the sorts of selective benefits (selective social and civic gratifications) that theorists of rational actions assert must accompany any political participation on behalf of a widely shared objective (22).

They also find that African Americans are more likely to be involved with non-political organizations than Latinos and equally likely as whites. They are also more likely to be involved with organizations identified with their own race (Verba et al 1995). These differential levels of involvement have participatory consequences and not coincidentally mirror the turnout rankings of the groups.

Finally, no study of African-American political participation would be complete without a discussion of religious organizations. In general, church-based social networks are distinct from other types of social networks. First, levels of participation in the network vary significantly, with the most committed members attending church-related activities throughout the week while others may go less than ten times a year. Second, network interactions can take on a number of forms not directly related to actual religious services, including participation on the church's financial committee or buildings and property committee.

Still, I contend that interpersonal interactions in churches are like those in other networks. When there are political or social discussions in churches, we should expect them to serve the same purpose, including perpetuating group norms and providing clues as to what is acceptable behavior. While these messages can be provided by any opinion leader, when they come from the pastor (even more from the pulpit) they should acquire an added credibility that should increase retention and limit dissonance.

Consequently, membership in a religious-based social network is positively correlated with political participation. Verba et al (1995) say that,

> involvement in a religious institution can augment the individual's potential for political activity in two ways: by providing opportunities to practice civic skills and by providing exposure to political stimuli, either explicit political messages or requests to become politically active (381).

They also state that religious denomination and practice are intimately connected to group identity.

With respect to African Americans, Verba et al. (1995) find that African Americans have the highest levels of church-based resource acquisition. In addition, they find that African Americans are more likely to be politically mobilized in church and are two times more likely to be exposed to a discussion of political matters than Anglos or Latinos. Harris (1999) argues that "[t]he feelings of self-worth and personal efficacy inspired by a commitment to religious faith served as a critical psychological resource for some blacks during the southern civil rights movement" (78). He also finds that black churches served as the organizational hub of black life, and were one of the major mobilizing agents of protest during the movement (see also Morris 1986). Harris describes the black church as providing macro resources like social interaction and community networks that provide information on issues and candidates and micro resources like group consciousness and cultural cues. The norm of church-based political

activism is a message that continues to be transmitted in contemporary black churches (McDaniel 2008).

In addition to advocating and facilitating political activism, black churches also promote particular political orientations. Harris (1999) notes the negative relationship between church attendance and adherence to a separatist, Black Nationalist ideology. Since the black church's oppositional civic culture adopted as its main strategy conventional means of participation, those most entrenched in church-based social networks were more likely to reject separatist ideals. More recently, McDaniel and Ellison (2008) find a relationship between religious institutions and support for political parties that is moderated by church context. Specifically, they demonstrate the interaction between race and religion. They argue that the Anglo-dominated type of evangelical Protestantism accentuates personal piety and moral conduct which correlates with support for traditional family values, punitive crime policies and narrow extensions of civil liberties. This translates into support for the Republican Party. African-American religion, on the other hand, has been shaped by the social context of the group. As a result, the theology emphasizes the responsibility of society and its leaders to treat all individuals with justice and mercy. These norms manifest themselves in strong support for liberal social and economic policies and ultimately strong support for the Democratic Party (which comes in opposition to the highly conservative nature of their religious doctrines of orthodoxy and biblical literalism).

Given the historical and contemporary importance of the black church, I expect black suburbanites to utilize their church-based networks as an alternative to their neighborhood networks. Though not specific to the black church, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) find that the highest level of Democratic Party support comes from worshiping in a Democratic parish but residing in a Republican neighborhood. They assume that

people exercise more control over their choice of a parish than a neighborhood and that people "take refuge" in churches as protective environments. For the suburban African American, the minority status of the neighborhood would elicit a greater social benefit from a reinforcing church network even if participation comes at higher (travel) costs (via location in an inner city neighborhood). Thus, church-based networks will be more salient and more influential in the participatory decisions of suburban blacks.

As previously stated, few studies deal with the political implications of network participation, and fewer still include a large number of black respondents. Nevertheless, I follow the lead of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) and Verba et al. (1993) in my attempt to model perceived agreement and differences in opinion and ultimately the effects on behavior. Central to the Huckfeldt and Sprague research is that individuals perceive certain networks differently. They believe that central to this perception is whether a participant is of minority or majority status in the network. While the authors find definite effects from minority status, their models deal with partisanship and religious denomination. There is also little comment on any behavioral consequences. I agree with the authors that minority status should have some bearing on network perceptions, including discussions of certain topics. I would extend this reasoning to suggest that racial and ethnic minority status invokes specific reactions, arguably more intense than partisanship or religious denomination. A primary aim of this chapter is to discern the effect of racial status and see how changes in environment, like neighborhood strata, meter participants' perceptions.

Three hypotheses will guide the analysis:

H1: The gap between suburban black and white opinion will be wider than the gap between suburban and urban black opinion.

H2: Suburban African Americans will feel their views are less often in line with proximate networks like their neighborhood and workplaces than with less proximate networks like churches and volunteer organizations.

H3: Congressional district demographics, like the proportion of African Americans or black median income levels, will have independent effects on the relationship between network agreement and individual characteristics.

Methodology

Two datasets, the 2004 NPS and the 2008 CCES will be employed to assess the relationship between minority identification and social network dynamics. The CCES, an Internet-based survey conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix, was fielded in two waves—the first from late September to late October (pre-election) and the second in November (post-election)—during fall 2008. The 1,000 respondents recruited for The University of Texas at Austin module were drawn using a matched random sample methodology. First, a target sample was randomly drawn from the target population (voting-age U.S. citizens). Then, each respondent in the target sample was matched with a member of an opt-in panel. This survey was useful because it allowed me to ask respondents questions uniquely tailored to the current study. However, the CCES had a very small sample of black respondents and the sampling procedure jeopardizes the external validity of the results.

Therefore, I augment the CCES data with the 2004 NPS in order to test the hypotheses on a larger, more representative sample of African Americans. The NPS is more recent than the National Black Election Studies described in the introduction and is unique for not only its racial and ethnic minority oversampling, but also its extensive

Caribbean battery. While there is research suggesting that people of Caribbean descent most often identify as blacks, I coded them as a separate race/ethnicity and proceeded with my analysis using only self-identified blacks. Even with this exclusion, the number of African Americans in the NPS dwarfs that of the CCES. In all, the NPS sample consists of 3,339 respondents, including 919 Whites, 756 Blacks, 757 Latinos, 503 Asians, and 404 Caribbeans.

For the following analyses, I compare suburban blacks to urban blacks and whites. In the CCES, respondents were asked to describe their neighborhood as either suburban, urban, rural, or mixed. Unfortunately, there is no question about neighborhood strata per se, particularly suburban residence, on the 2004 NPS. However, they do ask about the racial composition of one's neighborhood. It is mildly unsatisfactory to use this as a proxy for suburban residence, but the social network aspect of my larger theory is virtually unchanged with either query. We can think about suburban residence almost as an anecdote to the larger idea of being a minority in a pervasive environment of any sort. By extension, an African American living in a rural community, or an all white metropolitan neighborhood should still have the same feelings of racial threat and a lack of cultural reinforcement as an African-American suburban resident.

Results

In the CCES, 36.8% of black respondents lived in the suburbs, versus 28% in urban neighborhoods, a somewhat anomalous finding I attribute to the internet sampling procedure of the administrating firm. In the NPS, the numbers swing the other way, and are more in line with the previous National Black Election and Detroit Area Studies. In the NPS, only 6.5% of black respondents live in a majority white neighborhood,

compared to 54.1% in black neighborhoods. In general, most blacks in the NPS do work in majority white workplaces (24.7% versus 23.7% in majority black workplaces) and as expected 60.1 percent of blacks attend a majority black church (compared to only 4.1% that attend an all white church). Of the black respondents living in majority white neighborhoods, 57% work in majority white workplaces, compared to 43% in jobs of all other types of racial compositions.[9] Also, African Americans living in mostly white neighborhoods are much more likely to attend an all black church than an all white church (59.1% vs. 16.3%, respectively).

Differences in Opinion

As expected, the opinion analysis shows vast differences between suburban blacks and whites. Table 1 shows that African Americans in any type of neighborhood believe blacks face a lot more discrimination than other groups, more than doubling the percentage of whites. Even more stark is the proportion of each group that has personally encountered discrimination. More than twenty-two percent of urban blacks and 20.4% of suburban blacks have encountered "a lot" of discrimination compared to only 1.1% of whites. Fifty-five percent of whites report never experiencing discrimination, compared to only 4.1% of suburban blacks. This finding supports the Hochschild (1996) research showing that even high resourced African Americans still perceive high levels of discrimination in their lives. Interestingly, 12.7% of urban blacks say they have faced no discrimination, though the difference is not statistically significant in a two-tailed test.

---

9 The other categories were: mostly black, mostly Hispanic, mostly Asian, black and white, black and Hispanic, white and Hispanic, black, white and Hispanic, black and Asian, white and Asian, black, white, and Asian, white, Hispanic, and Asian, black, Hispanic, and Asian, Hispanic and Asian, and all races.

Also included in Table 1 is one of the standard racial resentment questions, "Over the past few years blacks have gotten less than they deserve. Do you agree?" Here we see a surprising trend of conservatism amongst blacks that live in majority black neighborhoods. Forty-three percent of those blacks strongly agreed with the statement, compared to 36.7 percent of suburban blacks and 12.3% of suburban whites. The "strongly disagree" category was chosen by 32.7% percent of whites, but also 12% of urban blacks, a statistically significant difference from the 2% of suburban blacks that strongly disagreed.

With respect to group consciousness, urban blacks were also more likely than suburban blacks to say that what happens to others of their race does not affect them. Thirty two percent of suburban whites said race does not affect them. Seventy-six percent of suburban blacks expressed some sense of group consciousness, compared to 59% of whites and 71.1% of urban blacks, though only the difference between suburban blacks and suburban whites is statistically significant. Roughly 12% of blacks, regardless of neighborhood ethnic mix, said they would work for a minority candidate which is not surprising. This is however statistically distinguishable from the 5.2% of whites that said they would do the same. There was no statistically perceptible difference for any group as to membership in an organization designed to help racial and ethnic minorities with all registering around 45%.

Finally, we see the expected splits in terms of ideology and party identification (Table 3) with suburban blacks and whites almost the flip-side of one another ideologically and 40% more suburban blacks identifying as democrats (71.4% to 31%). This is important because most of the network studies attribute norm retention and behavior to the perception that one's views are in line with the group. The data show that in terms of political identification, the belief that suburban blacks will hold different

ideologies from most in the majority white network seems valid. I contend that this perception of dissonance, if not hostility, will be one of the primary catalysts that pushes high racially identifying suburban African Americans into more salient behaviors. Once again, the conservatism of blacks in all black neighborhoods appears as 34.5% of respondents said they were conservative, compared to 26.5% of blacks in majority white neighborhoods. Around 27% of urban blacks identified as independents whereas only 14.3% of suburban blacks answered the same, a statistically significant difference at the .10 alpha level.

As mentioned earlier, one of best features of the NPS survey is their battery on the racial mixes of the respondents' occupation networks. In order to leverage these data, the same opinion questions were run to see if individuals with different workplace racial makeups also have different opinions. Blacks in majority white workplaces, where the aforementioned opinion gaps exist, should have the same reactions as blacks in majority white neighborhoods. Namely, the perception of minority status will make individuals less likely to engage in discussions and should push them toward more racially salient networks where they will be more receptive to the prevailing sentiment. At a glance, there does not seem to be much difference between the responses of blacks in majority white workplaces and blacks in majority black workplaces, but the theorized differences between blacks and whites in majority white workplaces are supported.

When asked if blacks face discrimination, (Table 2) 59.4% of blacks in white workplaces answered "a lot" versus 27.1% of whites in white workplaces. The differences are again even more stark when it comes to personal encounters with discrimination. Only 1.3% of whites in white workplaces said they encountered a lot of discrimination while almost twenty times more blacks in white workplaces said they had (27.8%). More than fifty-four percent (54.5%) of whites said they had experienced no

discrimination, while only 4.8% of blacks in white workplaces answered the same. It is important to note that it is the **perception** of discrimination that is important, not necessarily whether or not it actually occurred. If one perceives they have encountered a lot of discrimination, then there should be a psychological diligence against future encounters, especially in things like assessing dissonance between potential discussion partners.

As expected, more whites than blacks in majority white workplaces disagree that "Blacks have gotten less than they deserve" (Table 2), 30.8% to 8% respectively. Almost forty-three percent of blacks in white workplaces strongly agree with the statement compared to 13.5% of whites. All are statistically significant differences. One of the few significant differences between blacks in white workplaces and blacks in black workplaces is in terms of group consciousness or "What happens to others of your race affects you?" 29.6% of blacks in black workplaces say it **does not** affect their lives and around 30% of whites say the same, though we can only say with confidence that these numbers are higher than blacks in white workplaces because they are only significant in a one tailed test at the 90% confidence level. Table 2 also shows that blacks in majority white workplaces are again most likely to campaign for a racial or ethnic minority candidate, with 13.4% answering affirmatively compared to 5.3% of whites. These significant differences and those found for the same question in Table 1 support the part of my theory that people in non-salient political environments will seek out alternative participatory behaviors. There were no distinguishable differences between the three groups on working for a racial or ethnic organization with each around 45%, but 54.5% of whites said they are very satisfied with their life compared to 27.4% of blacks in black workplaces and 37.4% of blacks in white workplaces, both differences are statistically significant.

Ideologically (Table 3), blacks in majority white workplaces are slightly more conservative than blacks in majority white neighborhoods where only 47.6% say they are liberal while 36.1% of whites consider themselves liberal, a difference significant at the .10 alpha level. For blacks in white workplaces, 27.8% call themselves conservative compared to almost half of whites in white workplaces. Additionally, 37.4% of whites identify as republicans whereas only 2.7 blacks in white workplaces indentify as republicans. For democrats, the differences are 32.9% to 70.1% respectively. Again, one of the easiest identifications to ascertain from someone encountered daily is his or her political ideology and party support. If less than three percent of blacks in white workplaces are Republicans compared to over a third of whites, while more than two-thirds of blacks are Democrats compared to less than a third of whites, it is clear that political discussions in majority Anglo settings will trend conservative. That is not to say a liberal black cannot associate with a conservative Anglo, especially if they both like the same baseball team or have similar interests in fashion. However, if the political conversations devolve into a regurgitation of Fox News talking points or Obama bashing, the minority respondent (minority as a liberal not necessarily racially or ethnically) must find her news from a different source[10], like an alternative network, and surely will not be politically mobilized by members of that proximate network.

For the church ethnic mix question, the analysis is confined to only African Americans. The comparison of African Americans in majority black congregations to those in majority white congregations is telling. For this project, the church is considered one of the self-selecting social networks. Unlike the neighborhood or workplace, these

[10] As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988) show, the initial option is the decision whether to counter the dissonant information at the risk of an argument or to withdraw from the discussion. Their findings suggest most minority discussion partners will choose to withdraw.

associations can be more fluid and perceivably changed due to the desires of the person; one would not go to a church she did not like. For the suburban African American, I believe that engaging in proximate networks that are not reinforcing will privilege the search for more comfortable associations whenever possible.

At a glance, the gap between blacks in majority black churches and blacks in majority white churches comes to resemble the gap between suburban blacks and whites. Whether this is a facet of socialization in the network, or prior socialization that makes one amenable to choosing a self-selecting network where they are in the racial minority is a worthy question, yet beyond the scope of this data. As to blacks facing discrimination, African Americans in black congregations answer "a lot" at 56.4% while African Americans in white congregations answer "a lot" at only 38.7%, a statistically significant difference. Seventy-one percent (71%) of African Americans in black congregations identify as democrats versus only 51.6% of blacks in white congregations, which is also statistically significant (Table 3). There were no perceptible differences in their individual experiences with discrimination, or for most of the other questions discussed earlier.

When asked whether politics are discussed at church (Table 4), 58.6% of African Americans in black congregations answered "yes" juxtaposed with 38.7% of African Americans in white congregations. At the beginning of this chapter I talked about the black church and its role as a socializing institution for the black community. One of the roles, solidified in the civil rights movement, is as a conduit of news and information not found in the mainstream. While we cannot comment on the substance of the discussions recalled by respondents, the gap itself is cogent. It is no stretch to believe that an association of people whose primary identification is race, and a particular race that

consistently believes their politics and news is uncovered or skewed by the mainstream, would pass information and messages that reinforce that necessity.

After analyzing the responses in cross tabular form I was a bit disappointed that there was not more of a measurable distance between my target group and urban blacks as proposed in H1. There is a fairly persistent difference between both suburban and urban blacks and their suburban white counterparts. Upon reflection, however, I believe this result is explainable and possibly speaks to the class stratification debates touched on in Chapter 1.

The prevailing sentiment is that as African Americans gain more socio-economic resources their primary identification will shift away from one based on race. With SES resources comes political resources and we should therefore see the same movement away from race in their subsequent political participation, sentiments both with which I disagree. Where my theory may have overstepped is the idea that suburban blacks will become **stronger** in their identification (and subsequent participation) by virtue of the perceived hostility in their proximate surroundings. The fact that the suburban African American opinion is almost indistinguishable from that of urban African Americans challenges the prevailing literature, while at the same time mildly supports my theory. It is also interesting to see the difference in responses for blacks and whites in racially dominated neighborhoods versus workplaces or churches.

Regressions were run with the same questions described earlier and can be found in the appendix. The effects for suburban African Americans were consistently in the hypothesized directions indicating significant differences between them and suburban whites that mirror the results from the crosstabs.

A Perception of Minority Status

To test the actual network interactions amongst respondents (H2), the original questions from the CCES instrument were used. The CCES instrument asks respondents whether their opinions are in the majority or minority of four networking environments: neighborhood, job, church, or volunteer organization. In addition, participants were also asked how likely they would be to express dissonant views if they were in the minority. The exact wording of the question is as follows:

"When we think about the group in which we have political or social interactions we may think about our church, job, fraternal/sorority group, or volunteer organization. Thinking about your interactions in the following types of groups, do you feel your views are in line or in opposition with the majority of the group?"

There is evidence (found in the appendix) that the opinion differences between suburban whites and blacks in the CCES are even more stark than those in the NPS, clearly exemplifying the differing opinions and participatory behaviors of the two groups. For simplicity, the sample was restricted to only suburban respondents.

I asked two questions to assess group consciousness. The traditional question, "How much does race affect you?" and a question more geared toward identification of any demographic, "Which of the following groups do you feel closest to?" For the traditional question (see appendix), 46.7% of suburban African Americans answered "a lot," and 40% answered "somewhat." A full 86% of black suburbanites said race mattered to them, compare that with only 16% of white suburbanites answering "a lot" and 35% answering "not much," both significant differences.

We have seen that race matters a lot to African Americans but does it matter the most? The identification question was designed to assess just that (Table 5).

As expected, 46% of suburban African Americans chose race/ethnicity as their primary identification, by far the highest of any racial group and significantly different from the 16.5% of suburban Anglos who chose race/ethnicity. For suburban Anglos, their highest identification was gender at 25.9% followed closely by class at 25.1%. Suburban African Americans answered at 16.1% for each of those demographics. These two questions taken together show the preeminence of the racial identification for African Americans. It also provides an individual level confirmation that group consciousness may be the main driver of the disparate presidential and congressional voting levels seen in the aggregate data presented in the introduction. If we believe all of the research on salience in networks, and the privileging of certain norms and subsequent behaviors, it seems as though suburban African Americans will be the optimal candidates to forgo voting in local elections and choose alternative forms of participation that reinforce their racial identification.

Most pleasantly, the social network questions about whether respondents felt their views were represented in their various associations moved in the hypothesized directions. In the crosstabs (Table 6) we see that, for nearly every choice category (completely, somewhat, seldom, never) African Americans and whites differed in their perceptions of network interactions in the expected directions. In the self-selecting networks, the two positive categories were chosen by more African Americans than whites. They also more consistently chose the negative categories for workplace and neighborhood interactions. There were significant differences between whites and blacks on every category except volunteer organizations.

As to job interactions, 32.9 % of suburban African Americans felt their views were seldom in line with the majority of coworkers. This compares to only 17.8 percent of whites for a statistically significant difference of 15.1 %. Suburban African

Americans were slightly less likely to feel their views were somewhat or completely in line than whites, who interestingly had a larger proportion of respondents answer never. Both whites and African Americans were most likely to answer that job interactions were somewhat in line, though whites had the higher proportion. Latinos were situated in between whites and blacks in each answer category.

The results for the neighborhood interactions are even more conclusive. Again, 32.5 % of African Americans found those encounters seldom in agreement compared to 19 percent of whites, a significant difference of 13.5 %. The largest difference of 23.5 percent comes in the 'somewhat' category where there is also a significant difference of 21.2 percent between African Americans and Latinos. There was also a significant difference in the 'never' category with almost 15% of blacks saying neighborhood interactions are never in line compared to only 6% of whites. Comparisons within races are also telling where only 9.7 percent more African Americans answered 'somewhat' compared to 'seldom,' versus 45.7% more whites in the same two categories. Obviously, African Americans have very different experiences in their workplace and neighborhood interactions.

Moving to the self-selecting networks, the differences persist in the expected ways although they rarely achieve statistical significance. It is important to note that there was no specificity in the question about the racial makeup of one's church or if the volunteer organization recalled was directly engaged in activities to benefit the respondents' most prevalent identification. While the information and norm transmittal functions of these two networks for African Americans and other types of minorities were the impetus for my theory, the overarching idea is that interactions in these environments will be more reinforcing, regardless of racial makeup. Suburban African Americans were both more likely than whites and Latinos to say their views were

completely in line with church members (Table 6) and less likely to say they were never in line, although only the latter difference was significantly significant at the .10 confidence level. The same splits were found in the 'somewhat' and 'seldom' category. Within races, all three groups had the highest proportion of answering 'somewhat,' however more whites said their views were never in line with church interactions than completely in line (17.9 to 18.6), while twice as many blacks answered 'completely' compared to 'never' (21.2 to 10.6).

The proportions for volunteer organizations (Table 6) were very similar for all three races, with Latinos the most peculiar. This, and the results for church interactions, may suggest a contextual difference between these two environments, and network-specific racial differences between groups. This finding is also somewhat representative of the distinctions found in Verba et al (1993). All three groups were more likely to answer 'completely' than 'never' though suburban African Americans were more likely to say views were seldom in line with volunteer interactions than completely in line.

Overall, the cross tabular evidence provides support for H2. For all respondents, there was more perceived agreement in the self-selecting environments of the church or volunteer organization than the neighborhood or workplace. These differences became even more pronounced when comparing blacks and whites, with blacks feeling less reinforced in the neighborhood and workplace than whites and more reinforced in the self selecting settings.

Before discussion of the HLM model, regressions were also run on these network questions.[11] Again, the questions were coded with "views are completely in line with the

[11] I am fully aware that a linear regression model is suboptimal for this type of data. Its inclusion is for exploratory purposes only. Ideally, an ordered or multinomial logistic regression should be employed. The main model for the chapter (HLM) does utilize such a test.

group" at the lowest value. The primary independent variable is a binary measure of whether the respondent is black. Income is measured on a 14 point scale. Age is simply the age of the respondent. Education is a 6 point scale from "no high school" to "graduate school," and ideology is a five point scale from 0 to 1, with "very liberal" coded 1 and "very conservative" coded 0. Finally, gender is a binary variable coded 1 if the respondent is male.

For the self-selecting networks, suburban African Americans were more likely to say that their views were completely in line with their church and volunteer organization associations (Table 7). For their proximate networks, places most often encountered but potentially less reinforcing, they are more likely to say their views are seldom in line with the rest of their neighborhood. The effect for workplace views was also positive but did not achieve statistical significance.

Congressional District Demographic Effects

In addition to the cross tabs, the social network interactions of respondents were modeled using a multi level or hierarchical linear regression modeling technique (HLM). The employ of a multi-level regression allows me to explicitly model environmental factors, particularly how changes in congressional district level variables independently affect the relationships between dependent and independent variables.

The HLM technique is perfectly suited for this purpose. This procedure is best for questions where larger environments influence smaller or nested jurisdictions. This can be handled in the aggregate (like the precincts nested within CDs found in the introduction) or at the individual level. The basic idea is that individuals, and their opinions, are not created equally yet there are similarities between individuals in the same

environment, here the congressional district. If we assume individuals in certain environments are more similar to each other than they are to individuals living in other congressional districts we can model this variability. The multilevel model uses maximum likelihood to estimate separate error terms for each level of the model. The result is analysis of effects between the dependent variable and covariates at level one (the individual) and estimates of how level two (congressional district) variables affect the relationship between the first level variables.

Geography in the modeling process is handled differently at each level. At level 1, respondents were asked what type of neighborhood they live in (suburban, mixed, urban, or rural). This question was used to stratify the survey. Only suburban and mixed strata residents were included in the cross tabs and multinomial HLM model. The variable was included as a control and interaction variable in the linear HLM model. The simple idea is that living in a suburban environment should have some effect on your view of social interactions, especially for minorities. At the second level, respondents are grouped based on the congressional district in which they reside. Congressional district is not meant as a proxy for suburban residence, instead it introduces the concept of a local political jurisdiction, the type of environment that lessens the salience of low cost participation and should push high racial identifying African Americans into other participation avenues.

With the dependent variable being a question with four, somewhat ordered, answer choices, the implementation of either an ordered or multinomial logit model is optimal. However, as we will see, this type of model, especially with the inclusion of level 2 variables and the estimation of extra error terms, is an arduous task for any dataset, let alone one with only 2000 respondents, about a tenth of which are in the desired demographic. While a linear regression model is inappropriate it can be useful to

assess diagnostics and simple relationships. The more advanced tests may allow for more accurate estimation, yet may be suboptimal if the data are problematic.

The dependent and independent variables were the same for each regression model. Four models were run, one for each environment described earlier. In the simplest terms, the HLM model is interpreted like a normal linear regression model at level 1, and is estimated in much the same way. The relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable is modeled as the intercepts of the level 2 model, and the level 2 independent variables are then interpreted as affecting the **relationship** between the level 1 variable and the dependent variable.

For instance, if there is a positive relationship between being black and voting, there may be a stronger or weaker relationship based on the demographics of the respondent's congressional district. If we want to know what about the district explains the variability, we would add level 2 covariates like the ideology of the major party congressional candidates. It is assumed that more conservative candidates will be less receptive to racialized issues, like affirmative action or welfare, and blacks will therefore be less likely to vote. If the coefficient for candidate ideology were positive, that would mean more conservative candidates would **strengthen** the relationship between being black and voting. If the coefficient were negative then more conservative candidates would **lessen** the relationship between being black and voting.

At level 1, the independent variables are as follows: House vote, measured on a dummy scale indicating a vote in the respondent's 2008 House of Representatives election. Suburban, measured 1 if the respondent lives in the suburb, 0 otherwise. Minority, if respondents chose minority status in their neighborhood. Express view, if they would express counterviews if in disagreement with the majority of the group. Education, a six point measure scaled between 0 and 1. Income, a fourteen point measure

scaled between 0 and 1. Black, if the respondent is African American. Black x Suburban, an interaction variable if the respondent is African American and resides in a suburb.

At level 2 there were three independent variables, all from the Census Bureau. Black median household income, the median household income of black residents in the congressional district. Black BA degree, the number of blacks in the congressional district with a bachelor's degree. Black proportion, the proportion of the congressional district that identifies as African American or black.

An unsaturated model was run with the level 1 variables mentioned earlier, as well as the respondents' views on affirmative action and the distance between their ideology and that of the democratic candidate for Congress. While many of the control variables achieved significance and moved in the expected directions, the coefficient for blacks was indistinguishable from zero even in this most basic of models, a disheartening precursor of results to come. All models, except for the multinomial logit of volunteer organization interactions were estimated with robust standard errors.

For job interactions, (Table 8) the linear regression model indicates, via the positive intercept, that all things being equal respondents are more likely to say their interactions are in line with the majority of the group. Respondents that voted in the local congressional race were also more likely to feel in agreement as were those most likely to express their views and those of higher education. As theorized, minority status indicates a lower likelihood of perceiving agreement and an increase in the number of black bachelor degrees in the district strengthens this relationship. However, an increase in the level of black median income lessens this relationship (at the .10 level). Here we see apparent evidence that not all resource increases are created equal in the eyes of minority

respondents. The results for the suburban, black, and the black x suburban interaction were not statistically significant.

In the neighborhood, voting in the local congressional race leads to less perceived agreement on the part of respondents and in a nod to the racial threat literature, an increase in the number of black BAs will make house voters even more likely to say their interactions are not in line with their neighbors. Those who would express dissonant views are also less likely to perceive agreement as are those with higher education levels however, more black BAs will mediate this relationship. Unexpectedly, minority voters are more likely to perceive agreement with neighbors, the opposite finding of job interactions. Again, the results for suburban, black, and black x suburban were not significant.

For church (and volunteer) organizations, we should expect the opposite signs for minorities and African Americans. Resource increases and political participation should still lead to more agreement in these self selecting networks, but minority members in their neighborhood should now perceive more agreement as they are assumed to find networks where they are more in the majority. This is the case, minority members are more likely to say their interactions are completely in line with most of their church members (Table 8). We should also expect that those who will express dissonant views find overall interactions less reinforcing. Interestingly, those who voted in the house race are less likely to perceive agreement. More black BAs makes this relationship even more negative while a higher proportion of blacks lessens the strength of the relationship. The coefficient for black respondents was negative, surprisingly indicating less agreement for blacks in church. However, the inclusion of the interaction variable makes its interpretation less straightforward and this is actually a finding for black urbanites, though it is still peculiar in its own right.

The final linear regression of volunteer organization interactions (Table 8) tells the same story. House voters are less likely to feel their interactions are in line with the majority of their fellow volunteers but a higher black proportion in the congressional district would lessen this effect. Those who would express dissonant views are also less likely to find these interactions reinforcing as do those of increased education. Respondents who feel in the minority of their neighborhood are more likely to perceive agreement in their volunteer organization, though this finding is barely significant at the 90% level of confidence, and just as confounding, higher black median income will strengthen the relationship, yet the opposite is true for more black BAs. Also, the effects for suburban residence, black racial status, and the combination of the two were all indistinguishable from zero.

Looking at the totality of the linear regressions certain relationships stand out. Voting is not created equal and actually works against perceived agreement in all networks except the workplace. It seems that those who participate in their local races find other environments less reinforcing. The same is true for those who would express dissonant views. That this expression makes people less likely to find networks reinforcing may confirm the finding of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1988). Those who are more argumentative should more readily meet challengers to their opinion than those who remain silent, therefore lessening the chances potential discussion partners are perceived as in agreement. That workplace interactions show the opposite relationship again suggests some contextual complexity between the effects of these environments.

As mentioned earlier, the nature of the dependent variable requires a more advanced estimation technique. Due to the ordered nature of the response categories an ordinal logit model should be appropriate, however this model falls short when there is not an equal relationship between response categories.

Diagnostic tests run on each of the network environments show that this assumption is indeed violated. In such an instance a multinomial model should be employed. While it does not have the desirable properties of showing how a respondent's level of the independent variable will affect movement between all categories, it does allow for a bimodal comparison of one category to a base line category. The addition of the second level for the multinomial hierarchical generalized linear model works in the same way as in the basic linear model with covariates strengthening or lessening the relationship between level one variables.

The results for the multinomial models were less than stellar, though they basically tell the same story as the linear model. The more negative categories were modeled in reference to the most positive and all results are estimated with robust standard errors.

For job interactions (Table 9), higher income makes respondents less likely to answer they never feel in line in their interactions, compared to completely in line, minorities however are more likely to say their interactions are never in line with the majority of coworkers compared to completely in line. Interestingly, they are also more likely to say their views are seldom in line than completely in line with coworkers.

In the neighborhood (Table 10), minorities are less likely to answer 'never in line' than 'completely in line' which flies in the face of the cross tabular and linear regression results. The only significant result for category 2 was that higher income people are more likely to say their neighborhood interactions are seldom in line compared to completely in line. For category 3, blacks are more likely to say their interactions are 'somewhat in line' than 'completely in line' the same positive coefficient for income is found for category 3, this is the only time the 'somewhat in line' category is significantly different from the 'completely in line' category.

As to the self-selecting categories, interestingly, minority status ceteris paribus indicates a negative relationship between choosing the 'never in line' choice compared to 'completely in line.' Minority respondents are more likely to see agreement in their volunteer interactions (Table 11). However, this time the level 2 contexts move in the same direction with both higher black median household income and larger black proportions increasing the chances a minority respondent will say their views are never in line with church members (Table 12). While the same (expected) relationship between minority status and black median income holds for category 2, we finally get an effect for being a suburban African American. Unfortunately, this effect is in an unexpected direction, black respondents are more likely to say their views are seldom in line at church than completely in line. There were no statistically significant variables for category 3.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to assess the social network interactions of suburban African Americans. Throughout the recounting of the literature, we saw research that provided much of the theoretical background of this project, yet was unable to fully speak to my hypotheses. The most famous work of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) makes the case that network interactions have behavioral consequences, but does not speak to situations where networks are not salient. Verba et al (1995) did make an attempt to include African Americans and Latino minorities in their surveys. Unfortunately, the African American section is focused primarily on the role of churches in the civil rights movement and as a main venue for the acquisition of skills like public speaking. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1998) is the most similar to my theory, however they assess

minority status based on party identification and religious denomination. My project focuses on racial/ethnic identification which should have independent effects on individual behavior. In all three cases, a theory designed for suburban African Americans may have produced different interpretations and conclusions, as we saw in the NPS and CCES analysis.

The crosstabular, linear regression, and hierarchical linear model were employed to test the idea that blacks and whites have very divergent opinions, especially on racialized issues. The perception of these differences will cause suburban African Americans in particular to have less positive feelings about their proximate (and usually majority white) networks. Three hypotheses followed from this theory. The NPS data showed unequivocally that the opinion gap between blacks and whites existed in 2004 and the CCES data shows that it persists in 2008. There was also a congruence of black opinion regardless of neighborhood strata or the racial mix of one's occupation. The main questions from the CCES also confirmed the hypothesis that suburban African Americans in fact hold less favorable views of their proximate networks. Unfortunately, there was very little statistically significant data on the effect of congressional district level variables on the individual relationships outlined by the first two hypotheses.

Moving forward, chapter 3 will continue the story, and begin to show the behavioral component of the theory. When suburban African Americans have these divergent opinions and feel their proximate networkmates do not hold similar views what happens next? Chapter 3 will use the CCES battery to test whether these suburban African Americans do seek out more salient networks, especially ones located in the cultural communities.

		Blacks Face Discrim.	R has Faced Discrim.	Blacks get less than deserve	Happens R's race affects R	Campaign minority candidate	Race/Ethnic Organization Member	Discuss Politics at Church	R satisfied with life
Suburban Blacks									
None / Strong. Disagree		0.0	4.1	2.0					0.0
A little / Somewhat Disagree	Yes	4.1	24.5	22.4	75.5	12.2	44.9	55.1	6.1
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	44.9	42.9	38.8	18.4	85.7	53.1	32.7	46.9
A lot / Strong. Agree		49.0	20.4	36.7					46.9
Urban Blacks									
None / Strong. Disagree		1.0	12.7	12.0*					3.2
A little / Somewhat Disagree	Yes	6.6	21.3	15.2	71.1	12.7	48.2	46.9	14.2
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	35.7	40.1	25.6*	27.9	86.8	39.4	39.4	50.9
A lot / Strong. Agree		56.7	22.2	43.6					30.6**
Suburban Whites									
None / Strong. Disagree		3.0	55.3**	32.7**					2.6
A little / Somewhat Disagree	Yes	13.1	17.8	28.6	59.1**	5.2*	28.8**	28.8**	5.2
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	59.1*	16.6**	21.9**	32.3*	94.4*	50.1**	50.1**	35.1
A lot / Strong. Agree		23.2**	1.1**	12.3**					55.7

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
Note: Significance is in reference to suburban blacks. * two tail at 90%, ** two tail at 95%

Table 1: Racial Opinion by Neighborhood Ethnic Mix

		Blacks Face Discrim.	R has Faced Discrim.	Blacks get less than deserve	Happens R's race affects R	Campaign minority candidate	Race/Ethnic Organization Member	R satisfied with life
Black in majority White workplace								
None / Strong. Disagree		0.3	4.8	8.0				3.7
A little / Somewhat Disagree	Yes	4.8	16.0	19.8	77.5	13.4	49.7	13.4
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	34.8	43.9	25.7	18.7	86.6	49.7	43.9
A lot / Strong. Agree		59.4	27.8	42.8				37.4
Black in majority Black workplace								
None / Strong. Disagree		1.1	13.4	13.4				3.4
A little /Somewhat Disagree	Yes	3.9	21.8	12.3	68.7	11.2	45.3	11.7
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	37.4	41.9	28.5	29.6	88.3	54.7	54.7
A lot / Strong. Agree		57.5	21.8	40.2				27.4
White in majority White workplace								
None / Strong. Disagree		2.6	54.5**	30.8**				1.9
A little /Somewhat Disagree	Yes	11.5	17.1	25.2	60.7**	5.3**	41.0	5.8
Some / Somewhat Agree	No	51.3**	17.7	25.0	30.1	94.4*	58.8	36.5
A lot / Strong. Agree		27.1**	1.3**	13.5**				54.5**

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
Note: Significance is in reference to suburban blacks. * two tail at 90%, ** two tail at 95%

Table 2: Racial Opinion by Workplace Ethnic Mix

	Party ID			Ideology		
	Republican	Independent	Democrat	Conservative	Independent	Liberal
Neighborhood						
Suburban Black	10.2	14.3	71.4	26.5	14.3	51.0
Urban Black	1.7**	26.9*	64.8	34.5	7.1	44.3
Suburban White	38.5**	25.6	31.0**	50.3**	9.2	33.3**
Job						
Black in majority White	2.7	20.9	70.1	27.8	11.2	47.6
Black in majority Black	1.1	30.2	63.1	36.9	4.5*	44.7
White in majority White	37.4**	25.9	32.9**	49.1**	9.4	36.1
Church						
Black in majority. Black	2.2	20.5	71.1			
Black in majority White	6.5	38.7**	51.6**			

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
Note: Significance is in reference to suburban blacks. * two tail at 90%, ** two tail at 95%

Table 3: Ideology and Party Identification

	Blacks Face Discrimination				Heard Politics at Church	
	None	A Little	Some	A Lot	Yes	No
Black in majority Black	0.7	5.1	37.7	56.4	58.6	41
Black in majority White	0.0	12.9	45.2	38.7**	38.7**	58.1**

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
Note: Significance is in reference to suburban blacks. * two tail at 90%, ** two tail at 95%

Table 4: Church Ethnic Mix

	Gender	Class	Race/Ethnicity	Profession/Union	Other
Black	16.1	16.1	46.0	9.2	12.6
White	25.9*	25.1**	16.5*	14.4	18.0
Latino	14.5	21.8	38.2	9.1	16.4

Source: Co-operative Congressional Election Study. Data are from suburban residents only, significance is in reference to blacks.
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 5: Race by Group Closeness

	Job	Neighborhood	Church	Volunteer
Black				
Completely	9.8	10.8	21.2	18.3
Somewhat	50.0	42.2	49.4	50.0
Seldom	32.9	32.5	18.8	22.0
Never	7.3	14.5	10.6	9.8
White				
Completely	14.5	9.1	17.9	17.1
Somewhat	59.6	65.7*	43.8	58.8
Seldom	17.8*	19.0*	19.8	15.1
Never	8.2	6.2**	18.6**	9.0
Latino				
Completely	11.1	5.6	20.8	9.6
Somewhat	53.7	63.0*	41.5	48.1
Seldom	27.8	22.2	20.8	32.7
Never	7.4	9.3	17.0	9.6

Source: 2008 Co-operative Congressional Election Study. Data are from suburban residents only, significance is in reference to blacks.
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 6: Similarity of Views in Social Networks

	Church Views in Line	Volunteer Group Views in Line	Neighborhood Views in Line	Job Views in Line
Black	-.393** (.08)	-.137* (.07)	.140** (.07)	.004 (.07)
Age	-.009** (.00)	-.008** (.00)	-.008** (.00)	.000 (.00)
Gender	.124** (.05)	.075 (.05)	.003 (.05)	.125** (.05)
Education	-.027 (.09)	-.336** (.09)	-.115 (.10)	.234** (.09)
Income	-.114 (.10)	-.328** (.09)	-.295** (.10)	.340** (.09)
Ideology	-.013** (.00)	-.001 (.00)	-.002** (.00)	.002** (.00)
Adjusted R^2 / Log Likelihood	.174	.065	.072	.037
N	975	964	993	952

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 7: Social Network Interactions Regressions

	Job	Neighborhood	Church	Volunteer
Intercept				
Intercept	2.849** (.03)	2.222** (.02)	2.243** (.03)	2.115** (.03)
Blk. Median HH Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.14)	-.000 (.00)
Blk. BA Degrees	.000 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Blk. Proportion	-.691 (.49)	-.223 (.37)	.198 (.50)	.382 (.43)
Vote for Congress				
Intercept	.167** (.05)	-.178** (.05)	-.135** (.06)	-.243 (.00)
Blk. Median HH Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Blk. BA Degrees	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)
Blk. Proportion	1.370 (1.23)	-1.790 (1.08)	.000* (.00)	-1.805* (1.03)
Minority				
Intercept	-.194** (.06)	.225** (.07)	.182** (.08)	.118 (.07)
Blk. Median HH Income	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)
Blk. BA Degrees	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)

Table 8: Social Networks – OLS

	Job	Neighborhood	Church	Volunteer
Blk. Proportion	-.832 (.82)	1.044 (1.47)	-1.320 (1.44)	1.168 (1.10)
Express View				
Intercept	.520** (.08)	-.553** (.07)	-.547** (.09)	-.525** (.08)
Blk. Median HH Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Blk. BA Degrees	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Blk. Proportion	.000 (1.60)	-.345 (1.66)	1.332 (1.69)	-.617 (1.53)
Black * Suburb				
Intercept	.020 (.17)	.145 (.17)	-.159 (.154)	.108 (.17)
Blk. Median HH Income	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Blk. BA Degrees	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Blk. Proportion	.454 (1.20)	1.146 (1.74)	.771 (2.03)	.393 (1.69)

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 8: Social Network – OLS (cont'd)

For Category 1				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	-1.04** (.16)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	1.90 (3.21)
Minority	1.30** (.41)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	3.66 (7.29)
Black	-0.43 (.86)	-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-3.10 (11.28)
For Category 2				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	.22** (.11)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	5.24** (2.39)
Minority	1.14** (.35)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.80 (5.42)
Black	-0.02 (.56)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-0.84 (6.44)
For Category 3				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	1.39** (.09)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	2.38 (2.10)
Minority	0.44 (.31)	0.00** (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	5.03 (4.34)
Black	0.09 (.53)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-1.33 (5.87)

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, reference category ‘views often in line’
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 9: Occupation – Multinomial Logit HLM

For Category 1				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	0.64** (.19)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-1.42 (3.21)
Minority	-1.19** (.53)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	7.65 (8.79)
Black	-0.64 (.74)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	0.35 (10.55)
For Category 2				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	2.65** (.16)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-2.23 (2.63)
Minority	-0.49 (.45)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	7.30 (7.92)
Black	-0.84 (.62)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	7.25 (10.15)
For Category 3				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	1.53** (.17)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-0.11 (2.94)
Minority	0.25 (.46)	-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	5.61 (7.65)
Black	-1.43** (.66)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	9.52 (9.70)

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, reference category 'views often in line'
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 10: Neighborhood – Multinomial Logit HLM

For Category 1				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	1.15** (.17)	0.00 (.00)	0.00* (.00)	-4.19 (3.62)
Minority	-0.80 (.50)	-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-1.85 (8.37)
Black	-0.10 (.69)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	4.06 (9.80)
For Category 2				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	2.41** (.16)	0.00 (.00)	0.00** (.00)	-5.30 (3.41)
Minority	-0.73* (.44)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	2.42 (7.66)
Black	-0.43 (.63)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	1.72 (8.66)
For Category 3				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	1.11** (.18)	0.00 (.00)	0.00** (.00)	-6.96* (3.78)
Minority	0.13 (.48)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	-2.89 (8.66)
Black	-0.84 (.70)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-3.56 (10.35)

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, reference category 'views never in line'
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05, robust standard errors not available

Table 11: Volunteer – Multinomial Logit HLM

For Category 1				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	0.40** (.11)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	0.83 (2.26)
Minority	-0.78** (.33)	0.00** (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	9.03* (5.10)
Black	0.67 (.49)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	7.56 (7.72)
For Category 2				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	1.24** (.10)	-0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	0.62 (2.22)
Minority	-0.68** (.29)	0.00** (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	6.07 (4.89)
Black	1.05** (.40)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.88 (6.65)
For Category 3				
	Intercept	Blk. Median HH Income	Blk. BA Degrees	Blk. Proportion
Intercept	0.40** (.11)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	0.35 (2.25)
Minority	-0.11 (.36)	0.00 (.00)	0.00 (.00)	2.12 (6.32)
Black	-0.10 (.58)	0.00 (.00)	-0.00 (.00)	-0.36 (8.31)

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, reference category 'views never in line'
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 12: Church - Multinomial Logit HLM

Appendix

	Blacks Face More Discrimination	R Has Faced Discrimination	Blacks Get Less Than Deserve	Group Consciousness	Work for Minority Candidate	Prefer Leaders of R's Race	Heard in Church	R Satisfied with Life
Suburban Black	.122** (.05)	.431** (.06)	.244** (.08)	.931** (.41)	-.186 (.39)	-.003 (.08)	1.10** (.37)	.031 (.05)
Urban Black	.152** (.02)	.353** (.03)	.273** (.03)	.652** (.17)	.208 (.18)	.064* (.03)	.867** (.18)	-.063** (.02)
Education	.034** (.00)	-.010 (.00)	.038** (.01)	.213** (.07)	.313** (.07)	-.024** (.01)	.195** (.07)	.002 (.00)
Income	-.003** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.006** (.00)	.026* (.01)	.004 (.01)	-.006** (.00)	.031** (.01)	.001** (.00)
Age	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.009** (.00)	.022** (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.010** (.00)	.001** (.00)
Gender	.015 (.01)	.070** (.01)	.036 (.02)	-.022 (.16)	-.034 (.17)	-.014 (.02)	-.425** (.16)	-.029** (.01)
Ideology	.120** (.01)	.009 (.02)	.205** (.02)	-.278* (.17)	.576** (.17)	.076** (.02)	.260 (.17)	-.054** (.01)
Adjusted R^2 / Log Likelihood	.129	.221	.172	-466.40	-439.58	.040	-443.44	.080
N	807	757	794	783	819	799	685	805

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 13: African American in Suburban and Urban Neighborhood Regressions

	Blacks Face More Discrimination	R Has Faced Discrimination	Group Consciousness	Prefer Leaders of R's Race
Maj. White Job	.024 (.02)	.071** (.02)	.760** (.23)	.101** (.03)
Education	.045** (.00)	.058** (.01)	.082 (.08)	-.020 (.01)
Income	-.001 (.00)	-.005** (.00)	.055** (.01)	-.004* (.00)
Age	-.001 (.00)	.002** (.00)	-.001 (.00)	-.002** (.00)
Gender	.007 (.01)	.150** (.02)	.064 (.19)	.052* (.02)
Ideology	.040** (.01)	.071** (.02)	.244 (.19)	.008 (.02)
Adjusted R^2 / Log Likelihood	.040	.110	-366.60	.020
N	606	585	607	598

Source: 2004 National Politics Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 14: African American in Majority White Job Regressions

	Blacks gotten less than deserve	Support Affirmative Action	How Much Does Race Affect You
Black			
None / Strong. Disagree	7.9	3.4	6.7
A little / Somewhat Disagree	28.9	13.8	6.7
Some / Somewhat Agree	31.6	27.6	40.0
A lot / Strong. Agree	31.6	55.2	46.7
White			
None / Strong. Disagree	39.7**	38.2**	19.0
A little / Somewhat Disagree	34.1	31.8	35.0**
Some / Somewhat Agree	22.2	22.4	30.0
A lot / Strong. Agree	4.0**	7.6**	16.0**
Latino			
None / Strong. Disagree	36.4	12.7	14.8
A little / Somewhat Disagree	33.3	29.1	25.9
Some / Somewhat Agree	36.4	36.4	44.4
A lot / Strong. Agree	21.8	21.8	14.8

Source: Co-operative Congressional Election Study. Data are from suburban residents only, significance is in reference to blacks.
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 15: Suburban Opinion

	Blacks Should Get off Welfare	End Affirmative Action	Race is Closest Group	Work for Group Representative
Black	-.081 (.11)	1.100** (.08)	1.700** (.21)	.969** (.46)
Age	.000 (.00)	.002* (.00)	-.008 (.00)	.024** (.01)
Gender	-.135* (.07)	.288** (.05)	.020 (.17)	-.084 (.29)
Education	.311** (.13)	-.332** (.09)	-.191 (.31)	-.131 (.52)
Income	.268** (.13)	.452** (.10)	-.681** (.33)	.783 (.61)
Ideology	-.003** (.00)	.016** (.00)	-.001 (.00)	.001 (.00)
Adjusted R^2 / Log Likelihood	.017	.348	-459.08	-133.62
N	1026	1024	1018	202

Source: 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 16: Suburban African American Opinion Regressions

Chapter 3: The Ties that Attract

In the previous chapter, we saw how residence in a suburban neighborhood affected the social network dynamics of voters. A major finding was that suburban African Americans felt that their views were less often in line with fellow neighbors and coworkers, who most often are white. In self-selected networks, they felt their views were more often in line.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the behavioral consequences of these social network effects. If one feels the networks they encounter most often are not receptive to their opinion and policy preferences, that individual should seek out other networks. If the distinction between salient and non-salient networks has a racial component (as evidenced in chapter two), and the individual has high racial identification, we should expect her to view those networks dominated by members of the same racial group, or directed towards aiding the group, with a higher salience. Environmentally, we have seen that particular racial groups dominate certain geographic areas. The introductory chapter showed that in modern metropolitan areas, racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to dominate urban inner cities than suburbs. Taken together, we should then expect the high racially identifying suburban African Americans to seek out majority black networks and institutions found in these inner cities.

Previous research on neighborhood context lacked the appropriate data to adequately test this hypothesis. On balance, there is a clear understanding that neighborhood context does matter, both psychologically and politically. However, most of the scholarship on context is sociological and deals with the effect of blacks moving into white neighborhoods on feelings of racism and group dynamics. Research dedicated to the urban inner cities is chronologically rooted in the historic civil rights movement

and current demographic and socio-economic disparities. There is very little discussion about the urban neighborhood as a political mobilization vehicle or how black suburbanites interact with those institutions and co-ethnic urbanites.

NEIGHBORHOOD CONTEXT

Huckfeldt et al 1993 say that while the surrounding population distribution influences the "patterns of social interaction" (336) of the individual, there is a lack of comparison between alternative contexts like one's neighborhood and religious parish. These differential contexts have serious effects on opinion and participation because they "index [the] relevant opportunities and constraints operating upon the flow of political information (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988, 475). The authors find that different contexts are relevant for different behaviors, like partisanship and attitudes toward abortion, because, "people look to different places for different cues regarding different behaviors" (Huckfeldt et al. 1993, 375). Oliver, in his book Democracy in Suburbia echoes these sentiments saying environment indirectly affects civic behavior by influencing the determinants of participation. "[A] place's racial composition does not make the act of voting any different, but it does change the other factors that influence whether one is likely to vote" (24).

Oliver also describes how neighborhood types affect social interactions. He says that smaller, demographically homogeneous communities will have more geographically proximate social networks. In larger cities, people are less likely to be familiar with one another. The implication of these environmental distinctions is that urban residents should expect higher costs associated with finding salient networks. This problem is exacerbated for high racially identifying African Americans whose proximate networks

are majority white. They should presumably have a harder time finding salient interactions. They are aided however, by the geographic concentration of their co-ethnics and institutions in inner-city metropolitan areas. Oliver also examines the influence of neighborhood context on the salience and intensity of racial identity.

> Situations defined primarily by race, such as racially segregated residential areas, are more likely to evoke a sense of racial consciousness…than other [types of] group cleavages…[By its] demarking the salience of racial identity [it] also determines the psychological motivation to become civically active relative to racial concerns (Oliver 2001, 110).

Winter (2003) approaches this effect from a more purely psychological orientation through what he terms microcontexts and macrocontexts. For Winter, the immediate social situations one encounters make up the microcontext. They involve specific "events or stimuli (statements, offers, threats, etc.) presented by other important political and social actors" (128). The macrocontext, one's life state, social class, race, religion, history, etc. influence the individual's reaction to stimuli in the microcontext. Both these contexts have large influences on personality. I believe neighborhood, and social network interactions are part of the microcontext, with the specific feelings and behaviors of individuals in these interactions determined by identifications like race and race consciousness that make up the macrocontext. Though not specifically mentioned by Winter, party identification should also make up part of the macrocontext. If, in addition to the racial makeup of the neighborhood or network, the political choices of a voter comprise the microcontext, we should expect the same relationship between contexts, where individual behaviors are influenced by the partisanship and ideologies of candidates.

RACIAL DYNAMICS OF CONTEXT

Most of the seminal work on race and neighborhood context deals with the racial relationships between previous residents of an area and people moving in. Undoubtedly influenced by the times, the vast majority of the studies deal with how blacks moving into white neighborhoods affect the racialized opinions and feelings of whites. The general question revolves around racial differences in neighborhoods and their origins. The *locational attainment models* test, "the ability or lack thereof of individuals and families to convert human capital characteristics, such as income and education into 'good neighborhoods" (Adelman 2005, 212, see also Alba et. al 2000). The consensus is that African Americans are less able than other groups to translate demographic resources like income and education into commiserate neighborhoods. Accepting this fact, scholars disagree as to whether the differences in neighborhood quality are the result of discrepancies in economic status (*spatial assimilation model*) or reflections of the social hierarchy and racial discrimination in society (*place stratification model*) (Bledsoe et al. 1995, Alba et al. 2000, Adelman 2005, Branton and Jones 2005, Fischer 2008). The authors find that whites are reluctant to accept blacks as neighbors, but having black neighbors of higher socioeconomic status (compared to whites) eases this reluctance (Alba et al. 2000). Adelman finds support for both models as African Americans of higher socio-economic status live in less segregated neighborhoods when compared to other races.

There is also some suggestion that the socio-economic status levels of all residents have an impact on racial attitudes (Branton and Jones 2005). In addition to the racial threat theory discussed in chapter one, the theory of intergroup contact suggests that prejudicial attitudes increase commiserate with a minority group's population in a neighborhood. Here, increased interracial group exposure and/or contact are associated

with having more positive racial attitudes. The authors believe the effect of neighborhood diversity that the authors believe is contingent on socio-economic status. A highly diverse and high resourced environment will be more conducive to favorable attitudes. Highly diverse and low resourced neighborhoods will trigger perceptions of group competition and therefore have the opposite effect. They find that socio-economic status does influence racial attitudes but not all resources are created equally. Education and income had differing effects on racial and ethnic composition (Branton and Jones 2005).

The racial characteristics of the neighborhood also affect the racial identity of minorities living there. Bledsoe et al. 1995 identify three effects of living in mixed-race neighborhoods. The *social density hypothesis* deals with racial solidarity amongst blacks in majority-black areas. It posits that high racially identifying blacks will live in all black areas while low identifiers will move to the suburbs. This theory does not take into account that blacks are less able to translate resources into neighborhood prestige. One of the major assumptions of my theory is that individuals of any level of identification will want to live in the nicest neighborhood possible. The African American with high resources will chose the highest quality neighborhood and job, and its resultant (majority white) network associations. Identification levels will determine the level of desire to seek out majority black networks and institutions. The *social salience hypothesis* suggests that African Americans in suburban and mixed neighborhoods will feel the greatest solidarity. The authors say that "sometimes unpleasant contact[s]" with members of other racial groups will remind the individual of the common identity shared with other African Americans (Bledsoe et al. 1995, 438). In their analysis of blacks in Detroit, they find support for the social density hypothesis, where blacks in majority black neighborhoods score higher on their racial solidarity scale (see also Gay 2004).

There is also some evidence that amongst African Americans identity is so overriding that residential context does not matter (*identity supremacy hypothesis*).

THE URBAN CONTEXT

Explicit in my hypotheses is that African Americans primarily inhabit two neighborhoods, each with a distinct character. Most of this project has focused on the suburban neighborhood characterized by high average socio-economic status and majority white racial makeup. I believe that high racially identifying blacks will travel to the urban neighborhood for co-ethnic contacts. Implicit in this is the assumption that the urban cultural community will activate the individual's group consciousness.

> By providing the social and institutional settings that facilitate interpersonal contact, draw attention to the collective aspects of black life, and allow for the transmission of group based norms, residence in a predominately black community may increase the likelihood that shared values and shared fate will be demonstrated and perceived (Gay 2004, 547).

The ethnographers discussed earlier provide historic context about the urban cultural community and describe its place as a norm transmitter. The early black middle class was unable to move out of the urban neighborhood. Since this class of people included sales and clerical workers along with doctors and lawyers, these neighborhoods became ethnic enclaves that heightened racial identification and indexed political opportunities. Having well educated and politically efficacious co-ethnics living next door or attending the same church aided in the dissemination of information and behavioral norms (Patillo 1999, Hayes 2001). "Segregated communities provided a critical site for the reorganization of membership in a racial group and the formation of racial consciousness, by linking racialized individuals politically, socially, and economically, setting the stage for the creation of a common history and identity" (Hayes

2001, 55). However, both Hayes and Patillo acknowledge that when these African Americans, who had been shaped and nurtured by the cultural community, moved out into the (still majority black) black belt suburbs certain aspects of their lives changed. The early black suburbanites had to negotiate racial and class interests but this new reality may have helped the maintenance of their identity. The newfound proximity to hostile whites seemed to activate a new consciousness in the mold of the social salience hypothesis allowing for the transformation of, "the daily slights of racial subordination into politicized group interests" (Hayes 2001, xxviii). This is exactly how I expect the modern suburban environment to affect high racially identifying suburban African Americans, just farther out geographically.

Besides the general discussion of the urban neighborhood context, scholars have set out to describe the unique institutions of the urban neighborhoods and their effects on racial identity. The institutions in the community can be termed "associational spaces, where attention to the collective aspects of black life is encouraged and social interaction is facilitated [to] foster a deeper and more assertive racial group consciousness" (Gay 2004, 549). Harold Gosnell talked about how these institutions functioned in Chicago's black community well before the Civil Rights Movement. He says, "the indifference of the white press to the real aims and interests of the Negro group [necessitated the establishment of] Negro weekly newspapers to build up morale and correct [false] impressions" (Gosnell 1935, 100). He also acknowledges that the lack of education on the part of most blacks heightened the significance of these indigenous newspapers when it came to politics more than papers focused on other types of communities. Patillo says that residential discrimination forced entrepreneurs and professionals to locate their services in the cultural community and caused them to orient themselves towards the group and its empowerment. This sentiment was echoed by Hayes.

THE URBAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT

We have seen that the black urban community is one of the primary environments for norm transmission and consciousness raising. The question for this project is whether these communities serve as an outlet for political activism for African Americans that do not live there. If these suburban African Americans, with high racial identification, travel to their cultural community for more racially similar social networks and institutions, they will also be presented with participation avenues like volunteering for a co-ethnic candidate or helping with a church's get-out-the-vote drive. The political context of their own neighborhood should make the choice between types of participation, and the utility attached to each, more psychologically accessible. These types of participation in the cultural community will also reinforce the individual's group consciousness. The original focus of the literature on municipal elections was the relations between racial groups and how they formed coalitions of varying strengths and durations to elect their preferred candidates (Gosnell 1935, Bobo and Gilliam 1990, Vaca 2001, Kauffman 2004). Seldom is there an explicit environmental component comparing municipalities or types of neighborhoods. There is however, a strong focus on how certain institutions within each community were avenues for political mobilization especially when involved in electoral contests characterized by group-based, zero sum competitions.

> The politicians have found that in the [majority black] South Side area it is easy for them to reach a large proportion of the voters at political meetings, easy to spread a rumor about the racial attitudes of a given candidate, easy to engage in conversation about politics, easy to find persons interested in the details of registration and voting, and easy to demonstrate that on election day the popular thing to do is to vote. There may be many in the district who have had limited opportunities for schooling and some of the older ones may neither read nor write, but they are kept informed regarding political matters by a variety of face-to-face contacts. In church, at a lodge meeting on the street corner, in their place of

> employment, at a restaurant, at home with their children who have just come from school or at a place of amusement, they learn about the political issues and the candidates of the day (Gosnell 1935, 23).

Gay provides one of the most comprehensive examinations of this question in her 2004 article "Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes." Her thesis is that living around other blacks will affect whether individuals view race as a defining interest in their lives, but this relationship is contingent on the socio-economic status of one's neighbors. She finds support for the social density hypothesis that those who prefer predominately black neighborhoods exhibit higher levels of linked fate. Using the 1992-1994 Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality, and merging it with block-level census data, she finds that socioeconomic status in the environment does matter with blacks that live in "high quality" neighborhoods being less inclined to believe race remains the defining interest in their lives (554). This finding is hypothesized to be the result of an "imitative learning process" (550) that leads individuals to adopt the attitudes of their neighbors. Here, moving out of resourced deprived communities is believed to "erode the sense of collective identity and fate and with it the potential for group-based political mobilization" (560). Gay does leave some room that contemporary studies may have different findings, "[W]ith the benefit of national data and a survey instrument concerned with both the individual attributes of respondents and the collective attributes of their communities, future research may reveal more fully the environmental factors that encourage blacks to believe that, 'color still plays a role…" (560).

The relevant literatures do present some anecdotal evidence that suburbanites travel to urban neighborhoods out of a sense of linked fate. In these interactions, they do engage in quasi-political and political behaviors. Hochschild (1996) has quotes from black middle class voters who miss the cultural environment of these urban areas even

though they did not regret choosing the best neighborhoods and occupations their resources would allow. These feelings and resultant behaviors have a long history in the African American community, Wilson recounts, how the newly college educated sons and daughters of the 1930s black middle class provide the leadership for the civil rights organization critical to fostering the groups collective consciousness (Gosnell 1935). Contemporarily, Patillo (1999) talks about how the close proximity of the black belt suburbs to the urban neighborhood meant the new middle class blacks shared institutions with the urban underclass. Parents in the suburban neighborhoods made a conscious effort to have their children interact with children in the community believing it would aid in their development and give them a stronger sense of black culture and its prevalent norms and behaviors. Hayes finds that this desire is so strong on the part of some African Americans that they seek out the "supportive psychological environment for their children" (153) that majority black residential areas provide. Those that still live in the neighborhood exhibit similar feelings and often seek out black community relations because of ongoing white resistance to their moving into the more affluent neighborhoods.

> For Nepperhan residents…the relocation meant a trip across town to use the [African American oriented community] facility. [They] appear to have accepted a political identification and responsibility that transcended their material self interest…Just as residents supported the rebuilding of the Nepperhan Community Center on the [majority black and less affluent] west side, they later became active participants and leaders in institutions like the NAACP and YMCA which served the black population of Yonkers (84).

These residents also maintained links to majority black culture centers located some distance away in Harlem, New York and set up scholarships for less fortunate students in the urban neighborhoods.

Data and Methods

In order to see if suburban African Americans do indeed have this kind of draw to their co-ethnic community, cross tabular analysis was performed on various questions from the 2008 CCES survey. It is important to note that this attraction to the cultural community can take on many different forms. As evidenced in chapter 2, the opinion of blacks in majority white neighborhoods who also work in majority white workplaces is very different from those of other races and neighborhood environments (2004 NPS). The perception of these networks also differs by race and environment, as these individuals were less likely to find the social networks they encounter most often, (or their most proximate), agreeable to their opinions. This is somewhat contradictory to the established literature that suggests our most proximate social networks should be the main drivers of opinion and norm transmission. In addition, the suburban African Americans surveyed found networks they could self-select themselves into, the church and volunteer organizations, much more receptive to their opinions. They were also more likely to choose a majority black church.

The 2008 CCES is unique because of its original survey instrument designed solely for this project. In addition to an explicit measure of neighborhood type (as opposed to the proxies employed from the 2004 NPS and 2008 ANES used in chapter 4), respondents were also asked about their social and political interactions in their cultural communities. Politically, in addition to simple measures of turnout and candidate favorability, respondents were asked to rank certain participatory actions based on which would be the most beneficial to their cultural group.

Unfortunately, the problems that plagued the social network analysis persisted in this chapter. Having such a small number of African Americans to begin with, stratifying them by their neighborhood type, their geographic distance from the cultural community,

their level of group consciousness, and finally the actual answer choices leaves the number of respondents in particular categories painfully low. In some cases, their means are heavily skewed by a few outliers that inflate standard deviations and therefore measures of significance. With that concern in mind, we are still able to get some picture of how suburban African Americans view their cultural communities, and whether these feelings extend to political participation.

Respondents were asked which of the following groups they felt closest to; gender, class, race/ethnicity, profession/union, or other. Those choosing 'other' were allowed to type in a response. Respondents were then asked if they live within driving distance of an area where individuals of the same identity dominate. The design was to illicit thoughts about not only residential neighborhoods, but also cultural enclaves where people patronize shops, attend church, and volunteer for service opportunities. For this chapter, comparisons will be made between urban blacks, suburban blacks, and suburban whites that said their race was their closest identity and said they lived within driving distance of a cultural community dominated by members of their race.

The hypothesis is that voters who find themselves in social networks or political environments that are not receptive to their racial identity will seek out these qualities in their cultural communities. Of course, it is very different to travel to an area to eat than to volunteer or aid a campaign. While the resource costs of participation will be higher than eating, attending church, or shopping, I believe that more frequent contacts with these areas will introduce the individual to the (more racially salient) participatory opportunities available in the community. The contrast between an unreceptive local environment and the more salient one a short drive away should lead respondents to engage in these types of activities at higher than average levels, even if they continue to participate in their local environments.

Results

The results were less than conclusive, yet some interesting patterns did emerge. On balance, suburban African Americans do exhibit different views toward the community and have different participatory behaviors than urban blacks or suburban whites. In most cases, levels of consciousness within the group increased differences between, and within races. Unfortunately, the differences were seldom statistically significant.

In order to assess how frequently suburban African Americans drive to the cultural community for various activities, respondents were asked how often they traveled there. As Table 1 shows, suburban African Americans have the lowest proportion saying they travel to the cultural community. Urban blacks have the highest proportion, as we should expect since they live in such a community. The difference between suburban and urban blacks was significant at the .05 level. If we break the groups down by their level of group consciousness (Table 2), we do see that suburban African Americans that say their race is their primary identification were more likely than those suburban African Americans that chose another demographics to travel to the cultural community.

A follow-up question asked whether respondents shopped, ate, or conducted business in their cultural community. On shopping/eating (Table 1), again suburban African Americans had the lowest response levels, and were again, significantly different from their urban co-ethnics. Yet again, those suburban African Americans with higher levels of group consciousness said they shopped or ate in their cultural community more often than suburban blacks that chose identification other than race (Table 2). The same

relationship holds for conducting business in the cultural community (Table 1), though the gap between high and low racial identifiers is smaller (Table 2).

Knowledge about the political history of one's cultural community will help determine the level of norm transmission. If a respondent is to see the community as a place for political participation, a thorough knowledge of the area's history will show how important it is, and what place it serves, in the life of the respondent. As seen with the other questions in the battery, suburban African Americans have the lowest proportion saying they knew the history of the community (Table 1), not only did low group conscious suburban blacks say they knew more than high group conscious respondents, but urban blacks and suburban whites with any level of consciousness had higher scores (Table 2). The difference between suburban African Americans and suburban whites was statistically significant at .05. The evidence suggests that suburban blacks with high racial identification do not know the political history of their communities, calling into question the theory that they view the area as an outlet for participation.

In a similar vein, respondents that lived driving distance from a cultural community were asked, "which of the following describe your cultural community" and were allowed to choose all that applied. To see if the social interactions in the area were different than local networks, I asked whether participants thought their cultural community was inline or hostile to their views. There was no perceptible difference between the groups, with all three between 38% and 44% (Table 1). When stratified by group closeness (Table 2), urban African Americans outstripped both other groups with more than 80% of those that choose race as their closest group saying the community was in line with their views, a statistically significant difference. Forty percent of racially identifying black suburbanites and 28.5% of whites agreed with the statement. The same

general pattern held for people that thought their views were not represented in the community (Table 1), except about half as many said the area was hostile compared to in line. High racially identifying suburban whites were more likely to say their community was hostile to their views (Table 2), while the difference between suburban blacks of differing identifications was less than 3%. Thirty percent of urban African Americans that did not choose race as their closest group said their community was hostile to their views. Clearly some respondents that share a common characteristic with their neighbors (race in an urban environment) still feel outcast because said commonality is not their primary self-identification.

It is also theorized that suburban African Americans will attribute higher utilities to interactions in their cultural community. To see how respondents perceive these areas, I asked if they found the community invigorating or depressing. Here we continue the pattern of suburban African Americans having a very unfavorable opinion of their cultural community. No suburban black respondent said that the community was invigorating (Table 1), but neither did any urban black with high racial identification (Table 2). The most unexpected result of the entire chapter was for those finding the community depressing. Here 27% of suburban African Americans said their cultural community was depressing (Table 1). This was a vastly significant difference from urban blacks (6.2) and suburban whites (2.7). This effect appears to intensify amongst those suburban blacks that chose race as their primary identification (Table 2). Forty percent of high identifiers said the community was depressing, compared to only 12.5% of low identifiers. While this is contradictory to my hypotheses, there may be some basis for the finding found in Hoshchild (1996). In her book she finds that successful African Americans feel a kind of survivors guilt for having 'made it' while their co-ethnics suffer.

This may explain why so many say interactions in their cultural communities leave them feeling depressed.

Behaviorally we see that urban and suburban blacks think the community is a place for entertainment somewhat equally (Table 1). Whites have the highest agreeance at a significant 35%. For the high racial identifiers, suburban African Americans were the most likely to agree (Table 2). This difference was significantly greater than urban blacks that chose race as their closest group. None of them viewed their community as a primary source of entertainment.

Respondents were asked if they viewed their cultural community as the center of political activity. I hypothesized that urban and suburban blacks would both view the community this way, but for different reasons. For urbanites, this is their local electoral environment and should be reinforcing to their group consciousness. For suburbanites, this area should serve as a comfortable refuge where any potential political opportunities will be taken to fulfill ones civic duty and group obligation, both of which are lacking in their local environment. Urban blacks have a much higher proportion agreeing with the statement, and suburban African Americans are the lowest, though not significantly different from any group (Table 1). When separated by racial identification, those suburban blacks that choose race as their closest group register more agreement than do low identifying suburban blacks (Table 2).

It may be that the actual cultural community interactions of suburban African Americans are different from their perception of what best aids the group. To actually travel, shop, or open a business in an area is tremendously more resource costly than just expressing an opinion about group conscious behaviors. Suburban African American's opinion is clearly in line with their co-ethnics and they have unique feelings about their

social network interactions. It appears they have an idea about group-based participation, just do not act on it at higher levels than other groups.

Respondents were asked to choose two of, "[the] most important ways of achieving the interests of their group." All of the options involved some type of political behavior. Some are more resource costly, others are based in the local community, while others are directed toward their closest group. The choices were: volunteering in a community where most residents are members of your group, volunteering in the local community, contacting your local representative, having a powerful representative, joining a social/political organization, and voting.

No suburbanites felt volunteering in the cultural community was one of the two most important ways to achieve group interests (Table 3). Urbanites that felt their race was closest were more likely to choose community organizations as an avenue (Table 4). In the local community, 35% of suburban African Americans said that was a top two choice (Table 3). As hypothesized, more low group conscious suburban African Americans choose volunteering in the local community than high racial identifiers, though this difference was not statistically significant (Table 4).

Feelings about congressional representation were mixed. Only 7% of suburban blacks thought contacting their representative was a viable option (Table 3). Suburban whites had by far the highest proportion of choosing this option at a very significant 41.3%. Of those suburban African Americans that choose contacting a representative, all were of low racial identification Table 4). When it comes to having a powerful representative, suburban blacks had the highest rate of agreeance, but none of the differences were significant and all were below 14% (Table 3). No urban black or suburban whites with high racial identification thought having a powerful representative

was one of the top two behavioral choices. High and low suburban blacks were equal (Table 4).

Joining a social/political organization was one of the few questions that moved in the expected direction. A full 35% of suburban African Americans thought joining an organization was important to achieve group interests (Table 3). This was statistically different from the 10% of urban blacks but not the 17.2% of suburban whites who answered the same. Almost half of the suburban African Americans that chose race as their closest group felt joining an organization was a way to achieve group interests, while no urban blacks or high identifying whites felt it one of the top two options (Table 4). The fact that respondents were privy to all the options but could choose only two means they had to make a judgment about the relative importance of the behaviors. When comparing the groups, it may be that particular types of identification work differently than others. Breaking down responses by group closeness is a comparison between all respondents that think their race is most important, but whose political environments are different. More than half of suburban blacks to think joining an organization is more important than having a powerful representative or volunteering for the local community. The fact that no high identifiers in the other groups thought this a viable option lends credence to the idea that political environment does have some influence over the attributed utility of behaviors.

The above discussion appears to be about secondary choices as most respondents thought voting as one of the most important avenues. Interestingly, urban blacks had the lowest proportion choosing voting (Table 3). More urban blacks with low identification choose voting, while more suburban African Americans with high identification thought voting was a way to achieve group interests (Table 4).

To test the theory in a similar manner, respondents were asked to rank different types of participation by its ability to aid their closest group. Here, there was a clear distinction between group-based and more general forms of participation. The presented results are for respondents that ranked the particular behavior as one of their top two options.

None of the groups had high proportions choosing "joining an organization specifically tied to one's group" (Table 5). Suburban African Americans that felt some other identification was stronger than race were more likely to join a group organization (Table 6). This does not mean that racial identifiers did not believe joining those organizations was important, but it may be that organizations tied to other identifications are viewed as more beneficial.

When talking about volunteering in one's cultural community, suburban African Americans had the highest proportion ranking it in the top two (Table 5). The 11 point difference between these voters and urban blacks is statistically significant at the .05 level. Suburban blacks that chose race as their primary identification were more likely than all other groups, including low identifying suburban blacks and high identifying urban blacks to say that this behavior was important (Table 6). This finding is much like that described by Hayes and Patillo in their books. Suburban African Americans clearly feel like their civic time should be spent on group-specific behaviors.

In the same vein, they were far less likely than urban blacks to say volunteering in the local community was an important benefit to the group (Table 5). Low identifying suburban blacks had a higher proportion than high identifying blacks of choosing it in their top two choices (Table 6). This result would be expected if high racial identifiers do not find the local community receptive to their views.

Interestingly, nearly as many suburban African Americans chose voting for a congressional representative (Table 5) as one of their top two options (22.2%) as did casting a presidential vote (36.1%). However, when we look to the first choices the expected differences appear. While a full third of suburban African Americans thought presidential voting was the most important behavior to benefit the group, only 2.7% chose congressional voting as their first choice. No high identifying suburban blacks thought congressional voting was most important, though about the same number of high and low identifiers ranked it in the top two (Table 6). Slightly more high identifiers thought presidential voting was most important, while slightly more low identifiers had presidential turnout in the top two (Table 6). As hypothesized, suburban African Americans view congressional and presidential voting very differently, and often times this follows with their levels of racial identification.

Finally, we move to actual turnout. Respondents were asked would they vote in the presidential and house races, and if they would cast a vote for candidate Obama. These questions were asked without the global prompt of participation to benefit their closest group. Again, all groups had very high levels of presidential turnout, with urban blacks actually significantly higher than suburban blacks (Table 5). There is no significant difference (about 5%) between high and low identifying suburban blacks saying they will vote for president (Table 6).

Support for Obama follows the expected pattern with suburban African Americans significantly more likely to support him than suburban whites (100% to 52.3% respectively, Table 7). No low identifying suburban blacks said they would support Obama. As expected, for whites (who are on balance more Republican) having an identification other than race made them more inclined to support the candidate (Table 8)

Suburban African Americans also have the lowest proportion saying they will vote in the House election (Table 7), however more high identifiers said they would vote for a House candidate than low identifiers (Table 8). This finding is totally contradictory to my theory and the other data in the chapter. They also had the highest rates of ballot roll-off (Table 7), but again when stratified by group closeness the paradoxical result returns (Table 8).

Measures of ideological distance were also employed. As stated before, voting is a relatively costless act for a high resourced individual. Even if an individual chooses their race as a primary identification, that does not mean that a secondary or tertiary identification, like class, is not just as important or the main cleavage of the local election. The perception a voter has of her representative may be less favorable even if this is overcome by party identification. Respondents were asked to place their ideology on a 100 point scale with zero being extremely liberal. They were also asked to place the ideologies of the Republican and Democratic House candidates on the same scale. It was my belief that suburban African Americans with high group consciousness would think their Democratic candidate was actually more conservative than their ideology, again showing the perception that even the candidate of their own party is not in line with their views.

We see that suburban blacks think their Republican candidate is far more conservative than they are, more than the other two groups (Table 7). Low racially identifiers think their representative is less conservative (or ideologically distant) than high identifiers (Table 8). Interestingly, low identifying whites think their Republican candidate is as ideologically distant on the conservative side as high identifying suburban blacks, indicating that the party with the most racial salience for whites are the Republicans.

As hypothesized, suburban blacks actually think their Democratic candidate is more conservative than their ideology, this difference with suburban whites is statistically significant (Table 7). This gap is even more pronounced with it comes to racial identification as low identifying blacks actually think the Democratic candidate is more liberal than their average ideology (Table 8).

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the results, we see less than stellar confirmation of the hypotheses. Urban blacks and suburban whites are much more likely than suburban African Americans to travel or shop/eat in their cultural communities. In a completely unexpected finding, suburban blacks were significantly more likely to say such a community was depressing. This result than may be attributed to the resource and residential discrepancies between the urban and suburban neighborhoods. However, the fact that suburban African Americans are also the least likely of the three to view their community as the center of political activity suggests that their non-reinforcing social network interactions do not shift the civic duty calculations to participation in the community. When stratified by group closeness, we get the expected results where suburban blacks who chose their race as primary identification were more likely to engage in the community and even view it as the center of political activity.

It does seem to be the case that suburban African Americans believe their congressional representative is not the primary avenue to politically aid their group. Instead, it seems they perceive working in the community as the best way to achieve their group goals. Though not statistically significant, high racially identifying suburban blacks give higher rankings to working in the cultural community and volunteering for

social or political groups while low identifiers rank local community organizations and interacting with their representative as the best ways to achieve group goals.

Ultimately, we see a muddled picture of how suburban African Americans view their cultural community and how these views differ from other racial and neighborhood groups. As stated earlier, the paltry number of African Americans in the 2008 CCES instrument along with the further stratification by geographic distance from the community means outlying opinions can produce very large swings in the proportions. While it does not appear that these suburban African Americans have much behavioral engagement in their communities, when asked what types of behaviors will be the most salient for the group, they tend to lean away from their local participatory environment toward the cultural community, as hypothesized. Of course, some of the results may be attributed to confusion or a lack of recall by respondents to the prompts about a cultural community that is dominated by members of the group to which they felt closest.

It bears repeating that the hypotheses of this chapter are one aspect of the project's larger theory. High levels of cultural community engagement were hypothesized to be the consequence of social network interactions that are not in line with one's views. That suburban African Americans view their local Democratic House candidate as more conservative, while the other groups perceive the candidate as more conservative, indicates a lack of salience with the local electoral environment that should manifest itself in the logistic and multi-level regressions of the next chapter.

	Urban Black	Suburban Black	Suburban White
Community Travel	87.5**	63.8	78
Shop/Eat in Community	84.3**	63.8	81.7
Business in Community	59.3	47.2	66.2
Community Knowledge	75.0	55.5	72.9
In Line with Views	43.7	38.8	43.2
Hostile to Views	18.7	11.1	5.4
Invigorating	18.7**	0.0	29.7**
Depressing	6.2**	27.7	2.7**
Source of Entertainment	18.7	16.6	35.1**
Center of Political Activity	27.2	13.8	16.6

** Variables are significant with Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 1: Cultural Community Interactions

	Urban Black		Suburban Black		Suburban White	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Community Travel	87.5	87.5	70.0	56.2	77.7	79.3
Shop/Eat in Community	75.0	93.7	70	56.2	83.3	82.5
Business in Community	62.5	56.2	50.0	43.7	66.6	67.2
Community Knowledge	66.6	80.0	50.0	62.5	85.7**	68.9
In Line with Views	83.3**	20.0	40.0	37.5	28.5	48.2
Hostile to Views	0.0	30.0	10.0	12.5	14.2	3.4
Invigorating	0.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	28.2	31.0
Depressing	0.0**	10.0	40.0	12.5	0.0**	3.4
Source of Entertainment	0.0**	30.0	20.0	12.5	14.2	41.3
Center of Political Activity	25.0	29.0	15.0	12.5	11.1	18.4

** Variables are significant with high racially identifying Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 2: Cultural Community Interactions, by Group Closeness

	Urban Black	Suburban Black	Suburban White
Volunteering in Cultural Community	30.0**	0.0	3.4
Volunteering in Local Community	60.0**	35.7	24.1
Contact Representative	0.0	7.1	41.3**
Powerful Representative	10.0	14.2	10.3
Join Social/Political Organization	10.0**	35.7	17.2
Voting	60.0	78.5	79.3

** Variables are significant with Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 3: Group-based Participation

	Urban Black		Suburban Black		Suburban White	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Volunteering in Cultural Community	40.0**	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1
Volunteering in Local Community	80.0**	40.0	28.5	42.8	25.0	25.0
Contact Representative	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.2	50.0**	37.5
Powerful Representative	0.0	20.0	14.2	14.2	0.0	12.5
Join Social/Political Organization	0.0**	0.0	42.8	28.5	0.0	20.8
Voting	40.0**	80.0	85.7	71.4	100	75.0

** Variables are significant with high racially identifying Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 4: Group-based Participation, by Group Closeness

	Urban Black	Suburban Black	Suburban White
Join Group Organization	9.0	8.3	10.7
Volunteer in Cultural Community	0.0**	11.1	8.3
Volunteer in Local Community	27.2	16.6	14.2
Congressional Voting	9.0	22.2	19.0
Presidential Voting	36.3	36.1	29.7

** Variables are significant with Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 5: Participation Rankings

	Urban Black		Suburban Black		Suburban White	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Join Group Organization	12.5	5.8	5.0	12.5	11.1	10.7
Volunteer in Cultural Community	0.0	0.0	15.0	6.2	11.1	7.6
Volunteer in Local Community	18.7	5.2	15.0	18.7	11.1	15.3
Congressional Voting	6.2	11.7	20.0	25.0	11.1	20.0
Presidential Voting	25.0	47.0	35.0	37.5	22.2	30.7

** Variables are significant with high racially identifying Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 6: Participation Rankings, by Group Closeness

	Urban Black	Suburban Black	Suburban White
Presidential Vote	100.0**	96.9	91.1
Obama Vote	95.2	100.0	52.3**
Congress Vote	79.1	76.6	79.1
Ballot Roll-off	20.8	23.3	17.1
Republican Ideology Distance	-20.71	-30.09	-24.44
Democrat Ideology Distance	8.86	1.34	22.27**

** Variables are significant with Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 7: Turnout

	Urban Black		Suburban Black		Suburban White	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Presidential Vote	100.0	100.0	94.4	100.0	77.7	95.0
Obama Vote	100.0	88.8	100.0	100.0	63.6**	50.9
Congress Vote	100.0	64.2	87.5	64.2	71.4	81.1
Ballot Roll-off	0.0	35.7	12.5	35.7	25.0	15.3
Republican Ideology Distance	-37.3	-8.2	-25.8	-33.6	-14.0	-26.4
Democrat Ideology Distance	-3.5	19.1	-3.7	8.0	17.1	21.9

** Variables are significant with high racially identifying Suburban African Americans at .05

Table 8: Participation, by Group Closeness

Chapter 4: The Convenient Truth of Suburban Environment and Participation

The preceding chapters have provided evidence of the unique environment in which suburban African Americans find themselves. The question that motivates this chapter, and the overarching aim of the project as a whole, is whether these environments illicit discernable differences in political behavior compared to other groups. Suburban residence is much more than a change in neighborhood. Factors like redistricting have presented blacks of similar opinions and ideologies with vastly different political choices. The packing of African Americans into inner-city minority-majority districts has left the surrounding areas overwhelmingly white, conservative, and Republican. This shift, along with the perception of racial threat that comes with minority racial status (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), should move the electoral discourse of the majority white congressional district away from positive racial appeals and the norms of the minority group and lessen feelings of commonality amongst neighbors of different races.

These suburban black voters have received little treatment in previous studies. Those studies with sampling designs geared toward African Americans have focused on blacks in large metropolitan inner cities or on the few southern states with large black populations. They make little effort to include African American respondents in majority white areas or provide data on how neighborhood affects opinion and behavior. Surveys on general participation do better in capturing suburban residents, but seldom have large and diverse black populations. They gear their sampling designs toward things like congressional competitiveness and duplicating previous iterations, relegating suburban residence to determination by proxy. Their theories also treat high racially identifying African Americans as anomalies, acknowledging that racial and ethnic minorities may

not fit into their conclusions, but making little effort to explain why or determine if there is more behavioral diversity among certain group members.

In the introductory chapter, I presented aggregate level evidence to show that environment does have some influence on turnout and ballot roll-off. African Americans that live in majority black precincts but majority white congressional districts do appear to have lower turnout and higher roll-off as the proportion of whites in the CD increases. Regression analysis confirmed that this result holds without respect to socio-economic levels of the precinct and showed that certain demographic factors at the congressional district level influence the relationship between precinct level factors and voting. The task now is to see if this relationship holds at the individual level.

In examining the previous research on suburban environments, social networks, neighborhood context, and participation (chapter 1), we saw that none of the theories made it a point to test questions found in the others. The work on suburban residence and neighborhood context rarely included or tested explicitly political variables. Research on social network effects lacked sufficient discussion of when the most oft encountered networks, the proposed main drivers of behavioral norms, are not salient to one's primary identity. There is also a large disconnect between studies of "general" participation and those directed towards the African American experience. The general theories treat African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities as peculiarities with little attempt to fold them into the broader theories and conclusions. African American specific research is primarily consumed with the ideas of group consciousness and linked fate and relies heavily on those datasets with the skewed sampling designs discussed in the introductory chapter. Additionally, neither cannon has made a sustained effort to test the effect of suburban environment and the political consequences of a changing residential landscape on their previous findings.

In chapter 2, we saw that indeed, suburban African Americans have very different opinions than their white and Latino neighbors, and on some issues are much more liberal than are their urban co-ethnics. There were also strong effects by the racial makeup of one's neighborhood, workplace, and church networks on racialized opinion. Race was also a strong determinant among suburbanites of whether they felt their views were in line with the others in their social networks. If blacks situated in majority white networks do not feel as though they have the same opinions as coworkers and neighbors, we should not expect them to internalize and act upon that group's norms. Subsequently, we should expect different behaviors than the majority of the group.

The previous chapter offered tacit confirmation of individual-level behavioral differences based on environment, in spite of significant data limitations. It told the stories of the respondents that best exemplify the theory and showed that the historic African American cultural community is a draw for suburbanites looking for activities like entertainment and worship. Moreover, the geographic proximity to such an area appears to influence the information channels accessed and the view of the community as an outlet for participatory actions.

This chapter will build on the findings of the earlier chapters and assess the relationship between environment and political participation. I believe suburban blacks drawn out of the majority-minority district are confronted with electoral choices, at the congressional district level, that do not reinforce their group consciousness. Their higher socio-economic resource levels will increase their residential and occupational prestige. Consequently, they will be more likely to live and work in majority white social contexts perceived as hostile to their (racialized) opinions. With more salient networks and institutions just a short drive away, the benefits associated with these group dominated interactions will overcome any costs associated with distance or more resource intensive

behaviors. Non-political participation in these communities will expose the suburban African American to different group norms, heighten racial consciousness, and lead the individual to attach higher utilities to political participation in these areas. This will manifest itself in lower levels of turnout and more ballot roll-off in majority white and Republican congressional elections. It will also increase participation in areas beyond voting that can be better focused toward aiding the racial group.

PARTICIPATION

There are a number of ways to approach a review of political participation in the social sciences. Throughout this project, I have identified strands of research applicable to my theory of suburban African American political behavior with some lament that they seldom speak to one another. That said, some of the studies on suburban residence, social network effects, and neighborhood context do address the effects of these factors on participation. It is an exposition of what this research has to say about participation and its applicability to suburban African Americans that will be the focus of this section.

Resource-based Participation

Most general participation theories take for granted the assumption of Verba et al. that resources (e.g. money, education, time, etc.) are large determinants of participation levels. Others recognize this relationship but consider it more contingent on other demographics. What is rarely in dispute is that blacks participate at high levels despite lower resources because of high racial identification. What about the high identifying black with high resources but poor political choices? These voters should not have the

same linear relationship between resources and voting in either rationality or solidarity terms.

The Civic Volunteerism Model (CVM) of Verba et al. in their 1995 book, "Voice and Equality" is the most cited articulation of this resource-based participation. In the CVM, the authors say that participation is contingent on resources, engagement, and recruitment. Resources are things like the "time to take part in politics, money to contribute to campaigns or other political causes, and the skills to use time and money effectively" (304). Engagement is the interest in politics and public issues, the belief that activity can make a difference, and knowledge about the political process. Finally, recruitment is how elites mobilize citizens to politics, usually through networks. My greatest qualm with the CVM is its seemingly one-way direction, exclusively toward increased participation with little discussion of how networks, social status, or political environment can influence certain types of participation differently. For suburban African Americans, there is little question that they posses more resources than the median black voter upon which Verba et al. based their conclusions, since resources are most often associated with the economic position of the individual (Verba et al. 1993). What is not as clear is if this increase in resources leads to a commiserate increase in engagement and recruitment.

Especially for high racial identifiers, engagement may be metered as interest should be strongest in particular areas like racial equality or redistributive policies like welfare. Increased knowledge about the political process may not lead to more participation as the lack of racialized issues in the political discourse or the negative treatment of such issues by the mainstream could become more apparent. The makeup of one's network may also influence recruitment. While it is true that networks should mobilize one toward certain behaviors, not all networks are created equally. Not only

should non-salient networks push participants from certain norms, the same types of appeals should not be effective in all types of networks. The same type of motivation in a Major League Baseball clubhouse (competition to attain a championship at the expense of all other teams) should not be expected for a Little League T-ball team (enjoyment and sportsmanship).

Mobilization beyond Resources

There is evidence to suggest that the most effective mobilizing networks for blacks will be those geared toward the race, not those most often encountered. Research has indicated that politicians most often appeal to African-American networks using group-based messages as opposed to material self-interest. Further, Harold Gosnell notes the importance of black social networks: "The churches, the press, and the economic and social groups of the black community have a stronger hold upon the rank and file than corresponding institutions in other communities (1967, 114). As Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue, these racial group based social networks are more readily mobilized because they, " provide additional benefits for participation, including exploiting friendships and social obligations" (196). For suburban African Americans, these social obligations can come in the form of aid to the racial group. Zuckerman et al. (1994) seem to challenge this on its face saying that,

> by itself membership in a social category does not much influence vote choice. Instead, the greater the number of reinforcing social and political interactions the more likely one is to persistently support one party. In addition, interactions with those of like political preferences have a greater impact on voting decisions than do connections to people of the same social class or ethnic group (1023).

However, suburban African Americans find themselves in a slightly different situation than those analyzed by Zuckerman et al. The networks most often encountered

are likely to be Republican while suburban African Americans are overwhelmingly Democratic (as evidenced by the crosstab analysis of chapter 2).

The Costs and Benefits of Participation

The preceding literatures have shown that most participation is resource driven. There is also evidence that African Americans have high participation rates despite low resources and that high-resourced blacks may not participate in certain elections as often as the CVM or the social network research would suggest. To find a theory that can reconcile these seeming discrepancies we can turn to rational choice.

As recounted in chapter 1, the theory as applied to voting states that a person will vote if the benefits of voting are larger than the costs (Downs 1947, Rikker and Ordeshook 1967). This idea has direct applicability to my project in two ways. First, as described in chapter 1, there is a discussion of how certain types of participation are associated with particular costs and benefits. Ultimately, we can say that if one engages in one behavior over another, said behavior must either come at lower costs or produce higher benefits. If one chooses behaviors that come at higher costs, they must come with higher benefits. Secondly, if one chooses networks or institutions like churches or volunteer organizations that are located farther away than similar institutions located closer, there must be something the more (travel) costly place has that cannot be found at the closer one, something more beneficial. If the suburban black chooses more resource costly alternative participatory behaviors over voting and travels longer distances to find a black church or Urban League meeting in the inner city it must come with higher utilities. When both the alternative behaviors and privileged institutions are majority

black, or oriented to helping the black group, we have additional evidence that racial identity is the primary driver of political behavior.

I believe a lack of salient choices will be the main driver of suburban black participation and will push these voters toward alternative avenues that produce larger benefits. David Sears (2003) addresses part of this rationality calculation in his discussion of electoral choices and their effect on participation levels.

> Any decision involves a choice and a choice requires at least two alternatives that could be chosen. Each alternative is associated with a set of beliefs about the outcomes that are potentially associated with each alternative – beliefs that can be idiosyncratic to every decision maker. Each outcome must be associated with a value or preference, which again can be unique to every decision maker (21).

Clearly two voters can view the same election differently.

Rosenstone and Hansen place this in purely political terms saying participation has much to do with the attractiveness of the choices the system offers, and that these choices are important determinants of the benefits voters received from their efforts. In a nod to suburban blacks, they say, "other voters other times see little to accomplish in the election. They neither identify with the alternatives nor expect any policy advantages to accrue from the outcome of the election" (42). For the high racially identifying suburban African Americans who the legislature has drawn into a majority white, ideologically conservative district neither candidate choice is optimal. Even if their high civic duty or resources lead them to vote in such a contest based on other factors, their racial consciousness has not been addressed. Alternative forms of participation like donating money to a co-ethnic candidate from the MMD or working with the NAACP to register people to vote should be more rational.

Demographic Differentials

Chong and Rogers (2005) discuss the effect of solidarity on participation as a determinant of the benefits side of the equation. They define racial solidarity as incorporating, both psychological identification and the ideological beliefs that comprise 'consciousness.' The authors find, as we would expect, that group solidarity exerts normative pressure on individuals to think in group terms and contribute to collective goals through political action. When people seek out alternative behaviors that aid the group but also involve interpersonal interactions, the norm transmission is increased. Interestingly, they find less positive correlation between group solidarity and participation in recent studies. The authors also discuss the influence of solidarity on alternative forms of participation beyond voting. As assumed for suburban African Americans, they say that some forms of solidarity may even direct individuals away from [certain] political activities. Therefore, we see that participation may in fact be contingent on resources but it must fit into a rational cost/benefit analysis and can be further mediated by group consciousness.

BALLOT ROLL-OFF

A simple examination of voting rates may not be sufficient to see if suburban residence changes the behaviors of African Americans. The decision to vote and the resultant benefits should not be expected to be the same in each type of election or political jurisdiction. Attention to the nuances of ballot roll-off may increase our precision in assessing these political behaviors.

Candidate Constituencies

One mediator of participation rates is the actual office being contested. There has been some discussion earlier of ballot roll-off, which is the difference in turnout between two or more elections. In theory, elections at the top of the ballot, like president or governor, will receive more attention than those farther down, even if it is because of constituency size. Therefore, we can consider roll-off a measure of attentiveness and engagement in the election. For this project, I take ballot roll-off to be a measure of the salience of one electoral contest compared to another. In the formulation of the CVM, resources may be high but as a down-ballot race receives less attention (and requires higher costs to attain information), we should expect less engagement and recruitment and therefore lower participation. Rationally, the smaller the benefit to be derived the closer it comes to falling below the costs. Additionally, if the race offers no acceptable alternatives from which to choose then there can be no substantial benefit and voting becomes less rational.[12]

We can assume the suburban African American with high group identification attributes higher utilities to elections where candidates address racial issues in a positive way. A presidential election will address racial issues by virtue of 12% of the candidate's constituency being African American. Even if the strongest candidate is racially hostile, we should expect the opponent to take the opposite stance if only to capitalize on an untapped segment of the electorate. As a result, we should always expect some benefit from presidential voting for the high racial identifying black voter. Compare this constituency of 300 million to that of a congressional district which is $1/435^{th}$ as large (around 650,000 based on the 2000 census). We have seen from the maps in the

[12] Very seldom will voting be totally irrational, especially for the high resourced individual. Pure civic duty and socialization should produce some utility even if no distinction is made between candidates.

introductory chapter and the redistricting literature that the packing of African Americans into MMDs leaves the surrounding districts more white and Republican. Electoral discourse in this type of environment would less likely address racial issues positively. This should lower the benefit and drive suburban African Americans voters away from congressional voting, which would result in higher ballot roll-off.

Environmental Effects

Vanderleeuw and Sowers (2007) provide one of the few roll-off studies with an urban black environmental component. They say attention to roll-off is important because it is understudied and has serious policy implications. They also acknowledge that roll-off levels are contingent on socioeconomic characteristics. The authors find that black voters do roll-off more and that "the level of black electoral participation is sensitive to racial cues such as the race of candidates on the ballot or an issue that addresses the interests of blacks, in the absence of racial cues black voting is very much diminished" (938). Their work primarily deals with urban blacks voting in city council elections. Since suburban blacks have very similar opinion and racial identifications to their urban co-ethnics, we should expect the same behavior. The research of Harris and Zipp (1999) also speaks to the influence of racialized elections.. In their examination of municipal contests around the country, they found that the elections of blacks in one jurisdiction could heighten the participation of blacks in other cities that had not elected black officials. If this relationship carries over cities and states, surely it will sustain across congressional districts.

ALTERNATIVE PARTICIPATION

The case has been made that voting may not be the most beneficial participatory behavior for suburban African Americans. Key to our understanding Miller et al.'s (1981) group consciousness, is the idea that individuals will work to advance group goals. If the choices presented in the voting booth do not fit the bill, the high resourced identifier will have the knowledge and ability to find alternative forms of participation that will fill this group-based and civic desire.

At its most basic, alternative participation involves all forms of participation besides voting. The research often categorizes alternative participatory behaviors as either conventional or unconventional. Conventional forms include writing letters to officials, donating money, campaign work, and joining an organization with a political purpose. Unconventional forms include protests and boycotts to illicit a governmental response. The general belief is that alternative participation is costlier than voting from a resource and rational choice aspect (Verba et al. 1995). However, it can also be more beneficial because one is not tied to the candidate choices in their jurisdiction and can work to influence government in a way beyond electing officials. In this way, the suburban African Americans in non-salient elections with high racial identification can better target their participation.

Organization Membership

In the broader alternative participation literature there has been work done on each type of behavior, how they relate to voting and the other behaviors, and what impact they have on policy and elected officials. Following the social network discussion, we can see evidence that participating in social networks, especially volunteer organizations, teaches certain norms and are ripe places to mobilize political support.

Verba et al. (1995) say that alternative participation locales like church and volunteer organizations mobilize because people develop interpersonal networks that bring them into politics by exposing them to political stimuli and fostering informal political discussions. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) echo this sentiment saying mobilization through organizations works because it gets together like-minded people. They also discuss the norm transmission role. They say that the key aspect of network mobilization is that voters with some particular common characteristic are in one place. Furthermore, they have already engaged in an individual behavior for some collective aim by virtue of their attendance. This enables the constructing of a specific message to which receivers will be most receptive. While the authors acknowledge that the politicians primary goal is to win elections and enact policies, in the process they inform citizens about the issues at stake and the most effective course of action to achieve desired outcome. In addition to their cost cutting function, the appeals of candidates and officials "gear interest groups into action and create a buzz of political discussion in social networks. People then respond by participating in governmental politics" (123). When we talk about salient group norms not all networks or organizations are created equal (Verba et al. 1995). Organizations transmit norms directly through mobilization and indirectly through interpersonal contacts. We should expect organizations with an explicit racial focus and co-ethnic dominated membership to privilege the norms of that group. For the suburban African Americans who cannot access those particular norms and interpersonal relations in their job or workplace, costs may be higher to seek out salient messages but they are also most likely to psychologically retain them. When it comes time to act in accordance with these beliefs we should expect the behavior to be directed toward group goals.

Solidary Benefits of Membership

There is also research on the types of benefits derived from alternative forms of participation. The consensus is that this participation is ripe with solidary benefits.[13] Verba et al. (1995) say that while organization membership exacts more in the way of resources, it is especially rich in selective benefits that are necessary for [individuals] working towards a widely shared objective to be rational. Chong and Rogers (2005) say that racial identification and consciousness had larger effects on campaign activities and participation in boycotts and protests than on voting. The authors find that group solidarity has its greatest impact on activities that require solidarity over and above political interest and civic skills. Clearly, we see that not all forms of participation are created equal and different participation behaviors also vary across races. Verba et al. 1993 and 1995 find that African Americans have a roughly proportionate share of activists relative to their population. While they are less likely than whites to be involved in political organizations, they are just as likely to be active in their communities. African Americans are more likely than whites to say they have worked in a campaign but less likely to have given money. Yet in a nod to the roll-off research they are less likely to report having voted. There is no separation of racialized participation from generic types like party support. However, if my assumptions about rationality are correct, we should expect that when given the two options at equivalent costs the higher racial identifier would choose the racialized behavior because it comes with a larger benefit. For the suburban African American, if the solidary benefit differential is large enough it should overcome any extra costs for not participating in an organization closer to one's neighborhood.

[13] There is some discussion of material benefits like subsequent employment or policy actions

BLACK PARTICIPATION

As was stated at the outset, there are countless research studies about African American participation. I recounted the major strands of the literature in chapter 1. The aim of this section is to see what the research on suburban environment, social networks, and neighborhood context has to say about black participation specifically. Pattillo (1999) may summarize the case best in her book about middle class blacks that moved out of the central city. African American families, "mix strong cultural traditions with their economic resources to come up with their own 'mainstream' practices" (213). This is the point of this entire project. To find out what those mainstream practices are for suburban African Americans that find themselves in unique and non-racially reinforcing social and political environments.

The peculiarity of African American participation is not something new; neither is research proving this is the case. In 1935, Harold Gosnell found that not only did African Americans vote despite lower levels of wealth and social prestige, the appeals used to stir them to participation were different. Calls to rational self-interest and material benefits were less successful than more solidary appeals like race consciousness and civic pride. Rosenstone and Hansen attribute the effectiveness of these messages to the norms of the civil rights movement saying it increased political awareness, efficacy, racial identity, and social expectations (1993). As blacks and others achieved the policy objectives of the civil rights movement, African American participation evolved. As the democratic party moved solidly to the side of civil rights African American voters could see appreciable differences between the parties and they perceived more benefits from political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). They also saw the types of resource gains described by Hayes, Patillo, and Hoshchild. These increased resources coupled with the participatory norms of the civil rights movement produced a high-level

group based participation not seen in other races. While all were influenced by the same forces, it came in different proportions for certain groups (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Verba et al. pick up on this differential calculus in their 1993 and 1995 studies. They argue that a particular group subculture not only affects the levels of participation but also the participatory avenues. "Race and ethnicity matter to participation in two different ways…some resources associated with political activity [like]…religious denomination and practice are intimately connected to group identity…Moreover, race and ethnicity are surely germane to the content of messages communicated…" (1993, 494). African Americans find themselves in a unique position relative to minority groups in that the larger government and judicial structure have explicitly mandated their political incorporation. In such a situation "[w]hen demographic distinctions are pertinent to political conflict," participatory differentials amongst groups may be significant (495).

We have seen how the studies that deal with environment and social network dynamics handle participation. Now we will proceed in testing whether suburban African Americans indeed have lower turnout and higher roll-off compared to other groups and if that translates into increased participation in more group focused alternative behaviors.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL

In order to test the theories described earlier, two types of statistical models were analyzed. A logistic regression was run on electoral turnout and ballot roll-off to see if indeed, suburban African Americans have unique voting behaviors when compared to their white neighbors and urban co-ethnics. To model how environmental factors

influence this individual level relationship, I employed various HGLM models, much like those in chapter 2. Again, the hypothesis is that suburban African Americans, or in this case African Americans that reside outside of the minority-majority district, will be confronted with different participatory choices than other voters. They have a unique combination of high group consciousness and above average political resources like educational attainment and occupational prestige not found elsewhere in the population. Almost by definition, the electoral discourse and candidate choices in their immediate (majority white, Republican leaning) surroundings will not speak to their high racial identification. I hypothesize that this psychological aversion to the electoral climate will have the behavioral effect of making these voters less likely to turnout in non-salient House elections. However, possessing higher than average political resources will mean these voters are likely to participate in some manner. I believe they will choose participatory avenues that are salient to their racial consciousness, even if they come at higher resource costs.

A simple lgistic regression analysis was employed to test whether suburban African Americans do in fact exhibit different participation behaviors than respondents of other races. The logistic regression is appropriate when the dependent variables (in this case **presidential turnout, house turnout, ballot roll-off**, **meeting attendance, posting a political sign, and working for a candidate**) are dichotomous and therefore non-linear. Covariates were included to ensure that any effects are independent of the other demographics historically shown to influence participation.

The dependent variables were all coded on a 1 to 0 scale with 1 meaning engaging in the behavior. The independent variables are as follows: **black –** coded 1 if the respondent is African American, **age** – the respondents actual age, **gender** – coded 1 if the respondent is female, **education** – coded 1 to 17 for the highest grade completed by

the respondent, **income** – coded from 1 (less than $3,000) to 25 (over $150,000), **republican incumbent** – coded 1 if there was a Republican incumbent in the respondent's congressional district, **majority-minority district** – coded 0 to 1 where 0 = less than 40% black, and **black x mmd** – an interaction term between black and mmd.

Results

The results confirm the guiding hypotheses. Table 1 shows the logistic regression analysis for presidential voting, house voting, and ballot roll-off. For presidential voting, we see the control variables move in the expected directions as more resources indicate more presidential voting. Age, education, and income are all positively related to turnout. The effect for suburban African Americans can be found in the **black** measure. The interaction term, **black x mmd** will be 1 if the respondent is black and living in a minority-majority district. As a result, the effect for **black** is for blacks that do not live in majority-minority districts, our proxy for suburban blacks. As expected, there is a positive relationship between suburban black residence and presidential voting. African Americans that reside outside of a MMD are more likely to turnout in the presidential election than suburban whites or African Americans that live in MMDs. There is also a positive effect for blacks in MMDs when compared to suburban whites.

Ballot roll-off is a measure constructed by subtracting presidential turnout from house turnout. If a voter has a negative opinion of the local political environment, or assigns a higher utility to some other form of participation, that individual should be more likely to vote for president but not for a congressional candidate. From the third column of Table 1, we see that indeed suburban African Americans are the most likely of any group to roll-off their ballots. General political resources seem to increase the

likelihood of congressional voting, as age, education, and income are negatively related to roll-off.

Predicted probabilities can provide further representation of these effects. The predicted probability is the probability of participating in a particular activity for a "fictional" voter. It is constructed by evaluating the logistic cumulative distribution function at a certain point based on the coefficients from the regression analysis, holding certain variables at substantive values. For the participation and alternative participation models the predicted probabilities are the probability of engaging in the behavior for a respondent of average age (47.36 years), female, average education (13 years), average income (about $25,000), liberal ideology, and with a Republican incumbent. The graphs vary based on the race of the respondent and the racial make-up of their congressional district.

Figure 1 shows that African Americans in majority white congressional districts have the lowest probability of voting in a congressional election. While the gap in probability is relatively small, blacks in majority white districts have around a six point lower probability (83.2%), of casting a House vote. Furthermore, Figure 2 indicates that African Americans in majority white districts have the highest leel of roll-off, with a 16.7% chance of voting for president but not the House of Representatives.

The regressions in Table 1 show tacit confirmation that suburban African Americans seemingly attach different levels of salience to presidential and House voting, as evidenced in their positive likelihood of ballot-roll off. We can now see if they take the extra step of seeking out (or at least being the most likely to engage in) alternative forms of participation that are more easily directed at their racial identity.

In examining Table 2, we see a mixed effect for political resources, yet race moves in the hypothesized directions. Only education is significantly related to either

attending a political meeting, posting a campaign sign, or working for a candidate. The other resource variables have no significant effect. This finding apparently challenges the idea that more SES resources automatically lead to more participation of all forms. Interestingly, being liberal makes one less likely to attend a meeting. While most of the independent variables did not achieve statistical significance, there is a positive effect for African Americans in majority white districts attending meetings and posting campaign signs. There was no effect for candidate work, though the sign of the coefficient does move in the hypothesized direction.

The predicted probabilities are interesting in that the alternative participation levels of African Americans in majority white districts is very similar to those in MMDs. As hypothesized, there is a large difference in participation rates between black and white respondents in majority white congressional districts. African Americans in majority white districts have a 17.9% probability of attending a political meeting (figure 3) compared to 10.8% for whites. The gap is even larger for posting a political sign (figure 4) with blacks in white districts having a 47% probability compared to only 22.8% for whites.

The results from the regression analysis confirm the theory of this chapter and the project as a whole. We see that suburban African Americans have different participatory behaviors when compared to urban African Americans and suburban whites. They do have positive effects for presidential voting as should be expected because of the assumption that these contests are racially salient. These suburban African Americans are also more likely to roll-off the ballot than urban blacks or suburban whites. It also appears they shift toward more targeted behaviors. Suburban African Americans are more likely to say they attended a political meeting and posted a campaign sign.

HIERARCHICAL GENERALIZED LINEAR MODEL

To explicitly model the environmental effects of demographics on participation and opinion, an HGLM model was employed. As we have seen, the HGLM model is beneficial because it estimates individual level effects, along with the environmental factors that influence the level 1 relationships. Here, the aim is to assess how congressional district socio-economic status levels mediate the relationship between individual demographics and voting.

Level 1 Model

The level 1 models run can be divided into three categories; congressional opinion, turnout, and alternative participation. Each set of models was selected to test particular aspects of the general hypothesis of the chapter. I believe suburban African Americans with high levels of group consciousness will have a less favorable opinion of their congressional electoral environment when compared to other races. When deciding how to expend their scarce political resources, they should derive a greater utility from participatory avenues that are salient to their racial identity. As a result, I expect lower levels of local participation and more group-based behaviors, even if they come at higher resource costs.

Dependent variables in the congressional opinion models include: **House incumbent job approval** (1,0), **House Republican candidate feeling thermometer** (0,100), **House Democratic candidate feeling thermometer** (0,100), **House Republican candidate ideological distance** (-1,1), **House Democratic candidate ideological distance** (1,-1), **vote for House Republican candidate** (1,0), and **vote for House Democratic candidate** (1,0).

Dependent variables in the turnout category include: **presidential turnout** (1,0), **House turnout** (1,0), **House ballot roll-off** (1,0), **Obama vote** (1,0), and **Obama feeling thermometer** (0,100).

The alternative participation variables are: **Blacks get less than they deserve** (1,0), **Attend any political meetings, rallies, or speeches** (1,0), **Wear campaign button, post a sign, or display car bumper sticker** (1,0), **Work for a party or candidate** (1,0), **Contribute money to a candidate campaign** (1,0).

For each of the models detailed above, the independent variables are **gender, age, income, education, black,** and **ideology**. The independent variables are constructed in the same manner as the logistic regressions described earlier.

Level 2 Model

The level 2 models can also be divided into categories. As stated earlier, there appears to be some disagreement in the literature as to how congressional district level variables influence individual level participation and opinion. That higher personal socioeconomic status increases the likelihood of participation is one of the most durable findings in American political science. It is generally believed that higher levels of income and education in the surrounding environment have the same additive effect. However, Gay (2004) finds that having more wealthy and educated neighbors may cause African Americans to lose some of their group identity. This loss of consciousness should change the salience suburban African Americans attach to certain participatory choices. There has also been extensive evidence that the presence of African Americans in majority white neighborhoods increases feelings like racial threat and group competition (Blumer 1947, Bobo and Hutchings 1996). What is not as clear from either

study is whether changes in the makeup of the electoral environment influence the individual level determinants of participation. These particular level 2 variables were selected to begin answering this question.

Variables at the congressional district level were included to test the effects of homeownership (with the belief that more homeowners would produce a neighborhood environment of stability and social investment), household income, educational attainment, and minority population. Three distinct constructions of these variables were modeled to test particular aspects of the proposed environmental effects. At its most general is the **district SES** model where the number of homeowners, district median household income, number of residents with bachelor's degrees, and black population were modeled. To determine whether increases in SES among blacks affects the opinion and participation of district residents the **black SES** model includes the level of African American median income, the number of African American residents with bachelor's degrees, and the proportion of district residents that are black. Finally, **SES differences** models what effect differences in socio-economic status have on participation, and if this effect differs from those in the other two congressional district level models. Selected variables are the differences between white and black median income, bachelor's degrees, and population proportions.

Due to the extensive degrees of freedom needed to estimate slopes and error terms, at both the individual and congressional district level, in the same maximum likelihood model, variables with p-values below .10 were considered statistically significant. The inclusion of an interaction term, as in the logistic regression model

(Tables 1 and 2), was also detrimentally taxing to the model so the sample was restricted to respondents residing in a non-minority-majority congressional district.[14]

RESULTS

Congressional Opinion

A primary goal of this project is to get a systematic understanding of how suburban African Americans view their congressional district's political environment. The lion's share of research on African American congressional opinion was directed at minority-majority congressional districts (MMD). The works of Swain 1995 on descriptive representation and Cannon 1999 on how the size of a district's minority population effects the election of candidates of their choice are two exemplars of the scholarship in this area. Targeting such a population meant the vast majority of respondents came from lower resourced, inner city metropolitan areas. Geographic evidence presented in the introductory chapter suggests that there is a burgeoning population of blacks that are living and voting outside of these metro areas in more affluent, majority white districts. Research has shown that these districts, especially when constructed as a (welcomed) consequence of a minority-majority mandate are Republican leaning. Hence, voters whose racial identification is central to their ideology will not find a reinforcing environment in their daily interactions or political participatory choices. Yet, their higher SES levels will still incline them to participate. Rationally, they should choose avenues that best support their racial identity.

I hypothesize that black suburbanites will have a statistically perceptible negative reaction to most measures of congressional candidate support. I believe that increases in

[14] As stated earlier, this serves as an undesirable, yet unavoidable proxy for suburban residence.

socio-economic disparities where whites outpace blacks will increase this negativity, while a general increase in things like income and homeownership will lessen the negative relationship.

Outside of the campaign, the standing opinion of the respondent to her congressional electoral climate should have strong effects on participation decisions in the election. For all suburban residents there is generally a favorable rating of the current representative's job performance (Table 3). This is not unexpected, as most people have a more positive perception of their congressperson than they do Congress as a whole. There is tentative evidence that Black suburbanites do not share this positive sentiment. In each of the three level 2 models, there is a negative relationship between being a suburban African American and incumbent approval. Unfortunately, in each of the level 2 models, the effect for blacks narrowly missed the specified .10 degree of significance at .11 (SES differences), .13 (District SES), and .20 (Black SES). If we have confidence that this effect is truly negative, especially since it moves in the same direction in each model, we can proceed to assess the influence of the actual district level demographics.[15] We can gain even more confidence in this assumption when the district level variables also move in the hypothesized directions. Higher black median income and a larger share of the district population will strengthen the negative relationship between being black and incumbent approval. Having more homeowners and more educated blacks in the district will lessen the relationship, making African Americans more inclined to support

[15] If we reject this and are not sure if the level 1 relationship between being black and incumbent approval is negative or positive, it is still acceptable to report the environmental effects. If the level 2 effect of black median income is positive, it would amount to saying that increases in income will strengthen (make more positive) the relationship between being black and incumbent approval. The leap, at sometimes smaller than others, is to assume that the level 1 effect is in a particular direction in order to say 'more district income makes blacks even more/less inclined to support the incumbent.'

the incumbent. Higher personal educational attainment also means more incumbent support.

In addition to incumbent approval, feeling thermometer ratings of each House candidate was tested and moved in the established directions (Table 3). Suburban African Americans may find their electoral choices somewhat unsatisfactory, but the simple party label should be enough to engender candidate thermometer support. More nuanced measures like ballot roll-off and ideological distance should show the hypothesized cooler opinion.

While there was no effect for blacks on Republican favorability, the racial demographics of the congressional district do influence feelings toward the Republican candidate (Table 3). In general, most respondents have positive feelings toward the Republican candidate. More homeowners in the district increases the positive slope of this relationship, as do more black bachelor's degrees. Larger population differences lessen the positive relationship. As the literature suggests, higher individual income leads to more Republican support and larger income differences between the races strengthens the positive effect. However, more homeownership lowers Republican support amongst those with high personal incomes.

More homeowners also lessens the generally positive support for Democratic candidates (Table 3). Higher personal education is also positively related to Democratic candidate favorability and more district level education seemingly increases the strength of the correlation. In all level 2 models, African Americans that live outside of a minority-majority district are inclined to have favorable opinions about the Democratic candidates in their elections.

Suburban African Americans may have favorable feelings toward Democratic over Republican candidates, however, this does not mean they believe either candidate

adequately represents them. The 2008 ANES asks respondents to place their ideology on a seven point scale with zero being extremely liberal. They also asked respondents to assess the ideologies of the Democratic and Republican candidates for office in their district on the same scale. By subtracting the respondent's ideology from the perceived ideology of each candidate, we can get a measure of how much each voter thinks the candidates represent their political leanings. The more negative a score, the more conservative the respondent thinks the candidate is.[16] As we should expect, most people think the Republican candidate is more conservative than their personal ideology (Table 4), and having more homeowners strengthens this relationship. More white bachelor's degrees compared to blacks, makes respondents think their Republican candidate is more liberal.

Unfortunately, the crosstabular finding of chapter 3 that suburban blacks with high group identity in the 2008 CCES see their Democratic representative as more conservative does not hold in the HLM analysis of the 2008 ANES. The average voter believes the Democratic candidate is more liberal than their personal ideology, but larger income gaps between the races lessens this perception. In none of the level 2 models does the coefficient for African Americans reach statistical significance. The closest is .281 in the SES differences model (the largest is .689 for black SES). It should be noted that in each model the effect for African Americans is positive. Higher personal education makes the respondent rate the Democrat as more liberal. More black income strengthens this relationship, while larger income differences between whites and blacks lessens the slope.

---

[16] If one's ideology is 4 and she believes the Republican candidate is an ultra-conservative 7, then the score would be -3. If her ideology is 0, then the ideological distance would be at its greatest, -7.

On average most respondents were inclined to support the Republican candidate in their particular congressional districts (Table 4). Higher levels of homeownership strengthen this relationship, meaning the more homes that are owned in the district the more Republican it will become. Interestingly more homes overall makes the district more supportive of the Republican. It is not clear if these two results are paradoxical or whether the highly educated become even more stringent in their opposition as more people with high SES put down roots. Higher individual educational attainment also makes one less likely to support the Republican candidate. More homeownership, median income, and black median income increase this negativity, so more socioeconomic status at the district level strengthens the negative relationship between education and voting Republican. Higher individual level income increases the propensity to vote Republican but having more affluent African Americans in the district makes affluent non-black individuals more likely to support the Democratic candidate, or abstain all together. Overall, suburban African Americans were less likely to vote for the Republican house candidate.

The same relationship holds concerning support for the respondent's House Democratic candidate (Table 5). Being black, and having a higher than average educational attainment makes one more likely to vote Democratic. Having more personal income has a negative correlation and as the income levels of blacks in the district rises this negative correlation gets stronger. This may be evidence that perceived group competition sends voters to their traditional corners. Blacks living in districts where they are heavily outnumbered by whites are even more likely to support the Democratic candidate. This increased negativity associated with wealthy blacks, and black's heightened feelings of minority status may be more evidence of increased group interest motivations in voting.

A summary examination of the congressional opinion shows that most respondents that do not live in a minority-majority district are inclined to support Democrats (or at least not support Republicans) as are African American residents. In general higher personal income indicates more Republican support while higher education inclines individuals to support the Democrats. The effects of level 2 demographics appear to work in different directions depending upon the type of candidate and individual level relationship in question.

Turnout

Now that we have some evidence of how residents in non-minority-majority district congressional districts feel about their representative and candidates, we now assess any behavioral effects. Specifically, suburban African Americans should view the salience of presidential contests differently than those for the US Congress. Since presidential elections are expected to be more salient to highly group consciousness black voters, the general lower opinion and perceived ideological distances toward Congress should translate into lower house turnout and higher ballot roll-off. Overall, the turnout variables moved in their theorized directions.

On average, voters were more likely to say they would cast a ballot in the 2008 presidential race (Table 5). Confirming the established literature, more socio-economic resources also increase the propensity to vote for president. Higher district level education strengthens this relationship. Most voters were also inclined to turnout in the House election (Table 5), and district education seemingly has the same positive effect. Personal income is also positive, however larger education differences between races lessens this slope. More education increases the likelihood of voting for a House

candidate. Interestingly, larger education differences between whites and blacks will make one more likely to vote in a House election, while larger population differences make highly educated voters less likely to cast a house ballot. In the district SES model, African Americans were less likely to vote in house races with a p-value of .153.

The same association holds for the ballot roll-off measure. The majority of respondents said they would vote in both the presidential and congressional elections (Table 6). Higher education differences and more bachelor's degrees for all races at the congressional district level increase the chances voters will skip the House contest. Personal income and education make one less likely to roll-off. However as hypothesized, African Americans drawn out of the MMD are more likely to roll-off their ballots (at a p-value of .158).

Respondents are more likely to vote for Obama (Table 6) and register positive feelings toward the candidate (Table 6). Blacks are more likely than other races to say they will vote for Obama and give positive thermometer ratings. Increases in personal income make respondents less likely to vote for the Democratic presidential candidate. Again, income moves in a Republican direction. Interestingly, the more African Americans seem to gain socio-economically, the lower the district's support for Obama. In the black SES model, we see that higher black household income and educational attainment make voters even less inclined to support candidate Obama. Having more homeowners in the district also lessens the generally positive feeling thermometer for Obama.

In general, we should expect most voters to turnout because of the fairly low costs. There is, at most, an imperceptible increase in these costs to cast a ballot for president and house. That blacks still seem more inclined to roll-off even when accounting for district environments is encouraging for the validity of my theory.

Alternative Participation

Although not technically a participation variable, a regression of our level two models on the traditional racism question, "Do Blacks get less than they deserve?" (see Kinder and Sanders 1996) will allow an examination of whether environmental factors also effect the race opinion differences we have seen in the preceding chapters. As the overall intercepts show (Table 7) respondents generally disagree with this sentiment while more homeownership in the district makes respondents more racially sympathetic. Mirroring the level 1 divergence seen in other measures, higher personal income means one is more likely to disagree with the statement while more education has the opposite effect. African Americans living outside of the minority-majority district are more likely to agree with the statement. The affluence of the district as a whole strengthens this relationship. This result is much like the finding of Hoshchild 1996 where blacks living in more affluent areas, with higher occupational prestige, are solidly liberal on racial issues. Having more educated residents of all races as neighbors makes blacks less agreeable with the statement, providing some confirmation to the finding of Gay 2004.

Measures of alternative participation should confirm that blacks with unfavorable opinions of both congressional candidates and higher propensities to roll-off their ballots are more likely to engage in these more salient behaviors. Logistic regression (Tables 1 and 2) confirmed this hypothesis, and the HGLM will show how changes in congressional district demographics mediates this relationship.

Most respondents said they would not attend a political meeting, speech, or rally connected to any campaign (Table 8). However, African American respondents were more likely to choose this resource costly participation in each of the level 2 models, one

of the few variables to illicit as conclusive a result.[17] Continuing a pattern we have seen in each of the three level one categories, more homeownership seems to increase participation across all individual level demographics. Higher black income and population proportions also make one more likely to attend an event while more education lessens the likelihood. Higher personal income and education makes voters more likely to attend political events and more total income and black income in the district specifically, strengthen this relationship.

Much like event attendance, most respondents said they would not post some type of campaign paraphernalia at home or on their car (Table 8). More total income, black income, and homeownership lessen this negativity. Interestingly, larger income disparities makes respondents less inclined to post materials. African Americans are more likely to post materials, while in an allusion to the racial threat literature, having more total blacks in the district lessens this effect. It is expected that a more prevalent minority status will cause high group consciousness blacks to act in a more adversarial manner. (As evidenced in chapter 2 where these voters said they would be most likely to express divergent opinions.) Increasing the perceived strength of the group may lessen this need. Also, both education and income at the individual level make one more inclined to post materials. However, for education, more homeownership increases the relationship while more homeowners lessens the positive relationship between income and posting.

In a continuing trend, the average voter did not work for a candidate in the 2008 election (Table 8). African Americans on the other hand, were inclined to aid a political

[17] We cannot determine if this participation (in this case what candidate is being supported) is directed in a racially salient way. We do know they have strong racial identities, are more likely to take political cues from self-selecting majority black networks over their workplace or neighborhood, and have less favorable feelings towards House candidates. All of which suggest the racially salient choice will come with the highest utility

candidate though only in the district SES model was the effect significant. Having more black neighbors and more homeownership strengthens this effect. Higher education also had a positive effect at level 1.

In general, respondents did not want to donate money to candidates or to organizations that oppose or support candidates (Table 9), but having more residential stability in the district does dilute this aversion. More educated voters are more likely to donate money to a candidate, and unsurprisingly having high education and living in an affluent district increases this relationship.

	Presidential Turnout	House Turnout	Rolloff
Black	.475** (.23)	-.570** (.28)	.570** (.28)
Age	.028** (.00)	.024** (.00)	-.024** (.00)
Gender	.442** (.15)	.207 (.21)	-.207 (.21)
Education	.332** (.03)	.167** (.05)	-.167** (.05)
Income	.041** (.01)	.033* (.01)	-.033* (.01)
Ideology	.035 (.27)	-.256 (.37)	.256 (.37)
Republican Incumbent	.090 (.15)	-.101 (.21)	.101 (.21)
Majority - Minority District	-.164 (.35)	.059 (.92)	-.059 (.92)
Black x MMD	1.03* (.61)	.496 (.81)	-.496 (.81)
N	1420	1125	1125

Source: 2008 American National Election Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 1: African American Participation Logit



Figure 1: House Vote Probabilities



Figure 2: Rolloff Probabilities

	Attend Meeting	Post Sign	Work for Candidate
Black	.579* (.31)	1.10** (.21)	.549 (.46)
Age	-.003 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.004 (.00)
Gender	-.098 (.20)	.422** (.15)	.684** (.34)
Education	.276** (.05)	.086** (.03)	.166** (.07)
Income	-.008 (.01)	.041** (.01)	-.007 (.02)
Ideology	-1.78** (.20)	-.858 (.24)	-.729 (.55)
Republican Incumbent	.178 (.20)	.219 (.15)	-.296 (.31)
Majority - Minority District	.481 (.56)	.189 (.42)	-14.337 (666.09)
Black x MMD	-.465 (.76)	-.121 (.54)	14.340 (664.09)
N	1420	1420	1420

Source: 2008 American National Election Study
* significant at .10, ** significant at .05

Table 2: Alternative Participation Logit



Figure 3: Attend Meeting Probabilities



Figure 4: Political Sign Probabilities

	Incumbent Approval			House Republican Therm			House Democratic Therm		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	.627** (.07)	.629** (.07)	.641** (.07)	55.205** (1.01)	55.329** (1.00)	55.485** (1.02)	57.952** (.80)	57.913** (.87)	58.140** (.89)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	.419 (.86)	-1.97 (1.95)	-.392 (.46)	18.160* (10.48)	-32.256 (23.74)	-11.353* (6.48)	11.488 (9.81)	42.559 (29.06)	-7.582 (5.80)
Income	.010 (.01)	.006 (.00)	.008 (.00)	.316** (.12)	.396** (.14)	.358** (.13)	-.085 (.12)	-.068 (.10)	-.067 (.12)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	.270** .08)	-.113 (.21)	-.096 (.06)	.280 (1.12)	-3.928 (2.94)	.775 (.65)	2.21 (1.68)	-4.932 (2.74)	-1.541* (.93)
Education	.036 (.02)	.040* (.02)	.046** (.02)	-.183 (.37)	-.342 (.39)	-.255 (.33)	.598* (.34)	.682* (.36)	.551* (.33)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)
Population	.078 (.23)	.459 (.43)	.142 (.14)	6.83** (3.34)	6.410 (8.38)	-2.081 (1.84)	-.788 (4.03)	3.351 (7.46)	.926 (2.12)
African American	-.281 (.18)	-.229 (.18)	-.280 (.17)	-.726 (2.85)	.323 (3.72)	-.930 (2.92)	7.974** (2.62)	7.82** (2.65)	8.785** (2.72)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	2.64** (1.36)	8.03** (3.75)	-2.05* (1.08)	54.796* (32.91)	32.795 (72.23)	-12.904 (20.75)	15.900 (22.92)	59.113 (55.25)	-6.212 (15.19)

Table 3: Participation Opinion

	House Republican Ideology Distance			House Democrat Ideology Distance			House Republican Vote		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	-.114** (.02)	-.122** (.02)	-.110** (.02)	.067** (.01)	.064** (.01)	.068** (.01)	-.443** (.16)	-.640** (.21)	(.)
Homeown	.000** (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	(.)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Education	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Population	.230 (.17)	.308 (.32)	-.095 (.09)	-.036 (.16)	.206 (.48)	-.044 (.10)	.781 (1.61)	-3.22 (5.44)	(.)
Income	-.002 (.00)	-.002 (.00)	-.001 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.072** (.02)	.084** (.02)	(.)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	(.)
Income	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	(.)
Education	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Population	-017 (.01)	.045 (..04)	.007 (.01)	-.002 (.01)	.021 (.04)	.009 (.01)	.100 (.20)	-.676 (.54)	(.)
Education	-.021** (.00)	-.022** (.00)	-.021** (.00)	.012** (.00)	.013** (.00)	.012** (.00)	-.133** (.05)	-.148** (.07)	(.)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000** (.00)	(.)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	(.)
Education	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Population	-.123** (.05)	-.217** (.10)	.031 (.03)	-.012 (.05)	.091 (.13)	-.032 (.03)	-.307 (.47)	-.668 (1.77)	(.)
African American	-.031 (..04)	-.021 (.04)	-.031 (.04)	.021 (.02)	.016 (.04)	.025 (.02)	-2.583** (.48)	-2.771** (.74)	(.)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	(.)
Education	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)
Population	-.122 (..42)	-.878 (.67)	-.140 (.27)	-.189 (.24)	-.378 (.89)	-.170 (.11)	3.87 (3.16)	-4.071 (13.57)	(.)

Table 4: Candidate Opinion / Turnout

	House Democratic Vote			Presidential Turnout			House Turnout		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	.097 (.14)	.182 (.18)	.169 (.18)	1.617** (.11)	1.677** (.12)	1.613** (.11)	2.164** (.13)	(.)	2.204** (.14)
Homeown	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	(.)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	(.)	.000* (.00)
Population	-1.81 (1.81)	5.405 (5.08)	.700 (1.24)	-1.476 (1.32)	.470 (2.92)	.239 (.83)	-1.309 (1.77)	(.)	-.521 (.96)
Income	-.065** (.02)	-.064** (.02)	-.061** (.02)	.038** (.01)	.038** (.01)	.036** (.01)	.042* (.02)	(.)	.048** (.02)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	-.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Population	-.000 (.21)	.353 (.62)	-.248* (.14)	.040 (.12)	-.234 (.36)	.033 (.09)	-.231 (.19)	(.)	.063 (.09)
Education	.101* (.05)	.096 (.06)	.081 (.06)	.341** (.04)	.347** (.04)	.348** (.04)	.172** (.05)	(.)	.180** (.05)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Population	.266 (.54)	1.043 (1.64)	.041 (.44)	-.231 (.38)	.932 (..85)	.029 (.28)	.178 (.47)	(.)	-.574* (.30)
African American	2.377** (.40)	2.385** (.44)	2.450 (.49)	.586* (.30)	.503 (.34)	.625** (.31)	-.548 (.38)	(.)	-.425 (.40)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	(.)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	(.)	.000 (.00)
Population	-3.298 (2.64)	9.608 (10.92)	4.234 (3.00)	1.184 (2.72)	.997 (6.97)	1.274 (1.89)	1.058 (4.73)	(.)	-.084 (2.13)

Table 5: Turnout

	Ballot Roll-Off			Obama Vote			Obama Feeling Thermometer		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	-2.164** (.13)	-2.20** (.14)	-2.204** (.14)	.771** (.22)	.762** (.20)	.784** (.22)	68.175** (1.33)	68.134** (1.30)	68.38** (1.31)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000* (.00)
Income	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	1.309 (1.77)	3.107 (3.56)	.521 (.96)	2.248 (3.41)	6.718 (5.51)	-1.121 (1.49)	12.988 (15.43)	44.731 (33.68)	-7.217 (8.66)
Income	-.042* (.02)	-.036* (.02)	-.048** (.02)	-.036* (.01)	-.038** (.01)	-.037** (.01)	-.199 (.12)	-.162 (.12)	-.208* (.11)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	.231 (.19)	.064 (.50)	-.063 (.09)	-.215 (.24)	-.742 (.50)	.122 (.14)	-2.123 (.1)37	-10.104** (3.14)	1.096 (.79)
Education	-.172** (.05)	-.172** (.06)	-.180** (.05)	-.071 (.05)	-.060 (.05)	-.053 (.04)	-.053 (.35)	-.092 (.35)	-.145 (.35)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	-.178 (.47)	-9.07 (1.26)	.574* (.30)	.926* (.51)	.378 (1.35)	-.378 (.37)	1.979 (3.75)	9.439 (8.57)	1.417 (2.42)
African American	.548 (.38)	.555 (.49)	.425 (.40)	4.448** (.40)	4.479** (.80)	4.498** (.40)	24.07** (3.33)	23.486** (3.27)	23.833** (2.43)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	-1.057 (4.73)	5.793 (10.17)	.084 (2.13)	.501 (6.20)	21.651 (19.25)	1.469 (2.70)	3.752 (34.76)	23.926 (70.22)	-2.031 (13.38)

Table 6: Turnout

	Blacks Get Less Than Deserve		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	-.366** (.06)	-.371** (.06)	-.378** (.07)
Homeown	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	.237 (.73)	1.758 (1.74)	-.380 (.47)
Income	-.026** (.00)	-.025** (.01)	-.025** (.00)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	.016 (.07)	-.170 (.27)	.046 (.04)
Education	.052** (.02)	.050* (.03)	.032 (.02)
Homeown	.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	-.319 (.21)	.105 (.75)	.228 (.17)
African American	.924** (.12)	.979** (.27)	.944** (.14)
Homeown	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	.240 (1.92)	6.097 (5.84)	.735 (1.20)

Table 7: Race Opinion

	Attend Meeting, Rally			Sign			Work Candidate		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	-2.718** (.14)	-2.624** (.13)	-2.707** (.14)	-1.644** (.12)	-1.641** (.11)	-1.647** (.12)	-3.611** (.18)	-3.519** (.20)	-3.511** (.18)
Homeown	-.000** (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	-.000** (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	-.000** (.00)	.000* (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000** (.00)	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	-2.006 (1.33)	-6.53** (3.01)	-.034 (.90)	.594 (1.55)	-3.932 (2.99)	.598 (.90)	-1.128 (1.87)	-6.074 (5.32)	-.931 (1.08)
Income	-.022 (.02)	-.008 (.02)	-.018 (.02)	.043** (.01)	.044** (..01)	.052** (.01)	-.033 (.03)	-.028 (.02)	-.028 (.02)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Income	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	-.098 (.29)	-.638 (.68)	.123 (.16)	.064 (.10)	-.307 (.40)	-.083 (.07)	-.050 (.36)	-.607 (.81)	-.038 (.19)
Education	.354** (.06)	.321** (.05)	.272** (.05)	.106** (.04)	.108** (.04)	.075* (.04)	.889** (.43)	.265** (.09)	.223** (.09)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Income	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000** (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	.631 (.51)	1.367 (1.54)	-.326 (.45)	-.609 (.41)	-.231 (1.15)	.250 (.28)	.230 (.68)	-.394 (2.37)	.101 (.50)
African American	1.015** (.39)	.904** (.35)	1.062** (.34)	1.632** (.24)	1.636** (.31)	1.505** (.26)	.889** (.43)	.826 (.60)	.536 (.42)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	2.135 (3.02)	4.197 (8.31)	.223 (2.04)	-4.76 (2.49)	-3.299 (6.81)	2.654 (1.85)	-10.75** (4.84)	-16.742 (14.92)	5.74** (2.70)

Table 8: Alternative Participation

	Donate Money		
	District SES	Black SES	SES Diff.
Intercept	-2.381** (.12)	-2.302** (.13)	-2.411** (.12)
Homeown	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)	-.000** (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000** (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	1.250 (1.55)	-2.412 (3.62)	-.085 (.93)
Income	.011 (.02)	.017 (.02)	.028 (.01)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000* (.00)
Income	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	.458** (.20)	.204 (.53)	-.285** (.13)
Education	.317** (.05)	.315** (.05)	.252** (.04)
Homeown	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Income	.000* (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Population	.558 (.55)	1.565 (1.48)	-.276 (.38)
African American	.338 (.36)	.290 (.45)	.353 (.38)
Homeown	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)
Income	-.000 (.00)	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Education	.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)	-.000 (.00)
Population	-6.690* (3.55)	.221 (10.11)	3.539 (2.50)

Table 9: Alternative Participation

Chapter 5: The Brave New World

The preceding chapters have shown that suburban African Americans really do live in a brave new world. It is clear that the suburban environment has large effects on the social and political choices its black residents are faced with and exerts a unique influence on their behaviors.

The aim of this project was two-fold. Due to the lack of good, contemporary data on suburban African American opinion, one goal was simply to get a picture of their opinions and political behavior. The other goal was to see if their opinions and social interactions lead to participation in their historic cultural communities and a privileging of group-based political behaviors over those in their local environments. We saw large differences in opinion when compared to white suburbanites, though the gaps were not as large with their urban co-ethnics. These differences extended to social network interactions and, I believe, go a long way toward explaining why suburban African Americans were more likely to engage in group-based and alternative forms of participation when compared to all other voters.

The data provided some confirmation for each of the three hypotheses presented in the introductory chapter, though some chapters received more support than others. In all, it seems that the larger theory of suburban African American behavior is valid and will continue to help explain the political participation of this growing group of citizens.

In the introductory chapter, the data showed who these suburban African Americans are and how close their neighborhoods are from the historic inner-city majority black neighborhoods of major metropolitan cities. In Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, and Chicago, we saw that there are many majority-black precincts located in what are considered majority-white suburban neighborhoods. In each of these areas (assumed to

mirror other multi-racial cities around the country) these majority black suburban precincts are located less than twenty miles from the cultural communities and are oftentimes directly connected to one another by an interstate highway. We also saw that these suburban blacks are sometimes very close to other majority black precincts, yet find themselves drawn out of the minority-majority district and into a white congressional district with a conservative ideology or completely different municipal government. These majority black precincts, majority white neighborhoods, and easily accessible cultural communities are the perfect confluence of environments where one can be in the racial majority of one's street or block, but in an almost perpetual political minority, especially on racialized issues, while group based and cultural activities and institutions are just a short drive away.

Unfortunately, previous studies have not been able to tell as much about suburban African American opinion or political behavior. The surveys that were designed specifically for African Americans had sampling designs geared toward analyzing black behavior generally, regardless of neighborhood. As a result, it was clearly more cost effective to concentrate on respondents in the South and metropolitan inner cities. This means African Americans in areas that are less than five percent black have their opinions weighted-up as much as three times. As we saw throughout the project, this weighting means outliers from majority white neighborhoods have had major influences on what we know about suburban African American's opinion. That said, the close congruence of opinion between suburban and urban blacks in these early studies seemingly persists in surveys that are more recent. For national studies, like the ANES, the sampling designs are geared more towards variables like political ideology and competitive electoral contests than the race of the respondent. While these designs are more geographically diverse in terms of region of the country and neighborhood strata,

they include fewer African Americans and sometimes fail to ask questions about neighborhood, social network interactions, or environmental effects on participation. These differential designs forced me to use multiple surveys in the project, each with a different set of questions and proxies for neighborhood types.

Lastly, we saw the impetus for the project's main research question. Aggregate precinct level data from the 2000 Presidential election showed that majority black precincts found in majority white congressional districts have rates of voting and democratic presidential candidate support equal to those in majority black precincts in the minority-majority congressional district. However, unlike their urban co-ethnics, as the black proportion of the precinct and white proportion of the congressional district increase the precinct voters are less likely to vote in their local congressional election. Finding out the individual motivations behind this paradoxical finding that the voters with the most political resources are voting at lower rate was the major question this project was designed to answer.

Chapter 1 exemplified the need for a project like this, ambitious as it is. The major literatures all have some connection to the theory I have posited of suburban African American behavior, unfortunately, none of the literatures completely deals with these voters in a political manner. The research on suburban residence does not take into account political variables and studies of residential racial effects are often times focused on the feelings of whites. Those studies that deal with the politics of suburban municipalities lack empirical data and rarely incorporate African American issues into their instruments or theories. The latter point is echoed in the social network literatures. The discussions of how network interactions lower costs and increase the likelihood of voting fail to take into account what happens when one is in the ideological minority of their networks, a situation suburban African Americans find themselves in most often.

For African Americans, the literature on black participation rarely has an environmental component or attempts to explain the nuances of African American behavior based on neighborhood type nor resource levels. In addition, the work on historic African American cultural communities and institutions is more rooted in the legacy of the civil rights movement than what effect these communities have on people who do not reside there. Finally, the research on black suburbanites describes the black-belt areas surrounding the historic community in the 1970s and 1980s, areas that are considered inner city today. These studies also contain very little aggregate or individual level empirical data. All of this leads to a state of affairs where an underlying theory to tie all the disparate literatures together appears to be plausible and hopefully the data presented in this project has made a significant step in accomplishing that task.

Chapter 2 asked about the social network interactions of suburban African Americans in majority white networks. The key question was whether these individuals had different opinions from whites in the same networks or blacks in majority black settings and how strongly they perceived these differences. The social network literature shows that people receive behavioral cues and internalize the prevalent norms of the networks they most often encounter. However, when one is in the minority of the network (either demographically or ideologically) the effect can be the exact opposite. I hypothesized that blacks in majority white networks would not only express different opinions than whites in the same networks, but their perception of these differences would hold regardless of individual demographics. The hypothesis was resoundingly confirmed. Blacks in majority white workplaces and neighborhoods had much more liberal ideologies, especially in terms of racialized issues like the level of discrimination in society. Interestingly, blacks from white neighborhoods who attended majority white churches had opinions much like whites in each majority white network, while suburban

blacks in black churches had views more in line with urban blacks in black churches. Whether this is self-selection into particular networks or the effect of group-based norm transmission, the differences are clear. It is also clear that suburban African Americans feel their views are less in line with their neighbors and co-workers than their fellow church or volunteer organization members. This effect holds for all ideologies, incomes, and education levels. Clearly for the suburban African American, the idea that one's most proximate networks should be the main drivers of political behavior does not hold.

What is not clear is whether this minority perception causes suburban African Americans to seek out activities and participatory avenues in the cultural community. As chapter three showed, there is little conclusive evidence that this is the case, though we do know that suburban blacks view their Democratic House candidates as more conservative while all other voters view the candidate as more liberal. This could show that suburban African Americans do not perceive the local electoral environment as receptive to their views.

Chapter 4 proved that suburban African Americans do have different political behaviors than their white neighbors and urban co-ethnics. If these blacks did find themselves in non-reinforcing networks then the prevalent norms should not be internalized. If the prevalent norm is one hostile, or at least lukewarm, toward racial issues, they should seek out networks and participatory choices that reinforce their group consciousness. The data strongly support this postulation. As was found in the aggregate, suburban African Americans are less likely to vote in their US Congress race than suburban whites or urban blacks. Again, their perception of the local electoral environment is very different. Furthermore, these voters are more likely to rank voting and contacting their local representative lower than other types of participation and

instead are more likely to engage in group-based participation like working for a co-ethnic candidate or volunteering for an organization geared toward helping blacks.

As we can see, each of the hypotheses received some confirmation, indicating that they theory proposed throughout the project is strong and worthy of extra study. Oftentimes data limitations and validity issues in the instrument were the major causes of the conflicting findings. What is inarguable is that suburban African Americans do have unique social and electoral environments and these produce unique political behaviors.

Bibliography

Alba, Richard, and John Logan. 1993. Minority proximity to whites in suburbs: An individual-level analysis of segregation. *The American Journal of Sociology* 98 (6):1388-1427.

Alba, Richard, John Logan, and Brian Stults. 2000. How Segregated are Middle-Class African Americans? *Social Problems* 4:543-558.

Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee. 1954. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Billig, Michael. Political Rhetoric. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* ed. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 222-250. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Bledsoe, Timothy, Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman, and Michael Combs. 1995. Residential Context and Racial Solidarity among African Americans. *American Journal of Political Science* 39: 434 – 458.

Blumer, Hubert. 1958. Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position. *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1:3-7.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Franklin Gilliam. 1990. Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment. *The American Political Science Review* 84: 337-393.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Vincent Hutchings. 1996. Perceptions of Racial Group Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context. *American Sociological Review* 61: 951-972.

Branton, Regina, and Bradford Jones. 2005. Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment. *American Journal of Political Science* 49: 359-372

Campbell, Angus, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Canon, David. 1999. Electoral Systems and the Representation of Minority Interests in Legislatures. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24: 331-385.

Carsey, Thomas. 1994. Racial Threat and Partisan Identification. *Journal of Politics.* 57: 221-228.

Ceci, Stephen J., and Edward L. Kain. 1982. Jumping on the Bandwagon with the Underdog: The Impact of Attitude Polls on Polling Behavior. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46: 228-242.

Chong, Dennis, and Reuel Rogers. 2005. Racial Solidarity and Political Participation. *Political Behavior* 27: 347-374.

Clark, William. 2007. Race, Class, and Place: Evaluating Mobility Outcomes for African Americans. *Urban Affairs Review* 42: 295-314.

Cross, William. 1991. *Shades of Black: Diversity in African American Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dahl, Robert. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dawson, Michael. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fischer, Mary. 2008. Shifting Geographies: Examining the Role of Segregation in Blacks' Declining Suburbanization. *Urban Affairs Review*. 43: 475-498.

Gay, Claudine. 2004. Putting Race in Context: Identifying the Environmental Determinants of Black Racial Attitudes. *The American Political Science Review* 98: 547–562.

Giles, Michael and Kaenan Hertz. 1994. Racial Threat and Partisan Identification. *The American Political Science Review* 88: 317-326.

Gosnell, Harold. [1935] 1967. *Negro Politicians; the Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Harris, Fredrick. 1999. *Something Within: Religion in African American Political Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Harris, Jamie and John Zipp. 1999. Black Candidates, Roll-off, and the Black Vote. *Urban Affairs Review* 34: 489-498.

Harris-Lacewell, Melissa V. 2004. *Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk and Black Political Thought*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Haynes, Bruce. 2001. *Red Lines, Black Spaces*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hochschild, Jennifer. 1995. *Facing up to the American Dream*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Huckfeldt, Robert, and John Sprague. 1988. Choice, Social Structure, and Political Information: The Information Coercion of Minorities. *American Journal of Political Science* 32: 467-482.

Huckfeldt, Robert, Eric Plutzer, and John Sprague. 1993. Alternative Contexts of Political Behavior: Churches, Neighborhoods, and Individuals. *Journal of Politics* 55: 365-381.

Huddy, Leonie. Group Identity and Political Cohesion. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* ed. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 511-556. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Jackson, Byran. 1987. The Effects of Racial Group Consciousness on Political Mobilization in American Cities. *The Western Political Quarterly* 40: 631-646.

Joslyn, Mark. The Public Nature of Personal Opinion: The Impact of Collective Sentiment on Individual Appraisal. *Political Behavior* 19: 337-363.

Kaufman, Karen. 2004. *The Urban Voter: Group Conflict & Mayoral Voting Behavior in American Cities.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Key, Valdimer O. [1949] 1984. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press.

Kinder, Donald, and Lynn Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald. Communication and Politics in the Age of Information. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* ed. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 357-393. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

McClurg, Scott. 2003. Social Networks and Political Participation: The Role of Social Interaction in Explaining Political Participation. *Political Research Quarterly*. 56: 449–464.

Miller, Arthur, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk. 1981. Group Consciousness and Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 25: 494-511.

Morris, Aldon. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: Free Press.

Mutz, Diana. 1992. Impersonal Influence: Effects of Representations of Public Opinion on Political Attitudes. *Political Behavior* 14: 89-122.

Mutz, Diana. 2002. The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 46: 838-855.

Nasser, Haya El, and Brad Heath. 2007. More blacks going for suburbs, fast-growing locations. *USA Today*, August 9, Nation section.

Oliver, Eric. 1999. The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43: 186-212.

Oliver, Eric and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 574-589.

Oliver, Eric. 2001. *Democracy in Suburbia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pantoja, Adrian, and Gary Segura. 2003. Fear and Loathing in California: Contextual Threat and Political Sophistication among Latino Voters. *Political Behavior* 25: 265-286.

Pattillo-McCoy, Mary. 1999. *Black Picket Fences*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pattillo, Mary. 2005. Black Middle Class Neighborhoods. *Annual Review of Sociology* 31: 305-329.

Philpot, Tasha S. 2007. *Race, Republicans, and the Return of the Party of Lincoln*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Rosenstone, Steven, and John Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan Publishing.

Schneider, Mark, and Thomas Phelan. 1993. Black Suburbanization in the 1980s. *Demography*. 30: 269-279.

Sears, David, and Nicholas Valentino. 1997. Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Preadult Socialization. *The American Political Science Review* 91: 45-65.

Sears, David, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis. The Psychologies Underlying Political Psychology. In *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology* ed. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, 3-19. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Swain, Carol. 1993. *Black Faces, Black Interests*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tajfel, Henri. 1981. *Human Groups and Social Categories*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vaca, Nicholas. 2004. *The Presumed Alliance*. New York: Rayo.

Vanderlew, James, and Thomas Sowers. 2007. Race, Roll-Off, and Racial Transition: The Influence of Political Change on Racial Group Voter Roll-Off in Urban Elections. *Social Science Quarterly* 88: 937-952.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, and Norman Nie. 1993. Race, Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States. *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 453-497.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Voss, D. Stephen. Beyond Racial Threat: Failure of an Old Hypothesis in the New South. *Journal of Politics* 58: 1156-1170.

Walton, Hanes. 1985. *Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Walton, Hanes, Jr., and Robert C. Smith. 2010. *American Politics and the African American Quest for Universal Freedom*. 5th ed. New York: Addison Wesley Longman.

White, Ismail K., Tasha S. Philpot, Kristin Wylie, and Ernest McGowen. 2007. Feeling the pain of my people: Hurricane Katrina, racial inequality, and the psyche of Black America. *Journal of Black Studies* 37:523-38.

Wilson, William Julius. 1978. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zaller, John. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zuckerman, Alan, Nicholas Valentino, and Ezra Zuckerman. 1994. A Structural Theory of Vote Choice. *The Journal of Politics* 56: 1008-1033.